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ABSTRACT
Deinstitutionalization
:
Accidental Reform or Planning for Valhalla?
(September 1983)
Edward F. Shea, B . A
.
,
New York University,
M.Ed., Bridgewater State College, C.A.G.S.,
Boston University, Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Gene T. Orro
The treatise is a study of the ramifications and outcome of
a social reform movement in mental health resulting from a
non-related political strategy.
While the study focuses upon the geographical decentraliza-
tion of management and fiscal resources in mental health
and human services in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
and its effects upon the popular movement of deinstitu-
tionalization, it concomitantly displays the process and
pitfalls that can occur from unintended social reform
that
is popularized by advertising and political interest,
but
lacks leadership and a philosophical sense of
purpose.
vi
Also included is an examination of the role and development
of mental health community support programs as they have
derived from this non-intent ioned process.
Criticism and concerns over the various contributive and
deleterious influences affecting deinstitutionalization
are reflected by the Review of the Literature and indicate
the urgent need for clear understanding of the issues by
planners, mental health professionals, politicians, con-
sumers, and the general public.
Employing the example of a large catchment area in a state
where decentralization of mental health management and
services were politically mandated, but deinstitutionaliza-
tion per se was not even mentioned, the study presents the
problems of change based upon erroneous public assumptions.
Since the practices in the inquiry are not peculiar to
Massachusetts, it is conceived that the study should have
important implications for other mental health and human
services systems who may be undergoing similar changes for
other unannounced legislative or political designs.
It is not the intention of the inquiry that the phenomenon
of incidental change is either unique or restricted
to
mental health and human services. Nor does it
assume that
vii
accidental or tangential reform is essentially lacking or
bad. However, it does propose that when moralistic factors
are paramount in change, or the assumption of change, "ac-
cident" or " non-intent ioned" can become vitiating variables.
viii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The existing popularity of the so-called deinsti-
tutionalization of services to the mentally ill is seen by
most proponents as a progressive change movement based on
humanistic and moral concerns. Citing the inability and
inhumanity of current practices under the paradigm of the
"medical model," a term which has become a euphemism for
the psychiatric inability to successfully treat and reha-
bilitate psychotic patients, it propounds the circumstance
of community-based care and outpatient treatment as a vi-
able alternative. Contrarily, many educators, psychia-
trists and physicians see deinstitutionalization as an at-
tempt to deprofessionalize those services stemming from an
economy that has rapidly moved from an industrial to a hu-
man services base. Both of these suggest that the movement
is a "topsy" phenomenon suddenly erupting out of a new pub-
lic conscience evidenced by a clamor for radical change.
This dissertation accounts for the two perceptions
in a broader historical change modality that includes an
explication of the two viewpoints, but also proposes that
they may be, as in the case of Massachusetts,
subservient
1
to the actual political cause of the movement, and that
this factor may, in fact, have deprecatory effects on the
goals of deinstitutionalization.
2
The reputed cause and process referred to is, of
course, that involving the decentralization of services and
power to local constituencies. Not only has it occurred in
the field of health services, but it is the theme of the
current federal administration in a platform for dissemin-
ation of responsibilities of many services and governance
to the smallest indicated level such as states, cities,
towns, and communities.
Current thought on the process of reform of mental
health practices and institutions generally centers on a
growing dispair over the lack of success of the medical
model. This study, in presenting a case for deinstitution-
alization not as an intended change process, but as an al-
most accidental effect of the attempt to decentralize man-
agement and resources of services, further suggests that
the reform issue is a secondary factor in accounting for
the multitude of current problems. It also contends that
this perspective better explains the inflated and unreal
political and treatment expectancies that have accrued to
the movement and are currently threatening its progress.
Any assessment of the process of changing the na-
ture and quality of services and programs for the mentally
3ill must examine the emergence and involvement of community
support systems necessary to that process.
There exists a poverty of information about the ex-
act manner in which decentralization influences, abets and/
or detracts from the primary goal of deinstitutionalizing
traditional care systems or as to whether this was its in-
tended purpose. The dissertation examines these areas of
impact of the one process on the other and evaluates the
degree to which that impact facilitates or inhibits change.
Research was carried out in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts at the time former Commissioner Robert Okin's
Five Year State Plan for Mental Health was strongly commit-
ted to the decentralization of services to the community
level. The premise for this commitment was based upon the
belief that came after the political dictate to decentral-
ize power to the various regional constituencies, that:
Decentralization has been the real key to the pro-
gress made in improving mental health care over
the last ten years. There has been a continued
strengthening of the area structure as the primary
administrative unit for the delivery of services.
By the end of 1973, these units were functioning
in almost every area, and in 1975, the position of
Area Director was finally funded. (p. 4)
Historically, there existed within the
Massachusetts Department of Mental Health the typically
centralized administrative policy-making organization at a
commissioner's office and two types of subordinate
4structures regarding the care and treatment of the mentally
ill. The first subordinate organizational structure con-
sisted of state hospitals and their inpatient units. The
second subordinate structure consisted of seven regions in
Massachusetts; and in Region V (southeastern Massachusetts),
seven geographic areas, including Fall River which is pre-
sented as the example in this paper.
Despite what may have appeared to be a decentral-
ized organizational structure, the major responsibilities
and decision-making powers for the seven regions still lay
exclusively in the Commissioner's Office. All monies and
resources were allocated from this centralized authority.
The Commissioner and/or the state hospital superintendent,
supported by the Department's regulations as well as legis-
lative edicts, also determined policies and procedures for
the care of state hospital patients.
However, in 1978, the Massachusetts federal court
consent decree— "Brewster v. Okin and the Commonwealth et
al. "--added another dimension emphasizing deinstitutional-
ization as the essential goal in patient treatment and care.
Until this time, under the mandate for decentralization,
some of the goals of the new change directive had, however,
been accomplished as by-products of the movement.
Under the mandate of decentralization, the locus of
this authority was to be disseminated to the various
5regions; not only for the purposes of bureaucratic effi-
ciency, increased public awareness and community responsi-
bility, but as an attempt to change the character and qual-
ity of care and service.
The general purview of the deinstitutionalization
of services to the mentally ill has been a moralistic one,
perceived as primarily deriving from a growing humanistic
concern over the inefficient, inappropriate and ineffective
methods of treatment for the mentally ill provided by the
traditional hospital based medical models. From this, it
follows that the move towards decentralization directly im-
plied that centralized authority, rather than inept and in-
humane treatment, was in fact the chief factor in the main-
tenance of the outmoded practices.
The hypothesis suggested from this standpoint is
that local authority inevitably is more humanistically and
effectively responsive to the needs of the mentally ill
than centralized governance.
Questions that arise from this hypothesis include:
1. Is community sensitivity in its general dimen-
sion such that there is an awareness and interest in the
problems of the mentally ill?
2. Are local facilities within a given community
sufficient and capable of providing essential services to
such a needy population?
63. To what degree does local involvement facili-
tate the awareness and dimension of the problems?
4. What problems, if any, are endemic to the allo-
cation of funds and resources by the Central Office in
terms of the varying needs of different communities?
5. What guarantee is there that localized respon-
sibility for treatment and care will reflect an improvement
over the traditional centralized system?
In order to address these questions, however, we
must return to the moral variable of humanistic concern.
In the example cited involving the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, this concern has led to legal action for
deinstitutionalizing the mental health system that appended
to, and, at times, disrupted the process of decentraliza-
tion. The most important of the lawsuits involved in this
process was Brewster v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
The resulting "consent decree" is considered na-
tionally as a flagship for deinstitutionalization in mental
health systems. Because of the decree's mandate for the
"least restrictive" treatment of patients, the experiences
of the movement within the state tend to have national im-
portance. Also, within the Commonwealth, a peculiar situ-
ation exists in which the Federal Court ruling has had a
general effect state-wide; and although being legally lim-
ited to the geographic boundaries of the court's
7j ur is t i ct ion
,
has also had a wide range of compliance, in-
terest, and resistance behavior by citizens, consumers,
professionals, Department of Mental Health agency staff,
unions, and the political domain including the office of
the Governor.
The policies for governance and enactment of the
deinstitutionalization process have, as a result, been sub-
ject to a complexity of pressures, vagaries, and departmen-
tal and political, as well as ad hoc local interpretations.
For example, the situation has created a paradox between
the return to or the maintenance of the mentally ill in the
community which was originally perceived as an integral
part of decentralization, and the continuing emphasis upon
the use of state hospitals for care and treatment. Such a
paradox requires an explanation of what deinstitutionaliza-
tion and decentralization were intended to be, and how
they are disparate or complementary.
As previously pointed out, excepting the current
importance of the consent decree, nationwide deinstitution-
alization of the Mental Health system does not represent a
completely new movement. For over a decade, federal legis-
lation, court mandates and increased community involvement
have influenced the move to deinstitutionalize both the pa-
tient population and treatment methods in mental health.
In areas such as Massachusetts where this change
8movement has also been associated with a political and,
perhaps, budget strategy involving community decentraliza-
tion of management and services, the process has led to the
tacit assumption that deinstitutionalization and decentral-
ization are innately compatible. Under these conditions,
it is not alien that decentralization has come to be per-
ceived as a functional dynamic of the deinstitutionaliza-
tion and community mental health process. The study pre-
sented in Chapter VII is of the preparation for and ulti-
mate closing of one unit at a state hospital as a result
of decentralization and its ensuing effect upon the commun-
ity's mental health services and programs.
The Federal Community Mental Health Act (PL 94-63)
which was passed by the Congress in the summer of 1975,
required each state to produce a five-year state plan for
mental health services. Federal financial support for com-
munity mental health centers in Massachusetts was dependent
upon Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) ap-
proval of this plan; and on October 7, 1976, approval was
given
.
The Five Year State Plan also stated:
Our goal is clear. Comprehensive area-based
community mental health services must be
achieved in every catchment area in the five-
year period of the Plan (fiscal years 1977—1981).
Specifically, this is a commitment to ensure that
each area will provide all twelve essential mental
health services as outlined explicitly by the
9Department
,
and in a form which assures accessi-
bility, continuity of service, and quality of
care for each client.
The twelve essential services are: outpatient,
emergency, pre-screening, community inpatient,
aftercare, community residential alternatives, day-
evening treatment, children's, elderly, drug rehab-
ilitation, alcoholism, and consultation and educa-
tion. (p. 22)
Those services primarily related to deinstitution-
alization are community inpatient (deinstitutionalization
of state hospital patients with referrals to the inpatient
service of the community mental health center), community
residential alternatives, and aftercare (community support
programs with case management). Many problems, however,
were created by the decentralization of procedures and
responsibilities. Significantly, the necessity of estab-
lishing a network of community support programs was not
initially conceived in the plans for decentralization.
Basic but critical examples of the problems lie
within the following categories: Organizational changes
which include concomitant questions related to decision-
making; accountability; autonomy and methods of providing
services; staffing, especially related to the union-
management contract; support costs as related to budgetary
systems within the Commonwealth; contracting of services,
quality assurance; litigation; and advocacy.
The heart of the treatise is the examination of
decentralized services and management responsibility as a
10
means towards deinstitutionalization as well as community
support programs as vital components to its success. Also
examined is whether there are actually provided, as claimed
by proponents, earlier and easier access to care, the cre-
ation of minimal disruption to personnel support systems
(such as family and employment) and the ensurance of great-
er continuity of care. Of utmost importance and relevance
is the assertion that such a process is socially signifi-
cant regarding the human and civil rights of the clients
as citizens.
Limitat ions
The effects of this study are limited to mental
health systems where decentralization has been a major
factor in deinstitutionalizing traditional mental health
care systems.
Another limiting factor is the time sequence. In
some systems, decentralization has resulted out of the
commitment to deinstitutionalize. While in the situation
explored in this dissertation, the chronology is reversed.
The author has not explored the various possibilities and
ramifications that the change in the order of these occur-
rences has had on the process. However, in the federal
mental health acts of the 1960's, the implication for both
11
decentralization and deinstitutionalization is apparent.
Also, in examining the reasons and history of de-
centralization of mental health services, I have, of in-
tent, eliminated any in depth discussion of other decen-
tralization endeavors such as the state's right movement,
and political and emotional genesis, in order to maintain
the specific focus of this subject.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In studies completed by Pollack and Taube (1975)
and Redick (1973), it was summarized that in 1955 about
fifty percent of psychiatric admissions in the United
States were in state mental hospitals as compared to twenty
percent in 1971. To be found in the same references are
statistics which indicate that between 1963, the year of
the Presidential message on mental health, and 1972, the
residential population of state hospitals decreased by
forty-five percent (from 505,000 to 276,000).
Dr. Leona Bachrach (sociologist) has been an ardent
student and researcher of the deinstitutionalization process
within the nation over the past several years. Following
are some of her conclusions regarding "Informational issues
and accountability" (1976). She stated that "the vagueness
of the term notwithstanding, deinstitutionalization is con-
notative of a sociological process." The same author re-
lated to sociologist Kingsley David's (1949) definition of
an institution as a "set of interwoven folkways, mores, and
laws built around one or more functions" (p. 71). She con-
cluded that an institution may be viewed in two different
12
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ways
:
As an established place, such as a long-term care
mental hospital, or as an established set of social
patterns, such as the totality of artifacts and
practices society has adopted for the care of its
mentally disabled population. It is in the latter
sense that the term deinstitutionalization, when
used in reference to the mentally ill, has greatest
value. It implies the breakdown of a social system,
of established patterns of social control which de-
termine how the mentally ill should be viewed, what
their status in society is, what rights and obliga-
tions society has in reference to them, and what
rights and obligations they have in reference to
society. (p. 2)
In this assessment, the term deinstitutionalization will be
used primarily in the popular sense within the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts' Department of Mental Health's Region V;
that is, the orderly transfer of patients from Taunton State
Hospital /Corrigan Community Mental Health Center's Inpatient
Units to community-based programs with community support and
aftercare services. Bachrach continued by reflecting that:
Effective and conclusive research has lagged in
the deinstitutionalization movement. Even the ex-
tent to which community-based facilities and mental
hospitals tend to serve the same or different pa-
tient populations is not yet known. Reports on this
matter show conflicting results. In order for real-
istic and effective program planning to take place,
it is first essential to identify the population
which is to be served and then to ascertain whether
the target group(s) are being reached. It is also
necessary to have ongoing evaluation studies to
provide the feedback necessary for planning and im-
plementing modifications in programs already in pro-
C0SS
Many of the follow-up studies already conducted
have shown substantial percentages of released pa-
tients who could not be located in the community.
Thus, many follow-up studies are based on samples
which are biased by the exclusion of patients who
14
could not be contacted. The inability to locate
individuals for follow-up studies is, of course,
a reflection of the inability to locate them for
purposes of pursuing prescribed treatment courses.
The question of what actually happens to pa-
tients who leave mental hospitals and reenter the
community is largely unanswered. Although many
follow-up studies will varying degrees of sophis-
tication in design are reported in the literature,
their results are largely inconclusive in any broad
sense. For the most part, these works have very
limited replicability and generalizability
. There
is a need for more follow-up studies of mental pa-
tients after their release into the community and
these studies should have comparability and gener-
alizability in order that meaningful decisions re-
garding community-based care can be made. In short,
we need accurate, standardized information regarding
out present systems of care in order to make just
and rational decisions regarding future allocations
of scarce mental health resources.
Deinstitutionalization has often proceeded with
such rapidity that there has hardly been time to plan
carefully for community-based programs with a view
toward meeting special needs and overcoming special
problems of target groups. Issues of acceptability
and inaccessibility of services have often been over-
looked in the haste of implementing new' programs.
(p. 4)
Becker and Schulberg (1976) noted disenchantment
with the deinstitutionalization movement and resistance
to further change:
The vast majority of patients currently cared for
in state hospitals could be adequately treated in
the community if a comprehensive spectrum of psy-
chiatric services and residential alternatives
were established. The failure to establish this
network of community services before the discharge
of thousands of patients has discredited the dein-^
st itut ional izat ion programs in many states. (p. 256)
In the mid 1960's, considerable uncertainty and
controversy arose among planners, administrators and
15
clinicians regarding the future role of the public mental
health hospitals. Hoch (1964) stressed that a hard core of
schizophrenic and organically ill patients would remain,
who would continue to require the services of the large
mental health hospital. Although the responsibility might
remain with these hospitals, it remained unclear how they
could best care for them.
It was thought that many types of patients such as
those exhibiting bizarre behavior, antisocial individuals
and the seriously depressed and suicidal would not be suit-
able for community care. It also became evident that fed-
eral construction and staffing funds would provide little
more than seed money. The initial federal funds, there-
fore, would allow the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to
construct only a few. The Dr. John C. Corrigan Mental
Health Center in Fall River was one.
Schulberg and Baker (1975) related that:
The manner in which existing mental hospitals would
be utilized in community-oriented programs consti-
tuted one of the most profound and controversial
challenges to comprehensive planning. Advocates of
federally funded community mental health programs
asserted that the program's purposes included re-
placement of the existing mental hospital system
with an alternative system which would provide ser-
vices more effectively and reduce iatrogenic chron-
icity. (p. 11)
The same authors also stated (1975);
As is often the case in the formulation of compre-
hensive health plans, fanciful theoretical arguments
16
about the mental hospital's future role yielded tothe exigencies of financing, manpower and politics.
(p. 26)
Studies of the mental hospital as an organization
or community (Belknap, 1956; Caudill, 1958; Stanton &
Schwartz, 1954) highlighted the manner in which organiza-
tional characteristics affect treatment practices and pa-
tient care. The studies emphasized the need to modify such
problematic practices as confused channels of authority and
responsibility, opposing therapeutic orientations among
different categories of personnel and fixed roles in the
hierarchy
.
Organizational schemes for accomplishing goals of
unitizing State Hospitals have evolved over the past two
decades. Snow (1965) and Rowitz and Levy (1971) have de-
scribed several different patterns. Of utmost significance
is that the principle of decentralized authority for patient
care is a focal and constant ingredient in each pattern.
In the Kansas mental hospital organization during the early
1950's, patients were randomly distributed among each of
the sections. Ten years later, however, the Clarinda Plan
(Garcia, 1960) and the Kansas Plan (Jackson & Smith, 1961)
specified that each unit or section of the hospital should
serve a specific geographic community and to accept all ad-
missions from the area. These plans were forerunners of
the catchment area concept presently an integral part of
17
the 40 Massachusetts Department of Mental Health Areas,
specifically in Region V. As suggested by Brill et al
.
(1963), individual units could serve a specific geographic
area. The prevailing opinion within the 1960’s said that
units should be responsible for a designated community.
A key factor as presented by Schulberg and Baker
(1975) is the reality that:
It is widely recognized that procedures for im-
plementing a unit plan must be considered within
the context of modified staff functions since
the changed role of the department head and
other personnel is a major initial difficulty
in the transition from a centralized to a decen-
tralized facility. A unit plan cannot be imple-
mented by edict alone. We first must deal with
complex personality and role factors. (p. 143)
Chapter VI
,
Unitizing the Mental Hospital by the same au-
thors
,
includes descriptions, explanations and opinions of
Boston State Hospital's unitization process in the mid-
1960
' s. The overwhelming size of the State Hospital,
with thousands of patients and staff as well as large
physical plants, had produced an organization in which
centralized hierarchical control was maintained over most
of the institution's activities. As the State Hospitals
grew in size and complexity, decentralization was pro-
jected as an administrative strategy for responding to
unexpected or urgent problems.
18
The authors further contend that (1975):
Although it is possible to define relatively
clearly the manner in which each of the essential
services in a community mental health program
should be provided, the organization of these
elements into a comprehensive system is a far
more formidable program. (p. 249)
A national study by Schulberg and Baker (1975) of
relationships between mental hospitals and Community
Mental Health Centers found that:
Only minimal cooperation and staff exchanges oc-
curred between these two types of psychiatric
facilities. Maximum interaction occurred when
both the mental hospital and the Community Mental
Health Center operate under public auspices, a
formal affiliation agreement exists between them,
and the facilities are less than 45 minutes trav-
veling time from each other. (p. 196)
It has been recognized, particularly during the
past two decades, that the effective operation of a men-
tal health program requires the participation and coop-
eration of a number of psychiatric disciplines. Studies
of the interaction patterns and the issues created by
them were reported by Stanton and Schwartz (1954) and
Zander, Cohen and Stotland (1957). They found that al-
though the mental health professions commonly value close
19
teamwork, they also are organized in a definitely hier-
archical manner. The authors further attest that psychia-
trists, because of certain legal requirements and tradi-
tional practices, have the superior position and supervised
the activities of other professionals who often perceive
themselves as subordinated. Hirschowitz (1973), in anal-
yzing the application of the team concept, has observed
that this work pattern is sustained by a series of myths,
one ol which is that in team decision-making--there is a
democratic process. He maintained that in reality, every
team in a psychiatric setting actually has a hierarchy of
power and influence—notably the physician-psychiatrist
because of his/her status and "medical responsibility."
A study performed by Emery and Trist (1965) resulted
in findings that society may be viewed as moving from the
one extreme in which conditions affecting program develop-
ment were relatively placid and randomly distributed— to
the opposite extreme in which even more complex interconnec-
tions and fluctuating forces confront organizations with
turbulent environments. The turbulence has been created by
expanding scientific and technological developments, by
changing societal values, by altered professional domains,
and perhaps most notably, by people's growing aspiration to
control rather than to be victims of their surroundings.
20
Community mental health center environment has been dras-
tically altered and enlivened by psycho-pharmacological
successes, by society's increased tolerance for mental ill-
ness, by the growing use of nonprofessional personnel, and
by expanded citizen roles in determining program priorities.
During turbulent periods, however, survival and continued
organizational autonomy are dependent upon an ability to
generate sophisticated plans and strategies for obtaining
goal consensus and relevant resources.
The philosophy of mental health care which has been
predominant during the past decade has embraced the goal of
avoiding hospitalization whenever possible and is further
supported by (Schwartz, 1971) who referred to the "replace-
ment of custodial philosophies by therapeutic ones" (p. 68).
Because institutionalization is perceived as banishment from
society (Rusk, 1972) and is also viewed as fostering regres-
sion among patients (Herz, 1972), there follows a strong
feeling that providing services on a local level with ade-
quate and appropriate community support services should re-
place a state hospital admission. There appears to be a
substantial amount of statistical evidence, also, that sub-
stantiates the philosophy that hospitalization begets more
hospitalization. Selected examples are provided in:
Anthony et al
.
(1972), Buell and Anthony (1973), Fontana
and Dowds (1975), Franklin, Kittredge and Thrasher (1975),
21
Kirk (1976), Rosenblatt and Mayer (1974), and Schwartz
(1971)
.
Since the beginning of the 1970's, there has been a
prominent, simultaneous, emerging development
—the introduc-
tion of short-term, crisis or interventional services for
citizens in need of psychiatric care in local communities
(Caffey, Galbrecht & Klett, 1971; Herz, Endicott & Spitzer,
1975; Rhine & Mayerson, 1971; Schwartz, 1971; Schwartz,
Weiss & Miner, 1972; Walker, Parsons & Skelton, 1973; and
Yarvis, 1975).
Such services have been historically linked with
emergency care in general hospitals where patients' immedi-
ate future regarding treatment is determined within a matter
of several days. An alternative to general hospital emer-
gency admission in community mental health includes the
utilization of respite care admission up to 48 hours in a
mental health center such as exists in Fall River. The al-
ternative to a respite care admission is intervention at a
community crisis hostel with a disposition made of the cli-
ent's needs within three days. Options at the time include
referral to either a partial hospitalization program, a day
treatment program, a day activity program with outpatient
counseling and the possible inclusion of the medication
clinic. An individual service plan (ISP) is developed re-
garding the client's needs and goals. If the plan so
22
indicates, a case manager is assigned to the client and a
further referral could be made for consideration of place-
ment in one of the established group homes or supervised
apartments
.
Changes in treatment patterns have occurred, accord-
ing to Feldman (1974), "not because our patients are really
any different, but because we are" (p. 20). Hersch (1972)
points out that what may simply be labelled "the times" may
be characterized in one of two ways—either as an era of
social-political conservatism or as an era of social-polit-
ical reform. The former favors a view of problems as having
their bases in individuals, while in the latter, the focus
of problems is the environment. Accordingly, the former's
emphasis for improvement is on changing the individual; the
latter has greater weight placed upon modifying the environ-
ment. The deinstitutionalization movement, according to
Bachrach (1976), "is clearly the outgrowth of an era of
social-political reform" (p. 6). Greenblatt and Budson
(1976) wrote of the "rise of social psychiatry in planning
for ways and means of serving all the cit izens--without re-
gard to race, color, creed, or ability to pay" (p. 137).
Rutman (1976) provided a rather strong statement
regarding modern care of the mentally disabled:
Several basic issues underlying the concern for
community-based, as opposed to institutional care
for the mentally disabled, should be noted at the
outset. First, a major proportion of all persons
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now in mental institutions, or those who will behospitaliized in the future, neither need nor ben-
efit from long-term extended inpatient care.Second, there is reliable evidence that patients
who remain in institutions for extended periods
experience a variety of debilitating effects, andthat the cumulative results of long-term confine-
ment, a condition of state often referred to asinstitutionalization, is more damaging to the per-
son s mental health and well-being than the problem
which required entering the hospital in the first
place. Finally, for large numbers of present and
future hospital patients, return to normal social
functioning can only be accomplished if there are
developed a variety of community-based residential
facilities which can provide an atmosphere in which
such persons can feel secure and accepted by peers,
can improve skills of daily living, and can be helped
to find their niche in the normal environment. (p. 2)
There is a copious amount of literature which at-
tests to deplorable physical conditions and quality of care
and treatment with the resulting dehumanizing effect on
patients in state mental hospitals. At the same time, the
literature presents a sizeable number of articles strongly
opposed to the manner in which thousands of mental patients
have been "deinstitutionalized." Most of the references
refer to the term of deinstitutionalization as merely dis-
charging or releasing patients to the communities to fend
for themselves with little or no community support services
or programs as a continuum of care and as a prevention of
inpatient admissions.
Examples of opposing views to community mental
health, and of a more conservative ideology and concern,
appear to be as numerous as those proponents of
deinstitutionalization. Steinhart (1973) suggested that
the pendulum may have swung too far in the direction of
community care when he wrote:
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The original theme of keeping patients at home
whenever possible has become ritualized into keep-
ing patients completely out of the state hospitals,
and even keeping them out of any mental hospital.
Unfortunately, there are times when patients need
to be hospitalized, whether in a state hospital or
elsewhere. (p. 326)
Rieder (1974) maintained that "the state mental hospital
system and the patients in it are in danger of being
'phased out’ without any effective alternative source of
care being available" (p. 10).
Slovenko and Luby (1974) stressed that:
Mental patients are going from the frying pan into
the fire. Under the guise of civil liberties, the
state mental hospital has been transported to the
inner city. It is true that many persons in insti-
tutions have been dehumanized through neglect and
the failure of society to meet their needs; but
the second wrong of turning them back into a so-
called community will not make it right. In today's
world, neglect in the community dwarfs neglect in
the hospitals. (p. 225)
Additional references detailing the plight of dein-
stitutionalized mental patients in the community include:
Allen (1974), American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees (1975), Anderson (1974), Becker and
Schulberg (1976), Chase (1973), Crane (1974), Greenblatt
and Glazier (1975), Lamb (1975), Malloy (1974), Reich (1973),
and Reich and Siegel (1973).
Wolpert, Dean and Crawford (1974), in a paper
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presented at the National Institute of Mental Health, wrote
about a large number of deinstitutionalized patients living
in rooming houses in a section of San Jose, California.
The authors maintained that there was ample evidence of in-
adequate community facilities for discharged patients' fur-
ther rehabilitation, recreation or other support system.
Bachrach (1976) commented that "the deinstitution-
alization movement has, since its inception, been character-
ized by a polarization in attitudes" (p. 7). In describing
the polarization process as found in sociological theory,
Bachrach quotes Davis (1949):
Necessarily public issues tend to be phrased in
dichotomous terms—e.g., war or peace, protection
or free trade, prohibition or saloons. This does
not mean that each problem has only two facets
but simply that public action can best be mobil-
ized when there are only two sides. The most com-
mon formula is the "for or against" statement.
Often, the individual is not on either side in a
completely unqualified sense, but the heat of pub-
lic debate and the necessity of mass action reduce
the problem to its lowest common denominator, the
simple dichotomy--the final solution is often one
that practically nobody actually desires but which
represents the ultimate outcome in the struggle of
conflicting pressure groups— a struggle in which
the weapons of distortion, intimidation, censor-
ship, misinformation, and irrelevancy play impor-
tant parts. (p. 359)
The literature indicates, as preceding examples have
presented, that until the mid-1970's, most authors have ad-
hered to the "for or against" statement: the hospitals
should be closed for "X" reasons as compared to "Y" reasons
why they should remain open, usually with improvements
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because of failures in so-called community mental health.
Dingman (1974) opined that suitable facilities to transfer
the dependence on state hospitals do not exist, and that
Comprehensive Community Mental Health Centers are inherit-
ing many of the defects of State mental hospitals and there
is little point in planning to transfer functions to them.
Bachrach (1976) presents a very meaningful and as-
tute observation regarding what she calls A Taxonomy of the
Issues of Deinstitutionalization
. The author wrote of
eight major groupings of issues related to the topic as
follows
:
1. The selection of patients for community care;
2. The treatment course of patients in the com-
munity
;
3. The quality of life of patients in the com-
munity
;
4. The effect upon the greater community;
5. Financial and fiscal issues;
6. Legal and quasi-legal issues;
7. Informational issues and accountability;
8. Additional issues resulting from the process
of deinstitutionalization itself.
Bachrach emphasized that the ingredients as pre-
sented have been separated only in theory. She states that
the factors are completely intertwined and that the system
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of care of the mentally ill in this society is character-
ized by an integration of its elements. Though this dis-
sertation emphasizes holism, each of the intertwining eight
issues has also been addressed on an individual and selected
basis
.
Albeit there are numerous references which are, for
the most part, critical of deinstitutionalization—especial-
ly related to Bachrach's intertwining issues--this writing
is an attempt to address decentralization issues related to
deinstitutionalization and to specific negative aspects by
indicating positive results and methodology while at the
same time acknowledging failures, weaknesses and the reasons
for such, with recommendations for means of overcoming any
shortcomings
.
Mechanic (1975) lamented that Community Mental
Health Centers found it easier to focus upon assisting those
clients with less than psychotic disorders as an adverse
consequence of expanding community mental health services
in the 1960's.
Rutman (1976) pointed out that there must be an ex-
panded and more elaborate plan to provide a range of treat-
ment services for patients in the community.
Place and Weiner (1974) reported in a follow-up
study that:
The most glaring deficiency of mental health ser-
vices is the lack, if not total absence, of
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programs designed to provide discharged patients
with the practical skills needed to function in
an ordinary community. (p. 46)
Kirk and Therrien (1975) indicated concern for that
which they regarded as the fate of the chronically ill pa-
tients who have been discharged from mental hospitals, or
who have not been admitted to such hospitals, and who are
residing somewhere in the community. The needs, they main-
tain, have been ignored because the clients are considered
as undesirable and because community services cannot pro-
vide treatment programs. Presenting a continuing concern
about community-based mental health aftercare services, the
authors questioned further the lack of coordination in com-
munity treatment services. They felt that community ser-
vices which satisfy the needs of the clients should be the
responsibility of a single person and agency in an advocacy
role. The same authors related that we do not know enough
regarding effective community treatment. They further
maintain that use of psychotropic drugs is only a partially
effective treatment, and only as a beginning.
According to Bachrach (1976), "the issues of frag-
mentation and lack of coordination (in community mental
health aftercare programs) are among the most widely and
heatedly discussed in the literature" (p. 12). Additional
references addressing the controversy of aftercare include:
Gittelman (1974), Grenny and Crandell (1973), and Horizon
House Institute (1974, 1975).
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Accessibility of treatment services appears on
nearly every evaluative vehicle regarding community mental
health programs. There is concern by some authors that
services may be less accessible to mental patients because
of limited hours of service at a community-based facility.
01 greater time, distance and financial resources necessary
to travel to such facilities. Feldman (1974) listed three
components of accessibility: geographic, financial and
psychological. Psychological accessibility, it is felt,
requires that community mental care be aggressive. It can-
not be assumed that because treatment facilities exist, pa-
tients will automatically use them. Further discussions
of accessibility issues are found in David, Dinitz and
Passamanick (1974); Mannino, Rooney and Hassler (1970); and
Mechanic (1975).
Allen (1974) and Hoshall and Friedman (1975) had
concerns that former patients were getting less than opti-
mal treatment in the community. The same concern about
quality of care in community services and programs was in-
dicated by Crane (1974) and Scheff (1976). These authors
saw a heavy reliance on psychotropic drugs, at least at
times, to the exclusion of other treatment modalities.
Quality of life of patients in the community re-
garding community support programs and adequate residential
facilities and living arrangements has also been an
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important issue regarding deinstitutionalization. Bachrach
(1976) states:
Although the various alternative living arrangements
such as halfway houses, homes for the aged, boarding
homes, nursing homes, residential hotels, etc.,
which have been designed for the housing of mental
patients in the community, have often (in specific
instances) been found adequate and even preferable
to hospital residence, most reports indicate that
on a widespread basis they usually have fallen short
of the desired goal of providing a humane environ-
ment. (p. 13)
Many references address the problems of living arrangements
and residential facilities within the community. Several
works are: Cumming (1975); Davis, Dinitz and Pasamanick
(1974); Deasy and Steele (1976); Edelson (1976); Heinemann,
Yudin and Perlmutter (1975); Mannino and Shore (1974);
Schulberg, Becker and McGrath (1976); Sheppard (1976); and
Thompson (1975).
Community resistance and opposition to mentally ill
individuals returning from the hospitals appears in a great
deal of literature. The common theme throughout is twofold
the clients are not usually welcomed and attempts at pre-
vention of their return to community-based residences in-
clude zoning codes, city ordinances regarding licensure,
safety and building codes; and that living in the community
for many can be as disabling, frightening and isolating as
living in the institutions. Pertinent references covering
the issue of community resistance include: Aviram and
Segal (1973), Farina et al. (1974), Greenblatt and Glazier
y
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(1975), Horizon House Institute (1975), Ochberg ( 1974 ),
Ordnoff (1975), Piasecki (1975), Rutman (1976), Segal
(1975), State of Michigan (1974), and State of New York
(1976)
.
Within the past several years, there have been a
number of references pertaining to financial and fiscal
matters associated with community care. Examples are:
Macht (1974), Murphy and Datel (1976), Peterson (1976), and
Sharfstein and Nafziger (1976). Specifically relevant to
this paper in an unpublished paper—Holmes and Rassias pre-
sented a process for fiscal and personnel decentralization,
(see appendix)
However, opinion relative to cost-benefits of com-
munity mental health care remains divided. The difference
basically refers to whether community care is less or more
expensive than institutional care. According to Kirk and
Therrien (1975), the knowledge to make accurate cost assess-
ments is simply not available. The authors refer to hidden
costs assumed by other community agencies such as police,
courts, welfare, and general hospitals who are often called
upon to assist in dealing with former inpatients. Arnhoff
(1975) suggests that after considering the intervening var-
iables, the actual cost-benefits of community treatment are
far less than its advocates proclaim.
Legal issues in the Fall River Area include legal
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advocacy, civil rights, human rights, licensing, quality
assurance, and area based forensic services.
Ennis (1975) related that:
Courts have always been concerned to some extent
with the legal rights of persons facing involun-tary commitment to a state institution for the
mentally ill or mentally retarded. But until very
recently courts have refused to look behind insti-
tution doors. It is, literally, only in the pastfive years that courts have begun to consider the
rights that patients retain inside such institu-
tions once they are there lawfully. The rights
that have become the focus of that examination
include the following: the right to treatment;
the right to refuse treatment; the right to pro-
tection from harm; the right to be paid of insti-
tution-maintaining labor; the right to be treated
in the least restrictive setting and in the least
restrictive and intrusive manner; the right to a
free lawyer to resolve problems resulting from and
problems separate from institutionalization; the
right to a nonremovable limitation on the permis-
sible period of involuntary institutionalization;
the right to decent living conditions, including
the right to regular outdoor exercise, adequate
clothing, and adequate medical care; the right to
a public education regardless of the degree of
mental handicap; and the right to meaningful no-
tice, not just notice of these and other rights.
(p. 83)
Advocacy for such rights has followed former pa-
tients to the community. Legal issues have become more
important than ever, on a daily basis, as a part of the
quality of care of all Fall River Area patients.
The question of former patients becoming a physical
threat within the community was raised by Bachrach (1976)
who referred to several authors when she stated, "one ma-
jor focus in this area (of legal issues), which has lately
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become the target of vigorous debate, is the matter of 'dan-
gerousness- (p. 15). Zitrin (1976) reports that records of
discharged patients from the Bellevue Hospital catchment
area show criminal arrest rates, including rates for violent
offenses, that are higher than corresponding rates in the
community. Langsley, Barter and Yarvis (1976) asserted
that mental health professionals are not good predictors
of dangerousness. The significance of such a focus in the
Fall River Area is relatively negligible. One must attempt
to clarify "dangerousness." The literature predominantly
refers to or implies "dangerousness to others." Being "in
danger to self" is a different issue and one which is
raised in our area system much more frequently. Additional
references regarding legal issues are: Dix (1976),
Flaschner (1975), Langsley and Barter (1975), McDonald
(1974), McGarry (1976), Sehder (1976), Slovenko and Luby
(1974), and Stone (1975a, 1975b).
Ordnoff (1975) emphasized:
Institutionalization is a dehumanizing process
where the patient's individuality is lost, his
self-concept greatly lowered, and in many cases,
his ability to make even the simplest life de-
cisions seriously impaired. With this in mind,
the goal of any community residential program
must be to reverse the process. (p. 222)
Slovenko and Luby (1975) interjected that, "funda-
mentally, the need that must be faced is the establishment
of programs to meet the needs of people whether they are in
institutions or in the community" (p. 196).
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Bachrach (1976) Indicated that:
The time has come to face the issues of deinsti-
tutionalization squarely so that the movement can
achieve its promise—select ion of a patient popula-
tion or target group follows from an agency's under-
standing of its raison d'etre. But if it is unclear
what functions are to be transferred from the mental
hospital to the community, it must also be unclear
which patients should be served in the process.
With this recognition can come modified planning
and action.
A major shortcoming of the deinstitutionaliza-
tion movement, one which has clouded the issues and
confounded investigative efforts, has been the ten-
dency of persons connected with selected community
programs to reason inductively that the entire move-
ment is "working," when obviously this is not always
the case. (p. 22)
Arnhoff (1975) presented:
That reform movements often create more problems than
they solve has been noted, and the task of each suc-
ceeding generation is to correct the excess of the
last. There comes a time when reformist zeal must
be matched against available data, and while the
humanistic goals may persist, the paths to them must
be modified. This clearly is overdue for the field
of mental health. (p. 127)
Bachrach (1976) further suggested:
If the deinstitutionalization movement is to proceed
more effectively, it would seem that a first step to
take is to define precisely in the light of accumu-
lated experience, what are the targets for the move-
ment. Precisely which patients are to be deinstitu-
tionalized? What patients do we mean when we talk
about providing community care? Do we mean all per-
sons in mental hospitals, or do we mean only those
who, by virtue of specific demographic or diagnostic
characteristics they possess, may be assigned to some
localized experimental program? Do we mean patients
who are hospitalized primarily for lack of other
places to go— i.e., inappropriate hospitalization?
Or do we mean only those patients who might be con-
sidered "good risks" for rehabilitation via the com-
munity route. (p. 24)
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Bachrach's comments and reference to "deinstitu-
tionalized patients," though informative and relevant in
the general context, places the patients as the focal target
of the de ins t i t u t i onal iz at ion process. This, however, is
not the concept as proposed here. Though deinstitutional-
ization has as its primary thrust the removal or movement
to the communities from state mental hospitals or their
patients, that which accompanies the progression entails
more from a systemic point of view and is essential to an
evaluation such as presented in this dissertation. Any
study of deinstitutionalization has to include the transi-
tion from that which was the traditional hospital or medical
model and related components to a holistic community mental
health program.
At the other extreme, community mental health plan-
ners need to understand that hospitalization does not, as
some have suggested, and according to Adams (1975),
signify the failure of alternative methods of care.
There is a need to reassess the functions which are
known to be served by mental hospitals and to de-
termine without prejudice those which are not like-
ly to be fulfilled in community settings.
CHAPTER III
DECENTRALIZATION
Psycho-Social Impact
While the focal impact of decentralization was pur-
ported to be upon the decision-making process with the in-
tent of increasing local control over the meeting of service
needs for the various communities, a belief developed out
of fatuous campaign promises by eager political candidates
that it would also reflect a financial saving for taxpayers.
This conviction was supported by a universally growing sup-
position that the bureaucratic structure of centralized
control was not only inefficient but excessively expensive.
This belief, in turn, created the expectancy that
local governance bodies would not be a miniature emulation
of the central authority structure. They would instead be
smaller in size, have greater sensitivity to local needs,
and narrow the gap between the perception of the needs and
the delivery of services to meet them.
The envisionment
,
while it suggested a dissemina-
tion of decision-making powers, did not imply a change so
radical that one could legitimately expect a total revamping
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of the institutionalized concepts of services and treatment
for the mentally ill. However, the architects of the decen-
tralization mandate did not calculate the wide-ranging
change-effects of the increased community involvement at the
direct service level which occurred as an inherent, but un-
expected, product of the original concept. Certainly, the
state's commissioner and central office mental health plan-
ners, as well as supportive politicians had not anticipated
the meteoric clamor for radical change in terms of the de-
professional izing of services and treatment and the closing
of mental hospitals. The contiguity of these change pro-
cesses made it inevitable that they be linked or associated
in terms of the single goal. It is in this manner that we
can account for the essentially unstated implicit belief
that in mental health systems the process of decentraliza-
tion was in fact a function of the deinstitutionalization
of the system. From this view the derivation of community
support programs (CSP's) and greater community responsibil-
ity was of course an indicated development.
If one is to accept these assumptions, then the idea
of a current vitality for deinstitutionalization of mental
health programs and treatment as a radical change process
dictated by humanistic concerns and ineffective treatment
practices is an erroneous conclusion.
At a time when the government is more concerned
about the cost of its abilities to deliver adequate
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services to the mentally ill than to the problems and change
needs inherent to those services, the tendency has developed
to attach noble humanistic concepts to the movements without
regard for indicated contradictions to the change. There
are countless examples of discharged and/or community-based
mental hospital patients who have been "lost" or "fallen
through the cracks," maladjusted on medication with inhu-
mane side effects. There has been an incompatabi li ty of
the deinstitutionalization movement through alleged decen-
tialization to moral treatment due to the lack of a concep-
tual and philosophical base.
Definition and Strategy
From the viewpoint of management and planning in
human services, decentralization usually refers to the pro-
cess by which systems design decision-making powers, ser-
vices and fiscal responsibility are disseminated from a
central government authority to the various regions, dis-
tricts, catchment areas, or communities under its jurisdic-
tion
.
While the benefits and results expected of decen-
tralization vary from one jurisdiction to another, the
ultimate effectiveness of the process depends upon its
ability to elicit the "actual" or "felt" needs of a commun-
ity as a guideline for services as opposed to the projected
39
or assigned needs derived by professional planners from
demographic data.
According to Schulberg and Baker (1975),
Decentralization, as a strategy for coping with
changing needs, has been thought to produce any
or all of these benefits: (a) giving autonomy
to the work level at which organizational goals
can best be operationalized; (b) permitting prob-
lem-solving through prompter and more knowledge-
able action; (c) allowing greater organizational
flexibility in transactions with the environment;
(d) requiring less complicated and precise sys-
tems of organizational coordination; and (e)
creating a more personal social climate for lower-
level managers and workers because of the more
meaningful roles assigned to them. Along with the
benefits of decentralization, it has also been
recognized that if a viable system is to be main-
tained, special effort is required to integrate
the decentralized components. The organization as
a whole can exist and be effective only to the ex-
tent that autonomous subsystems relate to each
other, while a proliferation of uncontrolled sub-
systems will lead to devisiveness and ultimately
organizational dissolution. (p. 196)
However, the expectations for decentralization as
defined here became greater than what could be expected
from the method for coping with changing needs as perceived
by Schulberg and Baker. The process was verily considered
as: (a) a strategy for conferring the power of decision-
making on local communities; (b) allowing local communities
to have fiscal responsibilities for allocation of funds;
(c) allowing local communities to plan for services accord-
ing to their individual needs; and (d) to deinstitutional-
ize the treatment and care system by minimizing the author-
ity and participation of treatment professionals.
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The Massachusetts "Five Year Plan" referred to in
the introduction follows Schulberg and Baker in intent.
However, at this stage, it is not written or implied in any
of the documents that the procedure was focally intended to
deinstitutionalize or radically change the thinking and
methodology of mental health care. But as the community
assumptions in (a) through (d) above emerged and began
their influence, it became obvious that the concept of
changing needs might in fact be secondary to the concept
of a radical systems change.
Background
Historically, the development of general health ser-
vices at community levels as mandated by the federal or
state government has been without or with extremely limited
autonomy regarding fiscal control and a policy /program
decision-making process.
In most, if not all cases, these community health
services and "self-help" programs, such as those generated
by the Office of Economic Opportunity (0E0) in the early
1970' s, followed strict guidelines directing a program lo-
cation, how it would be set up and operated, and defined
the target population to be served. Organizations with
such titles as Community Development Service Centeis and
Citizens for Citizens, through federal grant funding became
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operational by 1973.
At approximately the same time, with legislative
approval, the Department of Mental Health established area
offices and forty area directors throughout the Commonwealth.
In many areas, attempts to begin or expand community mental
health programs (other than inpatient) in tandem with those
other agencies, in order to provide a comprehensive health
care delivery system were thwarted because of one or more
of the following reasons: (a) the target population identi-
fied for services by the agency governed by federal guide-
lines was not compatable with those clients selected by the
state mental health agency which had more flexibility in
the process of identifying clients' needs; (b) the state
mental health agency was not sufficiently decentralized in
terms of fiscal and personnel autonomy which would allow
for a shift in or additional resources to provide direct
care "outreach" professionals to the other health care
agencies. Only consultation and education could be offered,
and again only if enough trained personnel could be spared
from other duties; (c) in my opinion, it was believed by
many health agencies that there was a stigma attached to an
association with public mental health. The latter, there-
fore, would remain a separate health care entity for refer-
ral purposes; and (d) my opinion also relates to the ques-
tion of "turf" on the part of the health related agencies
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private as well as federally funded. There were attitudes
and actions, both covert and overt on the part of agency
management which would lead one to believe that at least
some of the organizations were fearful of losing their
identity and therefore the loss of their role and life sup-
port funding, should they become a part of a human services
network or "umbrella." There were also examples which
would indicate a more cooperative spirit, at least on the
surface. They only existed, however, when an opportunity
arose for a health care agency to participate with the De-
partment of Mental Health in a joint effort to acquire ad-
ditional funding through a state or federal grant.
Issues and Problems
Throughout the early 1970' s, informal attempts were
made in many areas or communities to develop a viable or-
ganization and working relationship solely among the public
or state human service agencies on a decentralized basis.
General apathy, cancelled meetings, lack of attendance,
representatives of top management in attendance with little
or no authority to commit the respective agency on issues,
etc. are several reasons why the movement failed. Some of
the same reasons for the failure as presented earlier re-
garding private or federally funded agencies were also per-
tinent to the relationship between the state agencies.
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In spite of this experience, the Executive Office
of Human Services, under the governor of the Commonwealth,
during the latter part of the 1970 's mandated that at each
area level, through the philosophy of decentralization,
specific state agencies such as Mental Health, Public Wel-
fare, Office for Children, Division of the Blind, and the
Rehabilitation Commission develop what was called "area
strategy." Public Health and Education were excluded from
the mandate for unexplained reasons; except by law in
Massachusetts, the Department of Education, the State Col-
lege and University Regents, and Trustees enjoy autonomy.
Timelines and guidelines in the form of directives
beginning with periodic meetings of area agency management
were imposed for establishing such goals as: the identifi-
cation of a target client population, inter-agency collab-
oration, needs assessments of the areas’ population, and
an inter-agency client referral process. Once more after
two years and again for most of the same reasons previously
presented, the efforts ended in a "paper shuffle" with
nothing meaningful accomplished.
Earlier efforts in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
to decentralize, unify and coordinate the services and pro-
grams of its human services agencies at each area level were
equally unsuccessful. Between the years of 1972 and 1974,
the Secretary of the Executive Office of Human Services
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( EOHS ) had as his major goal the establishment of a decen-
tralized area network of human services provided by the
relative state agencies under the administration of an
"Area Director for Human Services." Because of one major
factor encompassing attitude, fear, and reluctance, if not
outright opposition to the endeavor, the goal was never
achieved
.
That single most important factor designated earli-
er in this chapter was the total lack of sharing or giving
of expertise, identity, control, role, and eventually the
fear for survival. I feel that opposition was evident at
the community level to establish such a network; but I also
believe that the major reluctance began at the central or
Commissioners' offices of the designated state agencies.
CHAPTER IV
DE INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Concept and Definition
In contending that the current verve and process of
deinstitutionalization of Mental Health services was not
the primary intention of decentralization in the Common-
wealth but a spin-off effect that has been accentuated by
subsequent legal and administrative action, it becomes nec-
essary to explicate the role of centralization in the pre-
vious care and treatment practices. These service proce-
dures, generally under the supervision of physicians and/or
psychiatrists, are defined as the "medical model." However,
in order to understand the impact and role of this model
and its influences in services to the mentally ill, we must
take recourse to a historical perspective.
In the nineteenth century, largely out of the spe-
cific efforts of a religious and social reformer—Dorthea
Dix, and as a general component of a reform movement that
also involved the abolition of slavery, prison reform, and
women's suffrage, the state hospital movement began as an
attempt to give humane and effective treatment to the insane.
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In Mental Health, this period and movement is known as the
moral treatment era." The same state hospitals that are
today the target of reform were originally designed them-
selves as the cutting edge of a change process.
These early state hospitals were patterned after
the private hospitals in Europe, under the influence of
Philipe Pinel
,
where it was demonstrated that humane treat-
ment was not only more satisfying to administer, but more
effective than the chains, blood-letting and purges of tra-
ditional medical practice. Learning his new treatment
methodology from the non-medical supervisor of the hospital,
Pinel used his own behavior as a role-model approach to his
patients. The "asylums" or "retreats" where this practice
was implemented were conceived as essential respites from
the rigors and demands of society where under acceptance
and comraderie the patients were allowed to experience and
explore other ways, besides madness, of "being-in-the-
wor Id .
"
Unfortunately, a series of untoward events resulted
in the virtual destruction of the moral treatment movement.
By the late nineteenth century, state mental hospitals in
the United States had grown in size and number, but the
quality of treatment and care had deteriorated. Several
unrelated factors were responsible for this decline. First,
too little money had been appropriated by the states to
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maintain the quality of care. Secondly, training programs
had not been established to produce the number of skilled
employees needed to continue the practices. In addition, a
growing antagonism for the foreign-born people had developed
as a consequence of increased immigration, and these numbers
of poor and distraught "aliens" became overly represented in
the state hospitals. As an unpopular group, it was diffi-
cult to incur public support or get legislators to designate
funds for their treatment. Meanwhile, the profession of
psychiatry was developing as a specialty of medicine, and
humane "moral" treatment could hardly be considered as medi-
cal character. In order for psychiatrists to develop and
maintain some respectability among their medical colleagues,
the pressure to find organic causes and organic treatments
became irresistable
. As medical schools became the locus
of psychiatric training, the few earlier psychiatrists that
had been interested and involved in moral treatment found
no one to replace themselves. This was essentially the end
of the "moral treatment era" which reflected a growing op-
timism, a belief in the human's perfect ability rather than
our predestination, and the first attempt to "deinstitution-
alize" the injurious beliefs and practices that once again
surround the existence of the mentally ill.
Today's medical model, based upon disease, diagno-
sis, hospitalization, and cure has proven as ineffective as
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those practices that age rise to the moral reform. The
successful return of mentally ill patients to the society
was significantly higher in the mid—nineteenth century than
it is now despite all the sophisticated medical practices
of diagnoses and drug treatment. In the current movement,
it is as much this proven incapacity as well as the resul-
tant inhumanity of the medical model that has become the
target of reform.
From this situation, one major hypothesis and sev-
eral sub-hypotheses can be derived as to the process, ef-
fect and outcome of deinstitutionalization. The major
hypothesis is that deinstitutionalization is essential to
effective and humane treatment and care of the mentally ill.
Sub-hypotheses include:
1. Deinstitutionalization in mental health can be
accomplished through decentralization.
2. Deinstitutionalization in mental health can be
accomplished through altering or replacing the medical
model in therapeutic care.
3. Deinstitutionalization in mental health can be
accomplished by the depopulation of state hospitals and
stopping the warehousing of patients.
4. All of the above, either together or individu-
ally, are essential to successful deinstitutionalization.
5. None of the above, either together or
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individually, can make an effective or desirable change.
In the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the method,
problems and dynamics of community reentry of chronic men-
tal patients under a court mandate for least restrictive
treatment constitute deinstitutionalization. The generally
accepted definition of "deinstitutionalization" is the one
presented by Scherl and Macht (1970) who state that it is:
A process involving first, the avoidance of remote
settings for the care of the mentally ill, includ-
ing preventing both unnecessary admission to and
retention in institutions; and second, the concur-
rent expansion of community-based services for the
treatment of the mentally ill.
While there is nothing mutually exclusive in the two defi-
nitions, there are problems which are endemic to
Massachusetts and similar systems within the study of this
dissertation
.
The rationale for deinstitutionalization proceeds
from at least three fundamentals and largely untested phil-
osophical assumptions. In deinstitutionalization, it is
assumed that community-based care is preferable to insti-
tutional care for most, if not all, mentally handicapped
persons; that communities not only can, but also are will-
ing to assume responsibility and initiative in the care of
the most severely handicapped; and that the functions per-
formed by large institutions can be equally well, if not
better, performed in community-based facilities.
Deinstitutionalization is basically a social
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protest movement. Like other civil rights protests, it is
committed to improving the lot of persons who are perceived
as helpless in gaining access to life's entitlements. It
is a movement dedicated to the dignity of the individual.
Both progressive reformers and fiscal conservatives
have in the past endorsed the philosophy of deinstitutional-
ization. It has been widely assumed that community-based
care for the mentally handicapped is not only better than
institutional care, but also is cheaper— an assumption not,
as yet, borne out by most research results.
Deinstitutionalization strategy begins with plan-
ning for patient discharge and undergoes a series of ser-
vices and programs in a continuum that hopefully ends in
communitizat ion of the patients in a residential framework
of living with support services that approximates the ideal
of the least or less restrictive setting for effective
maintenance and treatment.
Institutionalization and the State Hospital
The mandate of those who attend to the mentally ill
has always been shaped by the social, economic, religious,
and philosophical temper of the times. In no case is that
effect more clearly illustrated than in the history of the
institutional segregation of people who have been labeled
"mad" or "insane."
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The movement toward institutionalization started
with the growth of secularism in the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries. As the power of the churches waned, so
did the view that disturbed behavior was a symptom of being
possessed by demons to be dealt with by exorcism or death.
In its place came the belief that deviant behavior was a
reflection of moral turpitude to be best managed by disci-
plinary measures and segregation from society. Institu-
tionalization replaced witch-hunting, but the basic objec-
tive continued to be to protect society rather than to care
for the individual.
It was not until the rise of "moral treatment" ad-
vocated primarily by Philipe Pinel at the Hospital
Salpetriere in Paris early in the nineteenth century that
concern for the welfare of the institutionalized person
competed with concern for the protection of society. As
inhuman living conditions and harsh punishment began to
give way to a more humane approach, there was growing in-
terest in understanding the nature and causes of disturbed
behavior from a medical perspective. Concepts of illness
replaced concepts of social deviance and medical treatment
became the new rationale for institutionalization.
The movement begun by Pinel led to a climate of
concern and reform in the United States which w'as centered
in Boston and Philadelphia. The first state initiative in
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this country was a bill filed in the Massachusetts General
Court for the "safekeeping of lunatics and persons furious-
ly mad." No action was taken on the bill until 1829 when
Representative Horace Mann moved that it be taken from the
files and referred to a committee of which he was Chairman.
Mann directed a state survey to determine the number of
mentally ill citizens and the conditions of their confine-
ment. Armed with the results of his survey, Mann argued
that these people required special care and treatment, not
incarceration. He called upon the state to purchase a site
and erect a hospital capable of accommodating 120 patients.
In 1830, Governor Levi Lincoln signed into law a "Resolve
for Erecting a Lunatic Hospital"; and three years later in
1833, the first state mental hospital in the United States
opened in Worcester. From 1833 through 1905, overcrowding
was kept to a minimum because many mentally ill citizens
were cared for in city and county almshouses. In 1905, the
Legislature passed the State Care Act which directed the
state mental hospitals to assume responsibility for all
mentally ill patients. As a result, the patients who pre-
viously had been cared for in almshouses were transferred
to state institutions and overcrowding became a serious
problem. The influx of immigrants, a number of whom were
placed in the hospitals because they did not have other
means of support, exacerbated the already rapid growth in
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patient population. Hospitals were filled beyond capacity
and became huge custodial asylums. Many were under—staffed
and poorly maintained. Individualized treatment was vir-
tually impossible since existing resources were necessary
to furnish custodial care. This lack of rehabilitative
services prevented the early discharge of patients and fur-
ther contributed to overcrowding. This produced an aging
population of institution-dependent patients.
Historically, the mental health services provided
by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts were institution-based.
Large institutions were built in remote locations in the
state as well as many extensive farming operations. By
1932, the state had built 11 mental hospitals. A series
of boards and commissions oversaw the care of the mentally
ill until 1938 when the Department of Mental Health was
established by the legislature.
History
After World War II, social, economic and medical
developments prompted a reassessment of the delivery ol
psychiatric services. The rejection of large numbers oi
young men from military service on the ground ol diagnosed
psychiatric disturbance had made the country aware ol the
prevalence of mental disorders and of the lack ol adequate
resources for prevention or treatment . Ihe new awai eness
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led to more funding of research and training programs in
the area of mental health. Then came a major medical de-
velopment: the widespread and effective introduction of
anti-psychotic drugs in the early 1950's. The possibility
arose that thousands of patients previously considered
manageable only within the confines of an institution could
now be treated as outpatients. That possibility increased
the growing pressure for the development of comprehensive
programs of community—based treatment. The pressure was
further augmented by the desire of state legislatures to
reduce the financial burden of state mental hospitals.
Instrumental in the caretaking of the mentally ill
was the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). The
federal agency was established in 1948 as a result of the
National Mental Health Act passed by Congress in 1946 which
supported research, training and services. In 1955, Con-
gress, through the Mental Health Study Act, authorized the
Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health to conduct a
nationwide analysis and reevaluation of the human and econ-
omic problems of mental illness. Of significant relevance
to the result of this review was the Joint Commission's
urging in January of 1961 that the treatment of mental ill-
ness be reintegrated into the mainstream of community pro-
gramming .
The Conference of State and Territorial Mental
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Health Authorities and the Governors' Conference passed
resolutions in 1962 strongly urging allocation of funds to
enable development of comprehensive state planning efforts.
As a result of the recommendation, the 87th Congress, with
the support of President Kennedy, appropriated 4.2 million
dollars in the 1963 NIMH budget. The funds were to be used
for aid to states for financing comprehensive mental health
planning at the state level.
During that same year, the major recommendation of
the Joint Commission were incorporated in the 1963 Commun-
ity Mental Health Centers Act (Public Law 88-164) whereby
Congress authorized federal assistance for the construction
of centers which would provide at least the following five
essential services for citizens residing within their geo-
graphic or "catchment" areas: inpatient and outpatient
care, emergency services, partial hospitalization, and con-
sultation and education.
The move from hospitalization to the community
placement and aftercare of mentally ill patients remains
the focus of nationwide mental health services. The dein-
stitutionalization process has been pursued with varying
degrees of success and failure which has ranged from out-
right victimization of a powerless patient group to the
recompensation and socialization of chronic patients for-
merly considered beyond help.
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Nationwide planning for new processes and programs
for the care of institutionalized mentally ill citizens to-
wards comprehensive community mental health services began
in the period of 1963 and 1965. During these two years, 50
states were involved in analyzing public and voluntary pro-
grams, and reports resulting from the efforts to establish
community mental health programs were submitted to the
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) for funding.
Prior to 1966, when Massachusetts passed its own
community mental health legislation— the comprehensive
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Services Act (Chapter
735)--very little in the way of publicly funded community
mental health services was available. With the exception
of the Massachusetts Mental Health Center and a scattering
of child guidance clinics, the only si, ate supported mental
health programs were 11 state mental hospitals housing over
17,000 patients in overcrowded, under-staffed conditions.
By and large, the seriously mentally ill had no alterna-
tives to state hospitalization.
The 1966 legislation, which was developed and en-
acted as a consequence of a major two-year federally-funded
planning effort, committed Massachusetts to a new area-
based framework for the delivery of mental health services.
Chapter 735 has indeed been the legal and philosophical
basis for deinstitutionalization and community mental
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health development in Massachusetts. As the community al-
ternatives to state hospitalization have multiplied, the
state hospital census has declined dramatically from about
17,000 in 1966 to less than 4,000 in 1980. Three state
hospitals have closed: Grafton (in 1963), Foxborough (in
1975), and Gardner (in 1976).
Role of State Hospitals
Nationally, the public mental hospital population
decline began, as is now well-known, with the introduction
of tranquilizing drugs in the mid-1950's. Although these
drugs allowed some mentally ill persons to resume relative-
ly normal lives in the outside world, their major effect
was to reduce the bizarre behavioral and thinking patterns
that made most psychotics inaccessible to other forms of
therapy
.
The quality and quantity of such available therapy
varies dramatically from state to state and hospital to
hospital. Some hospitals utilize treatment plans tailored
for each individual. The plan may include a discharge date
set as a target to work toward. Individual or group psy-
chotherapy sessions may be held two or three times a week,
and there are often opportunities to participate in recre-
ation and craft programs. If all goes well, the patient
is prepared for discharge planning through counseling,
prevocat ional training, and perhaps an interval of living
in a halfway house.
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But psychiatrists who have evaluated state hospi-
tals around the country report that it is still easy to
find the use of seclusion and/or mechanical restraint, in-
appropriate drug prescribing, lack of proper monitoring of
drug-dose levels, and inappropriate use of electroshock.
Massachusetts' state hospitals have not been spared
attacks by unions, legislators and various advocate groups
regarding the care and treatment of the patients.
During the latter months of 1979, there was a
series of outcries, investigations, news reports, and a
legislative hearing related to a number of deaths and the
improper use of seclusion and restraint in the Common-
wealth's mental hospitals.
On October 3, 1979, the Taunton Gazette reported
that the District Attorney's office was investigating three
deaths, of a "suspicious" nature, at Taunton State Hospital
since mid-July. On October 10, 1979, The Boston Globe
stated that the State Secretary for Human Services had or-
dered Commissioner of Mental Health Okin to investigate the
recent deaths of patients who had been placed in seclusion
and/or restraint in state institutions. Okin, in an inter-
view, said "There is no question that the level of care in
our state hospitals is very inadequate."
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In one editorial in the Taunton Gazette, October
12, 1979, it was stated that:
Someone should turn some serious attention to the
way health care is being provided for the mentally
ill-
• • • These incidents (deaths) happening as
they did should be alarming for they raise serious
doubts whether adequate care and treatment are be-
ing provided to patients in the state's mental in-
stitutions
.
During an interview reported on October 30, 1979,
former Commissioner Okin stated that "Corrective plans have
already been completed on three of the situations and that
some changes, primarily in ward organization and in-service
training have been implemented." Okin further noted the
radical shift in the number of inpatients at state hospi-
tals in the last 13 years—a decrease from 17,000 in 1966
to a current census of 2,639. He said "To properly address
needs of the remaining patients, a group that needs partic-
ularly intensive treatment requires development of complete-
ly new modes of mental health service delivery."
A Boston Globe editorial, November 4, 1979, opined
that
:
Excessive medication and involuntary restraint have
become routine practices as deinstitutionalization
has progressed. The "best" patients are now out in
the community, and new professionals coming into the
mental health field gravitate to the innovative com-
munity programs. Left behind in the state hospitals
are the hardest-to-handle patients and an "old
school" staff. These patients, totally dependent
upon the care of others, did not suddenly appear.
It is rather late in the day to be developing "new
modes" of service delivery.
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Dr. Okin, nevertheless, persisted as the Commis-
sioner in urging system changes. In testimony before the
Senate Panel chaired by Senator Jack Backman on November
29, 1979, he called for a radical transformation in the
way treatment is provided to the mentally ill and the role
of the state mental hospitals. He said:
Second class treatment is virtually guaranteed as
long as this treatment continues to be provided
in large, remote, antiquated and understaffed state
hospitals, which are completely divorced from the
mainstream of the community's general health care
system. Both patients and staff are victimized by
the working conditions of public sector state men-
tal hospitals. These conditions include non-com-
petitive staff salaries, enormous difficulties in
recruitment and retention of staff, significant
understa-f ing of the wards, the constraints of
civil service, the inability of state hospitals
to influence the collective bargaining process,
and the undesirable antiquated physical facilities
in which patients must live and staff must work.
The staff who stick it out under these conditions
are some of the most heroic and dedicated people
in the entire human service system.
Despite these
nificant progress has
improving the quality
He cited:
difficulties, Okin stated that sig-
been made over the last few years in
of life for state hospital patients.
1. A 35% increase in the relative staffing of
the wards.
2. A replacement of the many unlicensed phys-
icians who had been practicing medicine at the state
hospitals for the last 30 years. Four years ago [he
stated]
,
there were many unlicensed physicians in
our hospitals. Today only fully licensed physicians
are permitted to practice medicine in these facili-
ties .
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3. A 50% decrease in the total amount of seclu-sion and restrain used by state hospital staff, de-spite an increase in the overall number of difficultpatients
.
4. A 35% decrease in the annual death rate at
state hospitals. [Okin added] Despite this progress
and notwithstanding further improvements which haveto be made in the state hospital system, if we are
to do any more than tinker with the problems whichbeset these facilities, we must establish an alter-
native system of mental health inpatient services
in peoples' home communities.
It would appear that the Massachusetts Department
of Mental Health, under the former Commissioner, would have
virtually closed the remaining eight state mental hospitals
had he received the unanimous support of the legislature
and the private psychiatric and general hospitals. An
agreement negotiated by Okin and signed by representatives
of four powerful private and public health groups in the
spring of 1979 would have led to treatment in general hos-
pitals for most of the patients served each year by state
mental hospitals. The agreement was signed by the
Massachusetts Hospital Association, the Massachusetts
Psychiatric Society, and the State Department of Public
and Mental Health. Dr. Okin called for inpatient services
in local hospitals for acute treatment of all patients ex-
cept the extremely violent which would give the state an
opportunity to end the presence of what he called a "two
class system" in treatment of mental patients.
In his remarks, he made no mention of the chronic-
ally mentally ill. It could be assumed that in his "Five
62
Year Plan” for deinstitutionalization (1977-1982), which
included community placement in nursing homes and in a var-
iety of group residences for the chronic population, prob-
lems of a significant nature would not be encountered.
Regarding Okin's reference to the "extremely vio-
lent" patients, it might be further assumed that either
through the courts and the Massachusetts correctional sys-
tem or the Department of Mental Health this population
would be "cared for." The difficult to manage mental pa-
tient was referred to by Okin, at the time, as a "Tier 3"
patient who would require a secure setting
—
previously
referred to as "locked wards" in the state hospitals. In
the fiscal year 1981, DMH budget (July 1, 1980 to June 30,
1981), there was serious consideration and financial fig-
ures compiled for "capital outlay" expenditures (construc-
tion or renovation) in Region V for the hospitalization of
the "violent" patient. Such "treatment" facilities in
southeastern Massachusetts, if approved, would have been
at the Pocasset Community Mental Health Center on Cape Cod
and at the Corrigan Community Mental Health Center in Fall
River
.
Another mental health responsibility for the chron-
ic elderly and infirmed populat ion--the geriatric popula-
tion—would have been transferred to state public health
hospitals according to the former Commissioner's objectives.
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In a radio interview on March 16, 1980 at Boston
radio station WBBF
,
Okin summarized his philosophy and
goals as specified in his ’’Five Year Plan" related to even-
tually closing the state hospitals. In rather simplified
terms, he listed three categories of patients who could be
cared for by other means than a state hospital:
1. Clients for which there is no need for hospi-
talization who could utilize alternatives such as day
treatment /day care, group homes, supervised apartments,
crisis hostels, etc.;
2. Clients who need short-term acute care who
could be treated in local general hospitals; and
3. A small number who would need a back-up psy-
chiatric facility such as a Department of Mental Health
community mental health center.
However, it is Talbott's opinion (1978) that des-
pite deinstitutionalization, the state hospital remains,
and will continue to be
,
a major element in the service
delivery network for the chronically mentally ill. He
further suggests that if our efforts to treat this popu-
lation are to improve, we need to have a better understand-
ing of the successes and failures of both the state hospi-
tal and the numerous efforts that have been made to sup-
plant it. The author stated:
Beyond this, the state hospital as a prime example
of government medicine provides a point of reference
64
fOr "F 11 + 11 T»o rrf\vnv.nm «„4. l ^ i
the
for
Since the character and fate of state hospital s re-
main emotional issues which have produced wide polarized
thinking, theoretically we have the "conservative" choice
of leaving state hospitals as they are or of following one
of several possible courses as presented by Talbott (1978):
a "reformist" solution by drastically altering the charac-
ter of state hospitals; a "radical" solution by closing
them altogether; or a "pragmatic" alternative of develop-
ing new roles for these institutions.
Advocacy and Litigation
Because, historically, mentally ill residents of
public institutions were subjected to extraordinary neg-
lect, overcrowding and abuse, from time to time crusading
reporters and political reformers, would expose the inhuman
conditions in institutions. But these periodic exposes
never generated enough pressure to fundamentally change
conditions. Advocates for change did not have a strong
political base, and the changes they sought threatened
great disruption. The system had been stable throughout
this century because for most Americans, the system worked.
Institutional warehousing of the mentally ill (and the re-
tarded) was relatively cheap. It created jobs for
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professionals" and unskilled caretakers and perhaps, most
important, the system relieved most Americans of the dis-
pleasure and anxiety non-handicapped people often feel in
the presence of the handicapped. The nation’s conscience
was being solved with the assurance that institutions were
really run for the benefit of the mentally ill by profes-
sional experts.
Former President Carter's Commission on Mental
Health in 1978, however, noted that it was keenly aware
that even the best-intent ioned efforts to deliver services
to mentally disabled persons have resulted in well-docu-
mented cases of exploitation and abuse. But in the past
decade, some major steps have been taken to eradicate this
history of discrimination and to accord mentally disabled
persons the same rights and dignity as other citizens.
During the 1970 's in the United States, we have
seen a dramatic confrontation between the mental health
and the legal system. Litigation brought by advocacy
groups on behalf of mentally ill (mentally retarded) per-
sons has sparked what is often referred to as a revolution-
ary "patients' rights" movement. In half a decade, mental-
ly handicapped persons, through legal advocacy, have been
successful in persuading federal courts that they have a
right to treatment in Wyatt v. Stickney (1971), Welsch v.
Likins (1974), and Davis v. Watkins (1974); to treatment in
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t he "least restrictive s*t.t.inr ln Dixon v. Weinberg
(1975); t0 Ejection from forced administration of hazard -
ous or intrusive procedures in Kalmowitz v. Michigan Depart -
ment of Mental Health (1973), and Scott v, Plante (1976);
t0 ^th procedural and substantive protections in the civil
commitment process in Lessard v. Schmidt (1974), Lynch v.
Baxle y d974), and Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital
( 1974 ) , to safeguard against indefinite confinement after
—J ending that they are incompetent to stand trial in
Jackson v. Indiana (1972); and to liberty in O'Connor v.
L)-2P-a ldson ( 1975). The essence of these landmark judicial
decisions has been incorporated into both state laws and
federal legislation.
In 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States, in
the case of Wyatt v. Stickney
,
ruled that people who had
been hospitalized against their will and who were receiving
only "custodial" care had the right either to be treated or
released to live in their community. In 1975, in the case
of Dixon v. Weinberger
,
the Court ruled that patients had
the right to receive this treatment in the least restric-
tive alternative environment; and furthermore, in the case
of O'Connor v. Donaldson
,
patients had the choice to refuse
psychiatric treatment except in cases where they were con-
/
sidered to be in imminent danger of harming themselves or
others. The General Laws of the Commonwealth of
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Massachusetts had been rewritten in 1971 in a similar fash-
ion to ensure that treatment was given on a voluntary basis
except in cases of criminal or harmful behavior. What
these laws and court rulings clearly state is that any in-
dividual has the "right to be mentally ill” and to "refuse
treatment" except when they are known to be in danger of
harming themselves or others
.
In December of 1978, the Massachusetts Department
of Mental Health ( DMH ) entered into a federal court con-
sent decree which was hailed by mental health advocates
throughout the country as a major step forward in providing
community-based care for the mentally ill. The Northampton
Consent Decree marked the first time in the nation that a
state government has, through the mechanism of a consent
decree, affirmatively recognized that those who need men-
tal health services have a constitutional right to live and
be treated in the "least restrictive" setting. The decree
resolved a class action suit filed by the Mental Patients
Advocacy Project in behalf of nine patients and all other
similarly situated plaintiffs—some hospitalized at
Northampton State Hospital and some living in the commun-
ity—which charged that a lack of community mental health
programs was forcing them to be needlessly hospitalized.
/
Two months later, former Commissioner of the
Massachusetts Department of Mental Health, Dr. Robert L.
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Okin, at the 15th Annual Legislative Conference of the
Massachusetts Association for Mental Health, stated:
The Commonwealth entered into the most radical Con-
sent Decree ever to be signed in this nation on be-half of the mentally ill. Although the Decree spe-
cifically focused on the western part of the state
--in the region surrounding Northampton State Hos-
pital its moral weight will be felt throughout the
Commonwealth. Through the act of signing this Dec ree.The Commonwealth committed itself to the principle
’
that mentally ill people living in institutions or
living in the community but at risk of institution-
alization have the right to receive treatment in the
most normal, least restrictive setting suitable to
their needs.
Of great significance was the fact that the rights
of the chronically mentally ill to treatment in community
settings which were only implied by previous state legisla-
tion were not stated explicitly, confirmed by Court order
and supported by a broad coalition of advocacy groups and
professionals
.
Another landmark case emerged in the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts in 1979 as a result of a class-action suit
brought by seven patients at Boston State Hospital against
13 psychiatrists two years earlier.
In October of 1979, United States Federal District
Court Judge Joseph L. Tauro, in the case of Rogers v. Okin ,
held that both voluntary and involuntary mental patients
have a constitutional right to refuse medication based upon
fundamental privacy interest, except where there exists an
emergency which "would bring about a substantial likelihood
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of physical harm to the patient or others." At the same
time, the court held that on statutory grounds, the pa-
tients have a similar right to avoid seclusion when there
is no emergency. Having ascertained numerous violations of
both these rights, the court enjoined the staff at Boston
State Hospital from contravening them in the future, but
refused to award the plaintiffs monetary damages since the
staff had acted in good faith given the state of the law
and the difficult conditions that existed in 1973 when the
incidents took place.
However, state psychiatrists challenged Judge
lauro complaining that his decision was too rigid and un-
workable; and one month later a federal appeals courts,
ruling that judges "shouldn't second-guess doctors," over-
turned the lower court decision.
"Neither judges nor administrative hearing officers
are better qualified than psychiatrist to render psyciatric
judgments," Justice Frank M. Coffin wrote in the decision.
He said the balancing of the state's interest in preventing
violence and the right of a patient to refuse ant i-psychot-
ic drugs requires a "professional judgment call." Coffin
concluded, "The Court should leave this difficult and nec-
essary ad hoc balancing to state physicians."
Many lay people, family members of the mentally
ill, the "cop on the beat," as well as mental health
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practitioners find the recently enacted laws on behalf of
the mentally ill difficult to live with. Those advocating
reforms, however, argue that no matter how psychotic a per-
son may be, he should not be confined and treated involun-
tarily unless also proved to be dangerous.
Most psychiatrists believe the new approach poses
serious difficulties. They say there is now very good evi-
dence that schizophrenic patients can benefit from psychi-
atric treatment. But like the vast majority of people with
serious mental illness, the patient is not dangerous, and
therefore he is no longer subject to involuntary treatment.
As a result of his ill going unchecked, he may lose his
job; and if his family sticks by him, they will suffer the
inevitable consequences of life with a psychotic father and
husband
.
Psychiatrists have another objection to the new
legal standards. Since they are modeled on criminal law
and emphasize dangerousness rather than sickness, those
hospitalized involuntarily often have the same kind of per-
sonality problems as criminals. Such "patients" typically
have a long record of antisocial conduct with episodic vio-
lence. But they are not psychotic killers or psychopathic
rapists. Most are not psychotic at all; psychiatrists gen-
erally diagnose them as having personality disorders. They
are particularly difficult to manage in hospitals. Most
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are not amenable either to the newer drug treatments or to
the other short-term therapeutic treatment programs and
create havoc, terrorizing patients and staff, yet doctors
who use physical or chemical restraints to cope with them
may be sued for malpractice or for violation of patients’
civil rights.
Many psychiatrists say the most ironic aspect of
the new approach is that it does not protect the public
from dangerous "madmen." The objective legal standard of
dangerousness proves unworkable, they say, because no one,
not even psychiatrists, psychologists, judges or well-fed
computers, can identify the one patient in a thousand who
will kill his entire family or take a shotgun to work to
get revenge for his imagined persecution. Indeed, because
of the enormous difficulty in predicting future behavior,
the courts are forced to look to past behavior. This in-
/
creasingly leads to confinement of the chronic troublemaker
rather than the violent psychotic. Ennis (1975) related
that
:
Courts have always been concerned to some extent
with the legal rights of persons facing involun-
tary commitment to a state institution for the
mentally ill or mentally retarded. But until re-
cently, courts have refused to look behind insti-
tution doors. It is, literally, only in the past
five years that courts have begun to consider the
rights that patients retain inside such institu-
tions once they are there lawfully. The rights
that have become the focus of that examination
include the following: the right to protection
from harm; the right to be paid of institution-
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maintaining labor; the right to be treated in theleast restrictive setting and in the least restric-lve and intrusive manner; the right to a free
!
a
*fr to resolve problems resulting from the prob-lems separate from institutionalization; the rightto a nonremovable limitation on the permissibleperiod of involuntary institutionalization; the
right to decent living conditions, including the
right to regular outdoor exercise, adequate cloth-ing, and adequate medical care; the right to a pub-ic education regardless of the degree of mentalhandicap; and the right to meaningful notice, notjust notice of these and other rights.
Many of these decisions have advanced the cause
ol human and civil rights, but in some cases theimmediate effect has been damaging to patients.
For example, the landmark right-to-treatment case
in Alabama, Wyatt v, Stickney
, defined minimum
standards of care and stated that unless a hospi-
tal could provide specific treatment for a pa-
tient’s condition, it could not hold that patient
against his will. Providing such treatment would
have required the expenditure of large sums of
money. The Alabama state legislature chose not to
appropriate the additional funds, thus in effect
mandating the release of thousands of patients
—
who ended up in substandard housing and with still
less in the way of psychiatric services. (p. 83)
The Bay State Employee (December 1978) emphasized
that : i
Patients' legal rights often overruled or re-
stricted the treatment recommendations of phys-
icians. In the pursuit of justice, the judicial
system increased the outflow of patients from
state hospitals. Lacking adequate, supervised
facilities, mentally disabled patients, within
their legal rights, wandered out of the hospital
setting and fell between the cracks. Aftercare
or follow-up by the DMH, already in critical short
supply, is further hampered by patients' legal
rights and right to privacy.
Some civil libertarians acknowledge that these are
all genuine difficulties, but they consider them the price
that must be paid to preserve individual freedom in a
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democratic society. More radical civil rights activists
scoff at the scenario the psychiatrists describe. Some of
them claim that mental illness is a myth, and many consider
involuntary psychiatric treatment brainwashing, brain-dam-
aging, or a form of punishment in disguise. They, there-
fore, call for abolition of all involuntary confinement and
treatment of people alleged to be mentally ill.
There is, however, a difference in opinion as to
who or what group should be advocating for the mentally
^ ^ lawyers, mental health professionals, or former hos-
pitalized mental patients.
There have been few more outspoken critics of this
country's mental health system than the members of the
Mental Patients' Liberation Movement. Largely comprised
ex-psychiatric hospital patients who share a sense of
outrage' and anger at the treatment they have received,
movement groups have sprung up in almost every major city
in this country as well as in other countries of the
world. Speaking out against psychotropic medication forced
treatment and traditional conceptions of mental illness,
they have become an increasingly powerful political force.
Janet Gotkin is a member of the Mental Patients'
Liberation Movement. For 10 years, from 1960 to 1970, she
was a mental patient who spent three and one-half years in
various psychiatric hospitals— 13 of those months as an
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inpatient at a state psychiatric hospital in New York City
She received approximately 100 electro-convulsive treat-
ments and was given, in her words, ’’every kind of psycho-
active drug that had been invented by the devious mind of
man
.
”
In 1975, Too Much Anger, Too Many Tears
, written by
Janet and her husband Paul, was published by Quadrangle.
The book told the story of their 10-year struggle with the
mental health system—her's as a patient and his as a fam-
ily member. In an interview by Advocacy Now, The Journal
of Patient Rights and Mental Health Advocacy
,
Ms. Gotkin
states
:
When I first became involved with the mental pa-
tients' movement, I don't think we used the work
advocacy. We worked to represent people who were
incarcerated, to get them out of hospitals, to
help them find apartments and jobs, and to fight
against discrimination of all kinds. We considered
ourselves brethren. We were related by virtue of
our experiences and we helped each other. I real-
ize, though, that perhaps there is a need for more
widespread or institutionalized kinds of advocacy.
But I see tremendous inherent problems in the
growth of professional advocacy. . . . The system
of professional advocacy tends to breed an atti-
tude of paternalism, arrogance, and superiority.
Abuses of decision-making powers by professional
advocates are, unfortunately, quite frequent. We
don't want psychiatrists or lawyers or professional
advocates to control our lives. The major aim of
the mental patients' movement is that we be allowed
to control our own lives, to help each other, to
form alternatives, to do for each other what the
system is not doing. . . . When it really comes
down to it, our’s is a political struggle; we are
fighting to determine who is going to have power
over whom and in what situations.
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The hundreds of patients' movement groups through-
out the country follow a common model—that which in drug
rehabilitation is called "self-help" therapy. The patients’
movement adherents refer to "patient-controlled alterna-
tives" as strongly opposed to the "medical model" and the
dominance of psychiatrists. Most maintain that mental
health professionals cannot function as patient advocates
because of the inherent conflict of interest within the
same medical model. They further maintain that the aim of
mental health professionals should be to put themselves out
of business.
In the same journal Advocacy Now
.
Howard Gurevitz,
M.D. wrote an article entitled, "The Mental Health Profes-
sional as Advocate." Dr. Gurevitz is a private psychia-
trist and a member of a mental health planning and consul-
tation firm. He also served on the APA Task Force on Com-
munity Mental Health Centers. He concluded his article by
stating
:
When tension has developed between MHP ' s and
patient advocates, it has generally been over the
issue of every patient's right to reject treatment.
Most MHP's do not support such an unlimited right
and would support the type of safeguarded paternal-
ism suggested by Roth. Advocates who support the
absolute right to refuse treatment or who claim
that use of psychotropic medication is not a treat-
ment will inevitably come into conflict with the
values and structure of the mental health care sys-
tem. Most MHP's support the careful and rational
use of medications as a valuable and very effective
treatment method. What they fear will occur if ex-
treme positions of advocacy are taken (those which
76
seek to abolish some types of treatment or make the
acceptance or rejection of treatment altogether asimple matter of unquestioned self-expression by thepatient), is that many people who need and wouldprofit from treatment would not seek or accept it.Treatment institutions would tend to revert to pro-
viding custodial caretaking services rather than
active treatment; length of stay in institutional
care would increase, larger numbers of mental health
patients would enter the criminal justice system and
costs in an already under-financed system would es-
calate, further reducing available resources. The
right to refuse treatment also raises the question
of whether it is ethical for a therapist to continue
to care for patients who reject what the therapist
believes is the most effective type of care. It may
well be that a patient should be permitted to accept
or refuse a specific recommended treatment. To ex-
pect the therapist to provide, or make available,
alternative forms of care which he or she is not
recommending, is neither prudent care nor realistic.
Mental Health professionals have an important
and unique role to play in the advocacy process. To
the extent that it supports dignity and respect, ad-
vocacy protects confidentiality and promotes sharing
of decision-making and responsibility between the pa-
tient and therapist and helps improve and assure that
the quality of care is entirely consistent with the
intent and practice of mental health professionals.
The development of an effective therapeutic alliance
between the patient and therapist would not be pos-
sible if the principles of advocacy were not re-
spected, regardless of the particular methods of
therapy used. This is just as essential when the
treatment is primarily biological as it is if the
approach is main psycho-analytic. Conflict over ad-
vocacy roles between mental health professionals
and others occur when the goal of some types of ad-
vocacy is to abolish effective care and, in the ser-
vice of protecting the civil rights of patients,
ignore the right to receive adequate treatment which
could be of considerable benefit.
As an advocate, the mental health professional
must be a partner with others who also have impor-
tant responsibilities, not only to protect the rights
of patients who need mental health services, but also
to increase the scope and availability of these re-
sources .
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In their article, "The Politics of Mental Health
Advocacy in the United States," Patricia Wald and Paul
Friedman summarize by maintaining:
The functions of a mental health system remainmixed in the United States: to treat,' to protectt0 aCt aS a last resort
> to service as asociaHy imposed haven for the physically and so-cially inept. It is unlikely these mixed goalswill ever come entangled.
The tension between legal controls and mentalhealth treatment goals will probably continue
with both sides frustrated. As long as voluntary
social and mental health services continue to beinadequate in coverage and quality—as they surely
will for the indefinite future; as long as mentalhealth professionals continue not to know how to
1 1 eat most patients in a way that will ensure re-
covery or at least improvement— as they apparently
will not for the indefinite future; and as long as
vulnerable disabled persons continue to deal in-
adequately with life—with their parents, their
^
relatives, their school, work, and other societal
institutions— as they surely will for the indefin-
ite future, then the mental health system has no
chance of becoming pure by either the mental health
or the legal standard.
The tensions among advocates— like the tensions
among various branches of government or among pro-
fessionals or between professionals and the consum-
ers of mental health services— are, at least in our
pluralistic system, a sign of health. (p. 46)
Advocates for the "least restrictive setting" on
behalf of the mentally ill continue to have opposing advo-
cates who favor Talbott's "reformist" solution by altering
the character of the state hospital. The proponents of
the state hospital as a care and treatment facility
—
par-
ticularly for the chronically mentally ill— admit to past
failures of those institutions, but maintain that with suf-
ficient budger dollars, staffing, treatment modalities, and
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stringent quality assurance and human rights monitoring the
hospital and not the community is the more protective of
those patients who are the most dependent, and as the more
secure setting for those patients who are considered the
highest risk of danger to themselves or others. This
stance would also preclude the use of community mental
health centers, inpatient services most of which are open
lacilities having more than 90 percent of their patients
as voluntary. Beyond clinical issues related to this side
o! patient advocacy are those pertaining to political,
economic and personally motivated opposition to community
placement. All of these factors have resulted in a resis-
tance movement towards deinstitutionalization.
Deinstitutionalization has been synonomous, to
many, with completely closing all state hospitals. Initial
resistance to the movement was largely derived out of the
fear of a great number of involved professional and non-
professional workers that deinstitutionalization threatened
their jobs and livelihood. Reactions from this fear ranged
from projections of detriments to local economics to accu-
sations of dereliction of duty and patient care as a re-
sult of loss of supportive funds and resources for insti-
tutional maintenance which were allegedly re-routed to
private vendors and community-based facilities. Other
forms of resistance, in many instances not as overt as
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the workers, have been from the community—citizens as
well as local elected officials, certain state legisla-
tors and private practitioners.
As a result of the reactive nature towards the de-
centralization process in Massachusetts, the vitiating
prevalence of perceiving it as essentially the depopula-
tion or closing of large state hospitals, and not a radi-
cal change of the mental health system prevails.
CHAPTER V
PROBLEMS, ISSUES AND RESISTANCE
TO DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
Bassuk and Gerson (1978) asserted that "while it is
probably too early to evaluate its success, it is not too
soon to consider how such a well-intentioned reform as de-
institutionalization could have created so many problems"
(p. 1). The authors further charged that:
Today the population of mental hospitals has indeed
been reduced by two-thirds. That achievement is
offset, however, by huge increases in the rate of
\ admissions to those hospitals and in the number of
discharged but severely and chronically disturbed
former patients consigned to bleak lives in nurs-
ing homes, single-room occupancy hotels, and skid-
row rooming houses—chronic patients are being dis-
charged to a lonely existence in hostile communities
without adequate care.
The allegation by the authors relates to that which
some consider "depopulating" the hospitals and not to "de-
institutionalization" as previously described in this
paper. That is, the return to the patients' community with
aftercare or support programs which attempt to maintain the
citizens in the areas and also attempt to prevent readmis-
sion to the inpatient service.
Other than the questionable population of large
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mental health facilities, deinstitutionalization has been
understood as attempts to provide a continuum of a series
of adjustments involving constant accommodation of all the
components necessary for daily living and functioning of
former patients. Nationwide, numerous reports and articles
have indicated that, for many reasons, this has not been
the case. Mental health professionals as well as concerned
citizens and politicians have elucidated their trepidation
of the so-called deinstitutionalization movement.
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, California, New York,
and Washington, D.C. have been forerunners in the goal of
closing or ’’phasing down" hospitals for the mentally ill.
Their endeavors, however, have been criticized by opponents
who maintain that deinstitutionalization has not been ade-
quately planned for and that there has been insufficient
funding at the community level for the attainment of pro-
posed goals.
In 1972, Pennsylvania's Department of Public Welfare
announced that it was about to phase out state mental in-
stitutions by releasing large numbers of patients to vary-
ing types of community care. The movement began at the
Retreat State Mental Hospital, one of nineteen in
Pennsylvania. It was the first in that state to be dis-
qualified by the federal government from receiving Medicare
and Medicaid funds. Faced with closing the hospital or
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spending great sums to bring it up to standards, state
planners took a middle course and opted for the new policy.
Retreat served the Wyoming Valley, an area of
Pennsylvania which had already had its share of economic
and social burdens. The coal mines were almost all inop-
erative, and Wilkes-Barre, Scranton and surrounding towns
suffered high unemployment. Psychiatrists and other medi-
cal specialists were in short supply. There was one pri-
vate psychiatrist in Wyoming and Luzerne counties and fewer
than a half dozen for the entire region of 500,000 people.
The state hospital began to release its patients
or reassign some to other state facilities in April of 1975.
Approximately 115 of Retreat's patients were transferred to
residential care in nearby cities in northeastern
Pennsylvania, and another 30 were scheduled for release by
July 1977, reducing the patient population to about 250
—
about one-fourth of the hospital's capacity.
Over 100,000 people from the Wilkes-Barre area
signed a petition denouncing the release of patients from
Retreat State Hospital. Further attempts by the state
public welfare department to open other residential facil-
ities were blocked by the citizens. Plans for a nursing
home, a facility for the mentally retarded, and a home for
delinquent youngsters were all abandoned or rejected by
city officials after public protests. Opponents' petitions
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included the most common reasons for protest— fear of fall-
ing property values, the desertion of the neighborhood by
normal people, fear of crime and violence, and the noise
distraction of the mentally handicapped.
San Jose, California endured the ordeal which beset
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania and many other communities
throughout the country. In 1972, San Jose was caught up in
a short-lived plan, initiated by former Governor and now
President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, to close all
of California's 13 state mental institutions. Two of the
institutions were closed and the resulting outcry reached
its peak with the announcement that Agnews State Hospital,
serving the San Jose area, would be number three. The ma-
jority of its 900 patients were to be released to "commun-
ity care." The uproar in San Jose eventually led to the
policy's demise, but not before hundreds of patients from
Agnews were resettled in a downtown residential area.
There were emotional public rallies, clamorous city-council
meetings, and confusion about how patients could be cared
for in a residential neighborhood without ruining it. One
city became a repository for the mentally ill from surround-
ing counties. Had the patients been dispersed throughout
the county, San Jose would have probably been spared the
worst of its problems. Instead, almost all of the newly
released patients wound up in an area about one square
mile
.
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"Board and-care" homes were opened by private in-
vestors m the neighborhood which previously had fraternity,
sorority and student boarding houses for San Jose State
University students. As more mentally ill people gravitated
to the University neighborhood, new board-and-care homes
were opened. The homes, occupying more than half of some
blocks, were controlled only by loose city business-license
requirements
.
Neighborhood residents formed the ’’Campus Community
Improvement Association" because they felt strongly that
the one small area should not bear the burden for the en-
tire county. Under pressure from the association and other
\
members of the community, the San Jose City Council adopted
a moratorium on the establishment of board-and-care homes
in the University area. Two years later, in 1973, the
council replaced the moratorium with a strict zoning ordi-
nance requiring a city permit for any residential-care fa-
cility
.
Parlour and Goldsmith (1978), both previously asso-
ciated with the California state mental health hospital
system, watched the dismantling of that operation. They
cited poor planning, under-funding, inadequate resources,
and the democratic idealism of patients' rights as the key-
stones of the program's failure. They stated, "The state
hospitals in California are now cultural deserts of interest
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mostly to social pathologists and prosecuting attorneys."
Regarding important hospital accreditation, the same au-
thors said, "The accrediting agencies are not as apprecia
tive of democratization and other principles of the reor-
ganization process as they are of professional standards
of care."
Such steps, as taken by Pennsylvania and California
as well as other states, in depopulating public mental hos-
pitals, have triggered backlashes almost everywhere they
have been tried. Opponents generally include hospital em-
ployees and local merchants who worry about the economic
impact; local residents who worry about their safety and
property values, and politicians who worry about anything
that worries large numbers of their constituents. Accord-
ing to Williams (1977),
State officials often have pushed the plan (dein-
stitutionalization) too far, too fast, producing
some glaring problems, notably ghettos of former
hospital patients and a few crimes of violence
committed by recently released patients. These
incidents naturally fan community fears about the
mentally ill.
Sheppard wrote (1979):
With thousands of former mental patients liv-
ing in squalid flophouses or wandering about the
nation's skid rows, some states are having second
thoughts about their application of a 16-year-old
policy of treating most mentally ill persons in
community-based facilities.
In New York, for example, the population of
mental institutions has dropped from 89,000 pa-
tients to 24,000 since 1968. State officials
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cannot account for the whereabouts of the 65,000people who have been released, supposedly to ’com-
munity-based centers, but a further reduction, to19,000, is nonetheless planned by 1983.
Large numbers of the released mental patientshave made their way to the single-room-occupancy
hotels on Manhattan's Upper West Side, the flop-
houses along the Bowery and rundown city shelters.
Many others gravitated to such Long Island commun-
ities as Long Beach and Bay Shore after being re-
leased from Long Island's Pilgrim State or Kings
Park Hospitals.
In a report titled From Country Asylums to City
St reet
s
,
released July 2nd, 1979, the New York City Council
criticized the state's policy as "at odds with itself."
The report, prepared by Carol Bellamy, the City Council
President, said that 80 percent of the state's 763 million
dollar mental health budget goes to state hospitals which
house 25 percent of the state's mental patients, while
only 13 percent of the budget— 99 million dollars, is
available for community-based health care. It also stated:
We continue to give lip service to progressive
goals of deinstitutionalization and community-
based service while we continue to keep open
and fund the very asylums to which we no longer
send patients. (p. 2)
New York State began a program of "deinstitution-
alizing" mental patients without an adequate network of
community facilities. The focus changed to develop that
network, and before a patient could be discharged, there
had to be a discharge plan developed which detailed where
the person would be housed, what support services were
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needed, and where such services would be provided. As a
result, the rate of people moving out into communities be-
came 3.6 percent a year compared to a rate of about eight
percent two years before.
In April of 1978, the state initiated a Community
Support System that offered an array of about 14 services
in 46 counties in the state. One of the services the net-
work provided was patient evaluation by on-site rehabilita-
tion teams. It was such a team that examined 500 former
mental patients at Long Beach in 1975 and determined that
as many as 10 percent needed to be readmitted to mental
institutions
.
In Washington, D.C., 40,741 mental patients were
discharged Irom 1968 to 1975. Neither the city nor the
Federal government could account for 13,000 of them, and
many were believed to be living in rundown quarters in
some of the capital's toughest neighborhoods.
About 27,000 patients were on convalescent leave
living in large concentrations in neighborhoods like Mount
Pleasant and Adams-Morgan
,
where residents complained bit-
terly that their communities had more than their fair share
of facilities for the mentally disturbed.
The community-care movement lias not been without
problems in Massachusetts. Efforts to establish neighbor-
hood treatment facilities often met still opposition from
residents, and many public officials are still
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not sold on the concept. The Commonwealth has been accused
of depopulating its inpatients in zealous efforts to reduce
the state hospitals' census.
A particular view of the deinstitutionalization
process in Massachusetts is presented by Deevy ( 1979 ) who
wrote that:
As a result of the dedicated efforts of many
people, the ex-patient has generally fared much'better in Massachusetts. Nevertheless, the
record would suggest that we have little room
for self-congratulation.
Most elderly patients, despite their objec-
tions, were reinstitutionalized in nursing homes.
There is some evidence to suggest that the new
for-profit custodians provide even less psychi-
atric care than was available at the hospital.
The majority of discharged patients ended up
i living in cheap apartments and rooming-houses.
They constitute a lonely, alienated and largely
ignored enclave in our cities and towns. More
than 90 percent have not found employment
. Recid-
ivism rates are high and are increasing dramatic-
ally as the hospital population is reduced.
Deinstitutionalization has been the central
goal of the Department of Mental Health for the
past 10 years. Reluctant patients were jawboned
into accepting relocation. Promises of follow-up
visits and help in finding a job were frequently
made but seldom honored. Some were discharged
and left to their own coping devices. Judgments
regarding care and treatment were predicated on
the need to meet deinstitutionalization quotas.
Despite the assertions of mental health ad-
ministrators, it seems likely that the vast ma-
jority of hospital staff will be forced to find
jobs in other fields. Even if some form of train-
ing is provided, it is not likely that the groups
who contract to provide community care will hire
hospital staff. The institutional mentality is
considered a distinct handicap for community work.
Mental illness is a nightmare for many of our
fellow citizens. Hopefully research will soon
lead to more effective forms of treatment. In the
meantime, the number of people experiencing severe
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emotional disturbance is not likely to decrease as
a result of closing the state hospital.
It seems to me that those of us who are advo-
cates of deinstitutionalization and community care
should be willing to recognize the continued needfor some form of custodial care. This kind of
care should be as brief and as humane as possible.
A mental hospital does not necessarily have to be
a human warehouse. Most patient liberation groups,
despite their strident criticisms of current forms
of treatment, would subscribe to this view.
The strongest and most cohesive opposition to de-
institutionalization has come from the unions representing
state hospital employees.
In Wisconsin, a forensic hospital for male patients
scheduled to be closed was kept open because of organized
efforts of the employees’ union and local businessmen.
Pennsylvania found nearly all of its institutional employ-
ees--psychiatrists
,
psychologists, nurses, social workers,
and other therapists, as well as those staff providing sup-
port services, banding together through their union repre-
sentatives in a final attempt to prevent the discharge of
mental patients to a generally "unwelcoming and unprepared
community .
"
Massachusetts was no exception, particularly during
the period from March 1978 to March 1981. During that
time, deinstitutionalization in this state was at its peak
and concurrently, Massachusetts was one of few states whose
Mental Health Department was allocating more money into
community-based programs than into state hospital budgets.
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There was also a strong emphasis by the Department of
Mental Health to "contract” as many of its community pro-
grams as possible to private vendors.
Through lobbying efforts with the state legislature
and letter-writing efforts to the news media, the union
representatives and employees staged a vigorous campaign
not only to keep the state hospitals open, but to signifi-
cantly improve the conditions at the facilities.
Of particular interest during the two-year period
of union antagonism was the utilization of the American
Federation of State County and Municipal Employee Union's
( AFSCME ) monthly publication, "Bay State Employee." There
were several hard-hitting articles and editorials presented
from 1978 to 1980.
In March of 1978, AFSCME ' s periodical publicized
that during a recent four-week period, two residents in
Massachusetts state institutions took their lives and in each
case staffing levels were seriously low. The first trag-
edy took place in Worcester where a juvenile committed
suicide. It was alleged that staff members were under-
staffed by three workers—four of seven were on duty. The
second death took place in a Westboro State Hospital unit
over a weekend where staffing was low amidst a tense sit-
uation. The article stated that "across the state, under-
staffing is a serious problem. To think that it has to
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reach a suicidal point before state bureaucrats see the
light is a sorry thought to consider."
In August of 1978, the publication issued an arti-
cle entitled "Deinstitutionalization
— A Community Perspec-
tive." It was basically an interview with Dr. Inez Busch,
psychiatric director of the inpatient unit at the private
general Union Hospital (currently the Parkwood Hospital) in
New Bedford, Massachusetts. An outspoken opponent of the
state Department of Mental Health’s plan to deinstitution-
alize the state hospitals, Dr. Busch said that there are a
great many people in Massachusetts who need psychiatric
care and attention and who go unnoticed and unaided. She
related that:
DMH [Department of Mental Health] knows that dein-
stitutionalization isn't working--they ' ve never
done a study because they don't want to find out
if it works or not. ... If they can cover up
any problems they will. They only admit the
problems that are blatant and can't be ignored.
Dr. Busch further maintained, in the union article, that
modern day state hospitals can create communal type living
for those people in need of care because of mental distress.
She said "The state claims that the institutions made the
patients chronically mentally ill. That is not so, they
were chronic when they got there." She defined the chron-
ically mentally ill as "those people who are without in-
sight, don't know how to live on their own and are incap-
able of taking care of themselves."
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I lie entire December 1978 issue of the Bay Stute
Employee publication contained articles under a "Special
Labor Report" condemning deinstitutionalization and the
awai ding oi contracts to private vendors who provide De-
partment of Mental Health programs and services. The tar-
gets of the article were Northampton and Danvers State
Hospitals, the communities of Auburndale and Lynn, and a
contracted program on Cape Cod. ALso under attack in the
labor journal was the role of legal advocacy, the judicial
system, and the extent of patients' legal rights.
The August 1979 edition of the Bay State Employee,
including a number of photographs, keyed on Taunton State
Hospital and the group homes in nearby Norton and
Attleboro, in addition to Metropolitan State Hospital and
rooming houses in the Waltham area.
Two months later, former Commissioner of Mental
Health, Robert Okin, held his first meeting with 30 local
union presidents of AFSCME. Staff writer Anne Beaton of
the Boston Herald attended the meeting and her article
appeared on October 16, 1979. She reported that Okin ad-
mitted during the meeting that the state had "serious
problems" in its program to move mental patients out of
its institutions and into community-based facilities, lie
told the union officials that after 10 years of deinstitu-
tionalization, "much work needs to be done."
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The union' leaders told Okin of the many abuses and
pitfalls of deinstitutionalization
—especially the inade-
quate staffing and short supplies both at the hospitals
and in the community. They also indicated their strong
concern over contracting services and no proper monitoring
of the care patients receive once they move into community
settings. Okin is quoted as stating:
There are many serious problems and clearly we've
made terrible mistakes in the community movement.
But we're on a frontier—we've had no precedents
to follow. We've had to design program models
from scratch and feel our way through them.
During the following week, there were several edi-
torials written in newspapers throughout the Commonwealth
as a result of Okin's comments. One such editorial ap-
peared in the Taunton Daily Gazette (located in the city
in which both the State Hospital and the Dever State School
for the Retarded are operational). It concluded by stating
Okin is right when he says that more money is
needed in order to properly fund the (community)
program. By the same token, more funds are re-
quired as well to assure proper care of those pa-
tients still confined to state hospitals.
At one time, Massachusetts boasted a fine rec-
ord in the field of caring for the mentally ill
and the retarded, but in the interests of human-
izing that care, of moving patients into the com-
munity to speed their recovery, the state opted
more for saving money than it did for maintaining
that level of care. The lesson learned was one of
tragedy
.
The goal of deinstitutionalization in Massachusetts
according to former Commissioner Okin's philosophy in 1977,
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was to close the state hospitals by placing the patients in
the communities and depending upon private vendors as well
as general and psychiatric hospitals for the care and treat-
ment of the mentally ill. It resulted in additional, non-
union efforts to forestall the movement. The attempts,
though complementary to union aims, often had dissimilar
purposes as presented by state hospital psychiatrists,
community "movements," private psychiatric and general
hospital organizations, and legislative action.
One outspoken critic of the Massachusetts' endeav-
ors was Dr. Arthur Bloomberg of Northampton State Hospital
(1978). The psychiatrist charged that the move toward
community-based residences for the mentally ill by the
state Department of Mental Health is ineffective. He
maintained that the community care programs use para-pro-
fessionals without psychiatric supervision, lack careful
planning, have a negligible aftercare program, and are
devoid of moderate term care facilities, all contributing
to a system which he called a failure. He also said:
The people with authority in the state mental
health system are administrators, health plan-
ners and advocates. The psychiatrists, psychol-
ogists and psychiatric social workers are not
involved in the decision-making process. . . .
The attitude prevalent in state hospitals across
the Commonwealth is anti-professional and anti-
therapeutic.
Dr. Bloomberg added:
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He feared that what occurred in California when that state
began to reduce its inpatient population will also happen
in Massachusetts. He found the federal government guilty
of "enormous patchwork quilt services” and denounced it
for fostering the community-based care operation among the
states. The psychiatrist emphasized that the mentally ill
require clinically based, therapeutic, professional care
and treatment rooted in a hospital system and operated by
physicians and trained staff.
Community opposition in many cities and towns in
Massachusetts to the relocation of former mental hospital
patients took on the same light as in other states where
depopulating their hospitals was being attempted. Spear-
heading such resistance were usually groups calling them-
selves "organization” or "committees for neighborhood pre-
servation.” They quite often gathered the support of state
legislators, local officials such as mayors, city council
members, town selectmen, and planning board members, all
regarding ordinances and zoning requirements; building and/
or fire inspectors regarding licensing; and sometimes even
the police regarding a "disturbance” factor; albeit, the
support received by citizen opposition groups was as fre-
quently covert as it was overt in nature.
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It was frequently alleged that community residence
and resource availability developed erratically, piecemeal,
and too secretive in affected communities where, in many
instances, the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health
attempted to place former state hospital patients in com-
munity residences without informing neighborhood residents.
A major factor resulting in lack of support or loss
of support for the deinstitutionalization process in
Massachusetts was that of "saturation." For several years,
during the mid to late 1970 's, the location of the commun-
ity residences or "group homes" seemed to follow a pattern.
They were infrequently, if at all, begun in affluent com-
munities or neighborhoods and, once located in a particular
community, showed a tendency to multiply. Similar to what
happened in San Jose, California, for example, occurred in
Northampton. One working-class neighborhood in that
Western Massachusetts city contained 23 community mental
health facilities of various kinds within a one-mile radius.
Although not to such a high degree, saturation of community-
based mental health programs and residences developed in
many areas throughout the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
In Region V (southeastern Massachusetts) of the
Department of Mental Health, a protest meeting was held on
June 15, 1978 by Brockton's Committee for Neighborhood
Preservation representing the city of Brockton (the site
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of Region V's administrative office) and the surrounding
town's of Rockland, East and West Bridgewater.
About 150 residents from those areas joined to
oppose the opening of any more group homes for emotionally
disturbed clients from Taunton State Hospital. According
to newspaper accounts (Quincy Patriot Ledger and Brockton
Enterprise), in attendance were a member of one of the
town's planning board and a Boston police officer who re-
sided in one of the towns who were "vehement, though for
differing reasons, in their opposition to halfway houses
opened or planned in their municipalities." The chairper-
son of the Committee stated two demands: "home rule re-
garding zoning regulations so that we have the right to
say who lives in our cities— not the state telling us here
it is, take it"; and "a guarantee that sexual deviates,
rapists, molesters, and the violent will not be walking
our streets in the event that more halfway houses are
opened .
"
The police officer, one of nearly 40 speakers dur-
ing a four-hour session, said "We don’t want them, they
won't be welcome." He and others referred to the number
of children living on the streets selected for group homes
and the potential for danger to the children.
The member of a town planning board told the group
that he had intended to voice his town's objection to the
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opening of a specific halfway house, but that it was too
late. On the previous week, amid considerable public op-
position and selectmen's efforts to find a way to stop the
project, 14 patients from the Brockton Unit of Taunton
State Hospital were moved into the home after a letter of
protest to the Department of Mental Health.
A city councilman explained that while the council
is not opposed to halfway houses, it is considering a re-
solve to strengthen city regulations for such homes. He
said, however, that in view of court rulings that halfway
houses can be considered as "educational uses" and there-
fore exempt from local zoning regulations, there is doubt
that the resolve will be effective, if adopted.
Two state representatives urged the audience to
bring pressure on the state senate to adopt a budget amend-
ment which seeks to change the language of the state Zoning
Enabling Act to exempt halfway houses from the educational
uses provision.
Summing up his reactions to the meeting, the Region
V administrator for the Department of Mental Health stated
that "the emotional responses were much higher than he had
expected." He stated:
Other communities had welcomed group homes, though
most have experienced initial fears of the clients
which were overcome in time. The state plan for
deinstitutionalization is in fact established in a
variety of manners, sometimes in close work with
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f®
’
Rlental health workers fear the reaction
cates ?her
6ry Your attitude here indi-t e may be a need for some modification ofour approach to establishing the homes.
1C l °n 01
Following are excerpts from an editorial in the
Brockton Enterprise one week after the meeting:
Tuesday night a fire, now under investigation
oy fire marshals, caused an estimated $5 000 indamage to a house at 100 Pacific Street inRockland. The day before, the house had been soldto a nonprofit group which, under the auspices ofthe state, was to use it as a community residencefor 13 mental patients currently at Taunton StateHospital. If deliberately set, the fire may be
the most malicious response to date in the state's
12-year-long effort to establish community pro-
grams for its mentally ill and retarded citizens.
The fears voiced in local communities— fears
echoed in other communities across the state— are
understandable. They are, after all, an outgrowth
of a stereotype of the mentally ill that stretches
back for centuries and that was reinforced by the
decisions of the "experts" of an earlier day to
warehouse the mentally ill in isolated institu-
tions. Now the experts say that was all wrong—
that many of the mentally ill can live and benefit
from relatively normal lives in community facili-
ties. It is understandable that the general public
does not quickly accept that notion.
Residents of affected neighborhoods can and
should demand all reasonable assurances, should in-
sist upon full advance information about plans to
locate facilities in their neighborhoods, can in-
sist upon an advisory role in the operation of such
a community home and can demand written assurances
of the level and scope of staff services to be pro-
vided in the facility.
Yet, the prospective residents of the community
homes are citizens of the Commonwealth too and they
have a fundamental right to live in and participate
in the general community to the extent of their
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State mUSt nOW take every reas°nable step
As presented earlier, former Commissioner Okin's
final goal in the Commonwealth's efforts at deinstitut ion-
alizat ion
,
after completely closing the state hospitals,
would be to shift the responsibility for the care of the
mentally ill to general hospitals and private psychiatric
hospitals. He offered the idea to a Blue Ribbon Commission
on mental health services of the Massachusetts senate.
Opposition surfaced at a public hearing during the
last week of November 1979. The special commission decided
to limit its investigation into the operation of the De-
partment of Mental Health. One member stated that "it
would be foolish to reinvent the wheel—the subject is big
enough.
. . we have a long way to go before we meet the
challenge of Dr. Okin." The feeling of other members was
that the state will always have to provide some psychiat-
ric care because without state support the private sector
will feel set adrift.
Not all the professionals present agreed with Okin
that the state should remove itself from the mental health
care system. One psychiatrist working at a state institu-
tion presented his opinion that with enough properly
trained staff, the state could operate mental health facil-
ities .
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The president of the Massachusetts Hospital Asso-
ciation offered major financial concerns when he related
that one of the biggest fears was that the governor (Edward
J. King) would fail to make the financial commitment for
medical care for general relief recipients of the Welfare
Department and to fund medicaid at a high enough level in
the 1981 budget to cover psychiatric treatment for the pa-
tients in general hospitals when they need help.
The president of the 1400-member Massachusetts
Psychiatric Society, a staff member of the prestigious Beth
Israel Hospital in Boston, said that his organization felt
that the admission of involuntary patients should not be
mandatory until legal, financial and clinical issues are
resolved. It was further presented by the spokesman for
the private psychiatrists that many patients are discharged
into the community without appropriate treatment plans and
with certainty of re-admission. A last resort facility,
he said, must exist to meet expanding demands.
The director of the inpatient psychiatric unit at
Emerson Hospital in Concord rendered his opinion that a
plan which would have the effect of excluding private pa-
tients from their own community hospitals would meet for-
midable local resistance. Additionally, he believed that
specific provision must be made for the day when no local
beds are available to a patient unable to afford psychiat-
ric hospitalization.
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Another member of a private hospital medical staff,
the Framingham Union Hospital, and chairman of the psychi-
atric society's committee on general hospital psychiatric
units was also unsure of the future of Commissioner Okin's
plan for the private sector. He was concerned that the
present open unit at his hospital for private voluntary
patients would require a separate unit for involuntary or
committed patients that might have to function, in essence,
like a jail.
As we entered the 1980' s, it was becoming quite
apparent that the "Five Year Plan" for deinstitutionaliza-
tion by the Department of Mental Health and Commissioner
Okin was on the wane. Resistance by those forces which
were in critical need for the success of such a goal had
begun to reverse the process.
The major support, funding by the state legisla-
ture, began to turn around. In preparing the fiscal 1981
year (July 1, 1980 to June 30, 1981) budget by the state
representatives and senators, two of the most significant
aspects of the DMH budget involved non-money issues.
First, the legislature indicated its concerns over the
deinstitutionalization program. It required quarterly
reports on all expenditures made for new community-based
programs, the status of deinstitutionalization at all
state facilities, and status reports on all Individual
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Service Plans for all deinstitutionalization clients from
February 1979 to June 1980.
I he chairman ol the Massachusetts Senate Ways and
Means Committee, Chester Atkins, an open critic of the
Department, recounted in April 1980 the progress of earlier
funded programs by the legislature. From October to Decem-
ber 1979, the Department of Mental Health planned to begin
75 new programs. Only 21 were actually started, and 13 of
these were actually late starts from the previous quarter
of the fiscal year. As of the beginning of July 1979, in
the programs that were started, only 46 percent of the
contracted slots for clients were filled. He lamented
that while people wait in our institutions for community
placement, new programs were half empty.
Disputes over the fiscal 1981 year budget pitted
those who wanted to press the programs forward as fast as
possible against those who had serious concerns that the
system was spread too thin and in danger of breaking down.
Atkins and others, as opposed to Okin, advocated for a
moratorium on new community programs until quality was as-
sured in existing ones. He said, "Every action, every ap-
propriation, every policy is directed at shuffling people,
not treating them."
While still attempting to negotiate the fiscal 1981
budget with the legislature, a startling admission was
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given before Atkin's Committee in May 1980 by Okin. He
suddenly declared that he had been wrong in his previous
estimate of how fast the deinstitutionalization process
was moving. New analyses revealed that many of the com-
munity-based programs, 149 residential and 230 nonresiden-
tial, funded in the past year's budget were not off the
drawing board. Basically, the Department of Mental Health
did not place patients in community settings at anywhere
the rate anticipated; and of the 500 patients placed in
the past 12 months, 380 were from "late start" fiscal year
1979 programs and only 117 for 1980 programs. The Depart-
ment expected to place 589 patients in 1980 and was behind
six to nine months.
The reaction of state representatives and senators
who had been supportive of deinstitutionalization and had
been advocating for "sufficient funding" in the legisla-
ture, let it be known at just about every area office that
the Department's credibility from the Commissioner to the
area directors had suffered a severe blow. The result was
that the budget for the Department of Mental Health was
appropriated as "level funded." It remained the same as
the previous year, except for a few identified and justi-
fied "critical need" programs, union contracted and cost
of living salary increments for employees of contracted
programs
.
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The following year during the preparation of the
fiscal 1982 budget, the Senate Ways and Means Committee,
in its recommendations, made some harsh criticism of the
deinstitutionalization movement and of the way the Depart-
ment cared for the mentally handicapped.
In its recommendations for the following year, the
Committee said the Department of Mental Health ’’appears to
have abandoned attempts to create meaningful state-operated
inpatient treatment alternatives for clients for the sake
of rapidly closing the Commonwealth’s mental health insti-
tutions." The report continued by stating that:
The mission of the Department was regarded as a
vision, rather than a process. Deinstitutional-
ization was viewed in an almost religious sense,
not to be questioned, rather than as a controver-
sial goal which would only be achieved through
cooperation and compromise. ... In many in-
stances, the well-being of the client was sacri-
ficed in an attempt to meet a central office
census projection.
As a result of the Committee's assessment, it
recommended that the Department of Mental Health receive
no new program funds for fiscal year 1982, and "level
funding" with no new program dollars appropriated.
Commissioner Okin resigned in February of 1981,
followed shortly by the resignation in April of Robert
Kaplan, M.D., the Regional Services Administrator of
Region V of the Department.
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One must consider an extremely important factor,
Philosophically, clinically and fiscally, of the deinsti-
tutionalization movement in Massachusetts. It has been a
dual delivery system. There were eight state mental hos-
pitals operating at the same time as attempts at creating
community-based mental health programs. The state was in-
deed at a crossroads. At the time, there were soaring in-
stitutional costs and minimal quality of care in the
hospitals, while attempts were made to continue the crea-
tion of new programs in the community.
Proponents and opponents of deinstitutionalization
presented examples and data to support their quests for
proper and humane treatment and care of mentally ill pa-
tients. Included were arguments related to clinical,
administrative/management, financial and political aspects
ol the movement. The major question remained for those
interested in and concerned with deinstitutionalization.
What should the future hold for those citizens who suffer
from acute episodes of chronic mental illness? As pre-
sented in the following chapter, a full range of community
support programs, in the opinion of many mental health
professionals, is still the answer.
CHAPTER VI
COMMUNITY SUPPORT PROGRAMS: AN INTEGRAL
COMPONENT TO DECENTRALIZED CARE OF
MENTAL HEALTH PATIENTS
Introduction
The first major negative indication of the coinci-
dental relationship between deinstitutionalization and
decentralization resulted from the inherent absence of
planning. Though decentralization was slowly accelerating
the discharge rate at state hospitals, the recidivism was
also increasing. The more that were let out, the more
that returned. This phenomena maintained, and in some
cases, increased the original census.
It quickly became apparent that some organ for
the community maintenance of former patients was needed.
This was the birth of Community Support Programs.
Though an accidental product of decentralization,
Community Support Programs (CSP's) have become an integral
component of the external care and network for deinstitu-
tionalized patients. Throughout the nation, deinstitu-
tionalization of hospital patients rather than
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decentralization of such support programs was the initial
intent. Once it was determined by negative experiences,
evaluations, and dissenting media coverage that unprepared
patients openly discharged from state hospitals or even
placed in nursing homes or group residences were not being
qualitatively and professionally deinstitutionalized, did
CSP
' s become a major issue.
In Massachusetts, because of the absence of an in-
itial plan and commitment to decentralize treatment and
sei vices in union with deinstitutionalization, subsequent
progress has been unpredictable and uneven, and has often
occurred only as a result of executive directive or judi-
cial decision.
Many community support programs, such as group
residences, emergency and crisis intervention services
and case management hastily emerged as private vendors re-
sponded to a "request for proposal" (RFP) solicited by
the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health. Many of
the solicited vendors had little or no history or experi-
ence in needed programs and services, but were awarded the
contracts because of the dire need to fill the gaps and
related pressure from the political arena.
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Concept
The rationale for community support programs is
that of normalization through local care and involvement.
The general goal is to assist each person to live as nor-
mally as possible in his/her original residential commun-
ity. Programs should be designed to help the individual
client to achieve, to be productive, and to realize as
much personal growth as possible in a familiar environment.
Programs should also be socially integrated, in that the
community should be optimally involved and the individual
should be helped to relate to others and to assist others
within his/her capabilities.
Evaluation and monitoring the quality of care and
treatment of patients is essential to the success of a de-
institutionalization process. Otherwise, the result is a
movement based only on criticisms of past excesses and in-
eptitudes, and lacking a practical and operational philos-
ophy. Currently, some critics as well as some proponents
of deinstitutionalization are concerned that the emphasis
on the closing or depopulating of state hospitals rather
than focusing on defining and establishing guidelines for
effective community care systems and services will result
in a movement to reinstitutionalize.
Definition and Massachusetts Department
of Mental Health Regulations
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The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH)
guidelines for the CSP (1977) define related community
support services as a "network of caring and responsible
people committed to assisting a vulnerable population to
meet their needs and develop their potentials without being
unnecessarily isolated or excluded from the community."
Currently, the Massachusetts Department of Mental
Health regulations stipulate that such programs "shall
serve persons who have recurring problems due to psycho-
logical difficulties in obtaining food, clothing, and
shelter, and in utilizing supportive community resources,
particularly those persons who are unserved by and are un-
willing or unable to participate in other mental health
programs .
"
The Commonwealth's DMH regulations further define
Community Support Programs as:
A community support service which functions pri-
marily on an outreach basis and which undertakes
to: (a) assist clients in accessing financial,
housing, medical, employment, social, and other
essential community resources; (b) assist commun-
ity agencies, including social, vocational, and
mental health agencies in being responsive to the
client population; and (c) mobilize assistance
from citizens in the community, including family,
neighbors, peers, landlords, clergy and self-help
groups, on behalf of clients.
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Following are the specific prescribed mandates for
CSP s by the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health reg-
ulations :
Service Available. Services available shall include:
A. Direct client contact on a regular basis, appro-
priate to the client's needs.
B. Assisting clients in using community resources,
including
:
(1) applying for government or other entitle-
ments
;
(2) finding appropriate living arrangements;
(3) requesting and receiving mental health ser-
vices
;
(4) obtaining medical and dental care;
(5) gaining access to programs to develop so-
cial vocational, and community-living skills,
interests, and leisure activities;
(6) obtaining employment; and
(7) building and reconstructing personal and
community support networks.
C. Teaching clients how to access community resources.
D. Liaison with community resources, including:
(1) development of support from and involvement
of families, friends, and other associates;
(2) involvement of community organizations in
assisting the client;
(3) consultation and education to other community
programs; and
(4) linkage of clients to existing social networks.
E. Crisis stabilization, including providing or
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arranging personal support to individuals duringcritical decision-making or high stress periods
where a crisis intervention service is not re-quired or not acceptable to the client.
Case management, to ensure continuous availabil-ity of services, as appropriate.
Community-based training in act ivit ies-of-dailv-living skills.
One-to-one intervention or support to a client as
appropriate
.
Staffing
A. The program shall have a Program Director who
shall have at least two years full-time experi-
ence in a mental health setting, or its equiva-
lent
.
B. The program staff shall include at least one of
the following: psychiatrist, psychologist, prin-
cipal social worker, or principal psychiatric
nurse, on duty or on call for purposes of consul-
tation to and supervision of program staff. This
person may be the Program Director.
C. The staff person shall assist the client in his/
her attempt to obtain services or enter programs.
D. The program shall be implemented according to a
program design which is based on an understanding
of the special values, folkways, local helping
systems, traditions and demographics of the iden-
tified client population( s ) . The services shall
be highly flexible and respond in ways which are
personally and culturally acceptable to clients.
E. Clients shall not be excluded because of an un-
willingness or inability to come to a particular
program site.
Target Population
Community support programs include individuals with
a number of different diagnoses. By far the largest number,
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however, are schizophrenics. Schizophrenics constitute
about one percent of the general population of the United
States and a large number of such individuals are at risk
of serious relapse over a one to two year span. On the
face of it, the re-admission of many of this number, it is
suggested, lacks necessary supporting and maintaining
forces in the community rather than a need for specific
treatment in a psychiatric institution. It is constantly
presented by supporters of community support programs that
many hospital re-admissions of this population may be pre-
ventable if the appropriate array of treatment and suppor-
tive services can be made available in the community. The
same proponents maintain that a considerable number of
first hospital admissions could be averted should the same
support programs be offered to the clients in need.
The seriously disabled individuals present special
problems such as: (1) a lack of the general and specific
coping skills to enable them to meet successfully the prob-
lems of everyday life—of meeting and getting along with
others, of adjusting to the realities of a work situation,
and of providing for their own daily needs; (2) a high de-
gree of vulnerability to stress; (3) a lack of self-confi-
dence; and (4) residuals of a psychiatric illness, leaving
them subject to relapses.
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Problems and Suggestions
The special problems of the target population are
aggravated by deficiencies in our society's response to
them. Of the problems noted, only the residual mental ill-
ness has received significant attention in the community.
On the whole, follow-up and aftercare programs are not ade-
quate to meet the needs of the chronic patients. Personal
support appears to be provided only to those few who retain
positive family or friendship ties, or who have access to
one of the few organized support programs in Massachusetts.
Generally, special assistance and preparation to meet
everyday problems of living are only occasionally afforded.
Assistance in meeting needs for adequate housing is grossly
inadequate except for those who truly need 24-hour nursing
care. Furthermore, the lack of understanding of mental
illness on the part of the public, and discriminatory pol-
icies of public programs, compound the problems of the per-
son who is disabled as a result of mental illness. Despite
the efforts of professionals and volunteers in the field to
change public attitudes, mentally ill persons are a source
of discomfort and fear to most people. The popular percep-
tion of the mentally ill as dangerous and wildly unpredic-
table is daily reinforced by our commitment laws, by news
articles, and occasionally by actual violent acts which,
however infrequent they may be, are fully reported and
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contribute to the public alienation for the mentally ill.
Corrective actions are needed and include at least
four major steps: (1) build public understanding of the
real nature of mental illness, and of the problems of the
severely disabled. The citizen needs to know that the per-
son who is or has been mentally ill is rarely to be feared,
but needs support, assistance, and especially an opportun-
ity to construct a more normal existence. (2) develop un-
derstanding by the public, agencies, and professionals of
the program needs; (3) plan necessary programs and secure
funding
,
and (4) implement community support programs.
The mentally disabled have the same basic needs
that everybody has. Lengthy lists of potentially needed
services can be made. The necessary area of services, how-
ever, can be summed up in the following categories of ser-
vice needs: (1) medical care; (2) mental health care and
treatment (to include access to the full range of local
treatment services, including hospitalization, when re-
quired); (3) housing (a range of possibilities should be
available in every area, including private arrangements,
cooperative apartments, group homes, and perhaps other
options as well); (4) social and recreational provisions;
(5) personal support—This may be provided by caring staff,
relatives, friends, and volunteers; (6) gainful employment
in a job that needs to be done; and (7) money management.
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All services, to be truly effective, must be opti-
mally accessible to the person in need. This means that
they must be available on a crisis basis. It also means
that they must be geographically accessible, and as free as
possible from psychological barriers. Services must be ac-
tively presented to potential users, for example—not mere-
ly offered to those who seek them out. Services must also
be available on an indefinite basis. They must be provided
continuously as needed, and the client who "graduates" from
a service must be able to achieve reenty at any time the
need re-appears.
It would also appear that training programs and on-
site visits to established programs should be in order.
Such past efforts have so far been primarily directed to
mental health workers, but with increasing involvement of
related agencies. Educational and training activities,
once begun, should continue and expand.
Advocates for community support programs maintain
that they have emerged in recent years as effective ways to
assist adults who have been handicapped by mental illness
to survive in the community, and to take part as productive
members of society. It is suggested by most proponents
that a CSP should consist at a minimum of a Psychosocial
Rehabilitation Program with the following major components:
1. Prevocat ional Day Program . This program is
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directly aimed at counteracting the disabling effects of
alienation and lack of direction. The program enables a
disabled person to discover and demonstrate productive
capacity in the process of making a contribution to the
operation of the program which will be productive, valued,
and appreciated by others.
2
- Transit ional Employment
. This program offers
opportunities for members who have reached an appropriate
level of job readiness to be employed in a part-time job
with a firm which has entered into an agreement with the
program. The program provides a competent and dependable
supply of labor and the employer involves is to pay the
worker at the usual rate for the work and also document
his successful job functioning. This documentation becomes
the key to the eventual goal of permanent, full-time inde-
pendent employment.
3. Housing
. Community apartments : The rehabili-
tation program may lease apartments in the community for
subletting to members. This makes more satisfactory liv-
ing arrangements accessible to the members at a cost they
can afford by sharing. The apartment program has secondary
rehabilitative functions in the decorating and furnishing
of apartments and their subsequent maintenance. It also
provides a focus for trainee education and adjustment to
apartment living, including cooking skills, shopping, meal
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planning, housekeeping, etc. A distinct advantage of the
apartment program, as compared with group living arrange-
ments, is the maximizing of the normalization process,
avoidance of zoning issues, and reduction of community re-
sistance. Transit ional residences : A transitional resi-
dence is designed to provide a cooperative community living
arrangement with supportive supervision for up to nine
residents at a time. Residents should be semi-independent,
capable of managing their own medication, if any, and cap-
able of minimally acceptable social behavior.
4
- Social and Recreational Program
. This program
provides both organized activities and also opportunities
for the unstructured use of leisure time. It maximizes
use of volunteers and also member leadership roles. Most
activities are concentrated on evening hours, holidays, and
weekends. Particularly significant are the supportive in-
fluences provided to maintain adjustment and to work
through job conflicts and interpersonal difficulties.
5. Mental Health Services . The full range of
mental health services will be provided by the area mental
health program, 'on the same basis as to any resident of
the catchment area. Services may also be rendered by pri-
vate practitioners in the community at the consumer's op-
tion. The area mental health program will also have in
effect a vocational rehabilitative agency.
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Case Management system to assure that appro-
priate services, including health, adult education, social
services and assistance in managing financial affairs are
provided in a well-coordinated and timely manner to meet
the needs of the individual member.
There are different ways of achieving this assur-
ance, but all require the lodging of all individual case
responsibility in a single worker or team. In some pro-
grams, this is achieved by having each staff member serve
in large part as a generalist who involves himself directly
in the provision of many of the needed services. Inevit-
ably, however, the case manager is involved in many coor-
dinating and facilitative actions also, as he works to
focus the support and services of other agencies on the
needs of his client.
Recapitulation
The field of mental health experienced a multitude
of growing pains other than those provided by deinstitu-
tionalization as it passed through the 1970 's. It was a
time which offered new opportunities to respond to the
changing needs of the psychiatrically disabled. But, with
any alteration of the status quo, it was potentially a
disorienting period.
Many of the beliefs about the treatment of mental
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patients stemmed from experience in long-stay, institution-
al settings which emphasized the medical model. Work with
patients in such settings had not usually stressed the de-
velopment of functional skills. Rather, treatment was
viewed as a circumscribed event focused on the removal of
psychopathology— the assumption being that the control of
symptomatology would lead to the restoration of normal com-
munity functioning. It has been the belief of initiators
and supporters of Community Support Programs that the in-
patient programs aimed at developing functional skills
have had discouraging results, and that behaviors learned
in a hospital setting are often not transferable when the
patient is discharged to the community.
The once chronically hospitalized psychiatric pop-
ulation is now largely living in the community. A policy
of dehospitalization or depopulation has been adopted na-
tionwide as a focus thrust of deinstitutionalization with
unanticipated consequences. In a period of rapid change,
deinstitutionalized patients, mental health workers, and
members of the community have proven ill-equipped to deal
with their altered circumstances. Ex-patients whose com-
pliance and dependency had long been fostered in authori-
tarian institutional settings found themselves handicapped
by these behavior patterns in their new community environ-
ments. Mental health workers, who tended to be either
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vehemently opposed or complacently approving of the migra-
tion of patients to the community, made little effort to
adapt the existing community service delivery system to
the special needs of the large populations of discharged
patients that suddenly confronted them. Similarly, the
response of community members to the ex-patients thrust in
their midst was, at best, indifferent and, at worst out-
right hostility and rejection. Inevitably, this general-
ized failure of preparation and response had damaging re-
sults which have been well—documented in the news media.
Good ideas, like good intentions, often pave the
wrong road. And so it was with certain aspects of "com-
munity care." The well-intentioned idea was that many
people who were or might be institutionalized could func-
tion adequately—or more than adequately— in their own
communities. But the idea for treatment in the community
came before strategies for accomplishing its goals, a
better life for the mentally ill and more humane public
treatment
.
Those hit hardest were chronic patients without
comfortable places to live, those whose disabilities were
severe enough to require much more than traditional medi-
cal treatment and psychological counseling, but not so
dependent as to need long-term hospitalization. These
people had to learn how to take care of themselves—how to
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find an appropriate place to live, to work, and to play.
They required an entire support system with the same kinds
of services in the community that had once been provided
under one roof. While other patients benefited from in-
creased autonomy, short-terms hospital stays, and effective
crisis programs that got them home as soon as possible,
chronic patients suffered the loneliness of good intentions.
Atkins said (1980):
It is clear that throughout the history of stateinvolvement with mentally disabled people the
central issue has been where they should be housed,
not how they should be treated. (p. 5)
Statements of this nature have been representative of the
feeling that if we are to discharge mental health patients
to the community, particularly those whose illness has been
and will continue to be chronic, we must provide the sup-
portive services which can sustain their daily living
without further institutionalization, if at all possible.
Rutman (1976) provided a rather strong statement
regarding modern care of the mentally disabled:
Several basic issues underlying the concern for
community-based, as opposed to institutional care
for the mentally disabled, should be noted at the
outset. First, a major proportion of all persons
now in mental institutions, or those who will be
hospitalized in the future, neither need nor bene-
fit from long-term extended inpatient care. Second,
there is reliable evidence that patients who remain
in institutions for extended periods experience a
variety of debilitating effects, and that the cumu-
lative results of long-term confinement, a condition
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of state often referred to as institutionalization
s more damaging to the person's mental health and’well being than the problem which required enteringthe hospital in the first place. Finally for
*
large numbers of present and future hospital pa-tients, return to normal social functioning canon y be accomplished if there are developed a var-
community-based residential facilities
w ich can provide an atmosphere in which such per-sons can feel secure and accepted by peers, canimprove skills of daily living, and can be’helped
o md their niche in the normal environment
(p. 2)
Beyond the need for community residential alterna-
tives, those involved in the deinstitutionalization process
soon came to realize that a multi-faceted approach to a
complex problem must be researched, planned and accom-
plished. Depopulating the hospitals by placing former
patients in nursing homes and group living residences is
not, by itself, the change process indicated by deinsti-
tutionalization. Professional literature of the 1970's
attests to that fact.
The writings have highlighted numerous deficiencies
in existing community care systems. A theme in much of
the literature of the period is the failure of the commun-
ity health movement to bring significant benefits to sev-
erely mentally ill (Arnhoff, 1975; Kirk & Therrien, 1975;
Reich & Siegel, 1973).
Klerman (1977) refers to these patients as "better
but not well," and mentions their need for some degree of
social support. He suggests that the mental health
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movement may have become over-ambitious in the late 1960's,
expanding its responsibilities too broadly, before being
sure that the need to solve the problems of schizophrenics
— "one of our primary clinical obligations"—had been ful-
filled (p. 626).
Kirk and Therrien (1975) identify four myths that
they believe have obscured the fate of former patients.
While community mental health ideology was based on be-
liefs that community care would save money, that continuity
of care would be enhanced, that former patients would be
rehabilitated, and that the mentally ill would be reinte-
grated into society, these hopes have not been fulfilled.
The argument of Kohen and Paul (1976) is the lack
of rehabilitation in their review of proprietary extended
care facilities for the chronically mentally ill. They
point out that the placement of long-stay mental patients
in such facilities as foster homes, nursing homes or group
living residences accounts for nearly all of the reduc-
tions in the chronic population of public hospitals over
the past 15 years. While professional follow-ups of these
placements have been relatively scarce, the authors cite
several studies supporting their thesis that extended-care
placements have improved neither rehabilitation program-
ming nor the functional status of chronic mental patients
(Ellsworth, 1968; Epstein & Simon, 1968; Hefferin, 1968;
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Lamb & Goertzel, 1972; McClannahan & Risley, 1975 ).
The myth of reintegration is addressed by Aviram
and Segal (1973) who discuss new forms of social exclusion
of the mentally ill in the community.
In many cases where the mentally ill are in the
community
,
they are socially excluded by mechan-isms that foster a docility (such as overuse ofdrugs and the caretaker's economic incentive to
maintain a stable resident population rather thanto encourage a higher level of functioning) or byforces that encourage ghettoizat ion (such as zon-ing laws and local administrative regulation)
(p. 131)
Arnoff s (1975) review of social policy toward men-
tal illness raises an even more fundamental question.
A compelling body of systematic evidence now exists
to suggest that the actual cost-benefits of com-
munity treatment are far less than its advocates
proclaim, but that the consequences of indiscrim-
inate communtiy treatment may often have profound
iatrogenic effect: in short, we may be producing
more psychological and social disturbance than we
correct. (p. 12)
The problems expressed were documented from a fed-
eral viewpoint by two published congressional studies. A
March 1976 Senate Subcommittee Report deplored conditions
in proprietary nursing and boarding homes, citing serious
instances of neglect and abuse (Senate Subcommittee on
Long-Term Care, 1976). The report warned that privately
operated boarding homes are like nursing homes, rapidly
emerging as a major industry that will soon become in-
tractable. The report also highlighted problems connected
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with placement of ambulatory former mental patients in
nursing homes designed for the physically disabled or
dying.
Perhaps the most comprehensive study of the issues
from a federal perspective was the 1977 report issues by
the General Accounting Office (GAO). After extensive
studies of services affecting treatment of the mentally ill
in five states, the GAO concluded that "deinstitutionaliza-
tion has been adopted as a national policy without ade-
quate mechanisms to implement the idea effectively. Like
the senate reports, the GAO found that thousands of pa-
tients in mental hospitals remain there principally because
few alternatives exist, while additional thousands are be-
ing placed in community facilities and settings that may be
as stultifying and disabling as mental institutions.
Both congressional studies agreed that failure at
the national level to develop a coherent policy toward the
seriously mentally disabled is a major contributing factor
to the current crisis in services to this population.
During the period from 1975 to 1977, certain themes
emerged about the major causes of inadequacies in existing
service systems. Several such themes reappeared in differ-
ent arenas with sufficient frequency to suggest the ele-
ments of a federal initiative.
The congressional studies emphasized the lack of
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coherent federal policy regarding services to the mentally
disabled, pointing out that federal rhetoric and policies
had encouraged the trend away from reliance on institutions
for long-term care, but failed to provide effective imple-
mentation strategies. Discussions of this issue produced
a clear consensus that the term "deinstitut ionalizat ion"
was no longer useful as a planning goal. Over-reliance on
the ambiguous and misleading concept of deinstitutionaliz-
ation may have contributed to some of the system problems
being widely acknowledged by the press, the professions,
consumers and advocates of mental health services, and
others
.
There were numerous disadvantages cited with the
association of deinstitutionalization as a goal: the im-
plicit emphasis on getting rid of something rather than
creating something positive; the additional negative con-
notations in states where the term is associated with
"dumping" mentally disabled persons into neighborhoods
lacking adequate services; the overly simplistic dichotomy
implied by the term, suggesting that institutional care is
"bad" and community care is "good"; and the fallacy of
assuming, as was often done in earlier times of the move-
ment, that success could be measured by counting the number
of institutions closed or the reductions in resident popu-
lations of state mental hospitals.
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The magnitude of the need for improved community
services and the necessity for a more systematic approach
was first given official federal recognition within the
National Institute of Mental Health in early 1974 with the
establishment of an ad hoc internal Community Support Work
Group. The group defined its task as "promoting an organ-
ized community-based system of facilities and services to
increase the opportunity for mentally handicapped adults
to remain in the community and function at optional levels
of independence" (Ozarin, 1974). The development of an
NIMH strategy for pursuing the goal of Community Support
Programs (CSP) was a participatory process involving dozens
of people within NIMH and a wide range of individual con-
sultants and organizations throughout the country.
A Community Support Program Draft Proposal (Turner,
Stone, St Ten Hoor, 1977) was widely circulated in March of
that year for comment. Based on an overwhelmingly positive
response to the proposal, Bertram S. Brown, then Director
of NIMH, authorized its further development and implemen-
tation .
A Community Support Program Implementation Group
was established in June of 1977. This group analyzed the
many comments from the field on the draft proposal, synthe-
sized the changes suggested, and prepared detailed Requests
for Proposals (RFP's) to be used in competitive contract
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procurements open to all state mental health agencies.
That year, the National Institute of Mental Health
launched a pilot program titled the Community Support Pro-
gram (CSP)
. In its finality, the CSP was designed to im-
prove services for one particularly vulnerable population-
adult psychiatric patients whose disabilities are severe
and persistent, but for whom long-term skilled or semi-
skilled nursing care is inappropriate.
The CSP involved contracts, not grants, between
NIMH and state mental health agencies, many of whom would
subcontract with local agencies for demonstration projects.
During the first year, 19 states were awarded contracts
totalling approximtely 3.5 million dollars. Some of the
contracts were for "strategy-development" for states with
a need for more extensive planning, and others were awarded
for "community support system demonstration and replica-
tion" that would test different ways to develop community
support systems in local demonstration areas.
It was indeed a modest attempt by the federal gov-
ernment agency to support state and local areas since the
average amount for each entire state was only a little
over $184,000. The hope was that at the end of three
years, when funding ended, that the CSP's could be repli-
cated by non-demonstration areas by way of the establish-
ment of private, state licensed agencies or through state
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certified public agencies both of whom could bill for
third party payments for services rendered.
Though mechanisms were found in some states, dis-
tricts, or areas to establish "free standing” or separate
facilities or programs such as day treatment programs,
these services were only a part of the requirements for
CSP's on behalf of the patients. As a result, and
Massachusetts is one example, the replication of CSP’s was
insignificant in relation to the total need to continue
and build upon earlier efforts. The task reverted to the
public sector and, in Massachusetts, to the Department of
Mental Health.
It appeared that a New York Times editorial
(February 7, 1978) was a foreboding. While the article
emphasized the need for federal leadership to improve ser-
vices to chronic patients, it referred to the CSP initia-
tive as "belatedly pulled together" and "meager."
Nevertheless, the concept of Community Support
Programs took hold in a number of areas in Massachusetts
which were effected by the deinstitutionalization movement
as being essential to its success. The question for con-
cerned Department of Mental Health area administrators was
not what was needed, but rather how to provide them. There
were no new federal or state dollars to accomplish the mis-
sion for those patients who could benefit the most.
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The following chapter includes examples of the
relevancy, implications, successes, failures, and alterna-
tives to Community Support Programs (CSP). The key element
of any attempts to plan and successfully implement such
pi ograms related to deinstitutionalization lies within the
decentralization of decision-making, as well as fiscal and
personnel management at the area level.
CHAPTER VII
DECENTRALIZATION AND DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION:
FALL RIVER STUDY
Introduction
This chapter includes several studies of decen-
tralized departmental program and services change which
are examined in terms of their incidental and/or inten-
tional relationship to deinstitutionalization in the
catchment area of Fall River.
The original thesis that deinstitutionalization in
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has essentially resulted
from a potpourri of events, some tangential to the field
of mental health, is maintained and expanded.
Description of the Fall River Area
Fall River is one of 41 catchment areas within the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts' Department of Mental Health.
The areas are divided among seven geographic regions in
the state beginning with Region I in the western section.
Region V, which includes Fall River, is located in south-
eastern Massachusetts and includes Cape Cod and the islands
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of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket.
A catchment area" describes the community within
which the Department of Mental Health assumes the responsi-
bility to provide the 12 essential services referred to
earlier. The Area under examination includes the City of
Fall River and the surrounding towns of Freetown, Somerset,
Swansea, and Westport with a 1980 total population of
152,000.
Greater Fall River has been officially designated
as a poverty area by the Office of Economic Opportunity and
other certifying agencies which would qualify a region for
economic assistance through federal programs. The popula-
tion of the area is 60 percent Portuguese, including many
recent immigrants from the Portuguese mainland and the
Azores. This population has been designated as a minority
by the federal government. Ten percent of the families in
Fall River live at or below the official poverty level as
determined in the 1980 census. The mean income for 2,700
families was $1,996. Median family income for the City
was $2,500 below the state median in 1980, due largely to
the dominance of garment industries in the City which make
up nearly one-half of all manufacturing output. These in-
dustries offer typically low wages, and often do not oper-
ate for the entire 52 weeks of a year.
Unemployment has been chronically high for most of
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the last decade, averaging eight to nine percent and being
as high as 12 percent in a state where long-term unemploy-
ment has been above the national average for some time.
Despite efforts to diversify industry, the area
economy remains dominated by apparel and related manufac-
tuiing. Manufacturing comprises almost one-half of the
Fall River area's employment (21,300 workers), and apparel
and textile manufacturing account for three-fourths of
that total of 15,500 jobs, fully a third of the total area
non-agr icultural employment.
Low skill levels and their inevitable comparions,
low wage lates, are products of the Fall River apparel
manufacturing concentration. Fully 33 percent of the labor
force was classified as "operatives" in the 1980 census
skill index, and such persons are largely employed in ap-
parel and related industries where wages are historically
low. Contrasted with state figures, apparel manufacturing
earnings (which accounted for 54.6 percent of all manufac-
turing earnings in the city) were a full 50 dollars a week
less than the average weekly earnings for all manufacturing
in the Commonwealth. These statistics take on even more
meaning when viewed in the context of eight percent of the
Commonwealth's manufacturing earnings being in the apparel
field, again pointing up the extent of Fall River's earn-
ings concentration in the apparel field.
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Population education levels are traditionally low
in a region where economic opportunities do not present
themselves as requiring upper level education and training.
While this is changing in the Fall River Area, the long-
standing openings for low-skill employment has given Fall
River an under-educated population, particularly among per-
sons in their middle years of life. In 1980, the median
educational level for all persons over 25 in Fall River was
8.6 years. For the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, it was
11.6, a full three years difference. A study several years
ago by the Fall River School Department pegged the school
dropout rate in Fall River at 30 percent. Information from
that source now suggests that there was some underestima-
tion in the original survey, and that the rate was in fact
higher
.
According to the 1980 census, nearly 14 percent,
or approximately 14,000 of 97,000 citizens, were 65 or
over. This segment of the population is still increasing;
9.7 percent live alone and 26.6 percent are categorized as
being poor. In addition, the Fall River Area is comprised
of a significant population of persons living alone. In
fact, area wide, one in five persons (19.1 percent) is the
only person living in his/her household. Widowed females
make up 14.3 percent of the population. Thus, a consider-
able percentage of the population is disconnected from
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other household residents who could be a source of support
in a crisis situation. Research has documented that per-
sons without significant support available from others are
3-t greater risk for emotional illness due to the stresses
of daily life.
Fall River has historically been a point of entry
for immigrants from the Portuguese mainland and especially
the Azorean Islands. Unlike the neighboring City of New
Bedford, however, which has experienced a considerable mi-
gration of "black Portuguese" from the Cape Verdean Islands,
Fall River's immigration population is almost entirely
white. There is present within the City a considerable
immigrant population which was counted in the 1980's census
as 15,559 "foreign-born" persons. Another 31,493 persons
in Fall River were listed as "natives of foreign or mixed
parentage .
”
An implication of the large immigrant population
for program planning is the need to both speak the language
and understand the folkways of the immigrant Portuguese.
In many respects, the Portuguese immigrant is a peasant
living in an urban environment, particularly the older
Portuguese family members who are less exposed than their
children to the socializing effects of school. The island
of St. Michael, from which many immigrants come, is largely
a peasant-oriented environment with farming dominating much
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of the culture. Transplanted to Fall River with its large-
ly manufacturing economy and needle-trades dominance, many
unskilled Portuguese find employment in the garment indus-
try. The experience of immigration is known to produce
more psychological stress both for individuals and espe-
cially for families. Support systems that are ordinarily
available in the country of origin are often weak or miss-
ing in the new country. Persons suffering from chronic
emotional illnesses are likely to experience even more
difficulties due to immigration.
Preface
A study performed by Emery and Trist (1965) result-
ed in findings that society may be viewed as moving from
the one extreme, in which conditions affecting mental
health program development were relatively placid and ran-
domly distributed; to the opposite extreme, in which even
more complex interconnections and fluctuating forces con-
front organizations with turbulent environments. The tur-
bulence referred to has been created by expanding scientif-
ic and technological developments, by changing societal
values, by altered professional domains, and perhaps most
notably, by people's growing aspiration to control rather
than to be victims of their surroundings. Under these
conditions, the community mental health environment has
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been drastically altered by psycho-pharmacology, by soci-
ety's increased awareness of and tolerance for mental ill-
ness, by the growing use of nonprofessional personnel in
mental health programs, and by expanded citizen roles in
determining program priorities. During turbulent periods,
however, survival and continued organizational autonomy
are yet dependent upon the professional's ability to gen-
erate sophisticated plans and strategies for obtaining
goal consensus and relevant resources.
The changing philosophy of mental health care which
has been predominant during the past decade has embraced
the goal of avoiding hospitalization whenever possible and
is further supported by Schwartz (1971) who referred to the
"replacement of custodial philosophies by therapeutic ones"
(p. 68). Because institutionalization is perceived as
banishment from society (Rusk, 1972) and is also viewed
as fostering regression among patients (Hertz, 1972), there
follows a strong feeling that providing services on a local
level with adequate and appropriate community support ser-
vices should replace a state hospital admission. There is
a substantial amount of statistical evidence, also, that
substantiates the philosophy that hospitalization begets
more hospitalization. Selected examples are provided in:
Anthony et al
.
(1972), Buell and Anthony (1973), Fontana
and Dowds (1975), Franklin, Kittredge and Thrasher (1975),
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Kirk (1976), Rosenblatt and Mayer (1974), and Schwartz
(1971)
.
Changes in treatment patterns have occurred, ac-
cording to Feldman (1974), "not because our patients are
really any different, but because we are" (p. 20). Hersch
(1972) points out that what may simply be labelled "the
times" may be characterized in one of two ways—either as
an era of social-political conservatism or as an era of
social-political reform. The former favors a view of prob-
lems as having their bases in individuals, while in the
latter, the locus of problems is the environment. Accord-
ingly, the former's emphasis for improvement is on changing
the individual
;
the latter has greater weight placed upon
modifying the environment. The deinstitutionalization
movement, according to Bachrach (1976), "is clearly the
outgrowth of an era of social-political reform" (p. 6).
Schulberg and Baker (1975) contended that:
Although it is possible to define relatively clear-
ly the manner in which each of the essential ser-
vices in a community mental health program should
be provided, the organization of these elements
into a comprehensive system is a far more formid-
able program. (p. 249)
Fall River Community Mental Health
Public mental health services in Fall River began
in 1962 when an outpatient clinic was set up at the private
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Union Hospital under the administration of Taunton State
Hospital. It was a result primarily of the efforts of the
Fall River Mental Health Association. The Greater Fall
River geographic area was, at that time, being drawn in
preliminary plans at the Department of Mental Health.
In 1965, a small day program was added and plans
were initiated to have one of the first of two new centers
in the state open in Fall River because it ranked second
in a provisional need and resource index developed by the
federal government. It was planned and staffed to be a
comprehensive center under the first Federal Guidelines.
The Dr. John C. Corrigan Mental Health Center was acti-
vated in July of 1968, constructed by a federal grant and
staffed by state (DMH) personnel.
The Fall River Area of the Massachusetts Department
of Mental Health has been directly involved in the deinsti-
tutionalization of chronic patients— from the regional
Taunton State Hospital since 1973, though the Center opened
five years earlier for the treatment of catchment area
citizens in need of short-term acute psychiatric care.
There was at that time no administrative nor pro-
grammatic relationship between the Community Mental Health
Center and the State Hospital's Fall River Unit 15 miles
away
.
A chronic population, many of whom were over age
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65, resided at the hospital while the Center began to in-
tercept acute admissions which had previously been referred
to the hospital by area physicians, families, the district
court, and police. Any of the chronic patients at the hos-
pital who were placed in area nursing homes resulted from
the efforts of a centralized hospital social work "place-
ment team" with no communication with the area office and
with no follow-up. Other than a very rare discharge to
family care, nursing homes were the only discharge plans
for those patients who left the state hospital. Such fa-
cilities, to this day, remain a "place" for elderly and
chronic patients to re-locate, just as the general hospi-
tals have been doing for a number of years, but not always
in concert with mental health facilities regarding follow-
up or aftercare.
Chu and Trotter (1972) noted that the NIMH regula-
tions (HEW, 1964) for community mental health center:
. .
.
prescribed no plans, mechanisms, nor proce-
dures to guide centers in determining their rela-
tionship to state hospitals, no methods to divert
potential state hospital admissions instead to
community mental health centers, and no procedures
whereby patients released from state hospitals
could be rehabilitated and assisted back into the
community. Indeed, the regulations contain not a
single reference to the goal of supplanting state
hospitals. This omission reveals perhaps the most
erroneous set of assumptions underlying the commun-
ity mental health centers programs. (p. 12)
At the state hospital, DMH policies or mandates
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were carried out by the personnel responsible for managing
geographic units.
"Unitization," which had become a new
term, referred to all patients who were identified by spe-
cific community family ties or origin within a region and
who were intended to be relocated within that region. This
policy and procedure was established at Taunton State Hos-
pital in Region V of DMH in 1972 when there were estab-
lished the Attleboro, Brockton, Cape Cod, New Bedford,
Plymouth, Taunton, and Fall River units.
Previously, patients had been admitted from the
Region simply as hospital patients wherever there was an
empty bed according to functional diagnosis— i.e., acute,
chronic, "dangerous , " and alcoholic. In addition, there was
a separate medical-geriatric ward, and all hospital pa-
tients were segregated according to sex. It was determined
however, by Department of Mental Health "planners," "sur-
veyors, consultants," and central and regional office
administrators that patients were receiving nothing more
than custodial care with little or no psychiatric or medi-
cal treatment in addition to negative factors of support
or care services relating to the physical plant. At this
time, through the decentralization process, it became the
responsibility of the unit administrators to establish
treatment modalities and programs which would fulfill psy-
chiatric and medical needs of the chronic, acute, dangerous
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alcoholic patients on the same unit based upon the pa-
tients’ area relationships. The unit personnel from that
time on became the caretakers and the treatment specialists
for a mixed population. The only differentiation was by
the establishment of separate wards for males and females,
but with no regard of patients' diagnoses. Contrary to
this process, unitization was inhibited because there was
no administrative nor programmatic contact between hospital
personnel and the area office. As a result, the procedure
of decentralization at this time was only a "paper" reality,
and depopulation of the hospital had become the veritable
thrust of deinstitutionalization.
Administrative Decentralization at
the Regional Level
In the fall of 1977, the position of Superintendent
of Taunton State Hospital was removed officially by the
Department of Mental Health. Simultaneously, official
responsibility and accountability within the hospital was
divided among the Assistant Superintendent of the hospital
and seven area directors. Affiliation agreements were
written, signed by the area directors and the Assistant
Superintendent, and approved by the Region V Services
Administrator as the Commissioner's designee.
The agreements specified that the Assistant
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Superintendent would be responsible for all core or support
services; e.g., dietary, pharmacy, security, maintenance,
grounds, housekeeping, clerical, and personnel. The area
directors assumed administrative responsibility for the di-
rect care clinical staff responsibilities and services of
their respective geographic units which were designated
"Facilities" in 1978 by the Department of Mental Health.
A Facility incorporated each of seven hospital units with
the seven geographic area mental health services and pro-
grams. The area directors became Facility directors at
Taunton State Hospital and assumed full responsibility for
deinstitutionalizing the patients from their respective
units. This entire process was the first major step in
decentralizing accountability and responsibility from the
previously managed Region V State Hospital to the area
level
.
Despite these changes, the arrangement was con-
sidered to be nebulous and manacing by hospital personnel.
It had been quite a sudden move for many of the staff who
felt more comfortable being responsible to one authority,
the Superintendent. In addition, guidelines for a change-
over to the Facility concept could not be found in the
Alliance (Union) contract, nor in the Massachusetts Nurses'
Association agreement. Further, at the time such organiza-
tional change was not specifically included in state
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legislation, Joint Hospital Accreditation standards, nor
the federal certification regulations as surveyed by the
Massachusetts Department of Public Health.
Changes at Taunton State Hospital beginning with
geographic unitization and continuing through further de-
centralization of unit patients and staff towards commun-
ity living prompted strong resistances among competing
forces with differing goals. Conflicts were initiated sim-
ilar to those initially described by Ishiyama and Grover
(1960) in their study of a mental hospital where unitiza-
tion was undertaken to reduce custodial care and increase
therapy
.
A considerable number of employees were threatened
because of the possible loss of employment or the neces-
sity of relocating to an area program because of the de-
centralizing of services and the depopulation of the state
hospital. Other members of the direct-care personnel
—
mental health assistants, licensed practical nurses and
registered nurses--spoke of being community mental health
oriented and supportive of returning the patients to their
respective communities.
It is, however, difficult to document the sincerity
of that percentage of staff members. One might suspect
that the rationale of some was based upon economic secur-
ity since staff members were being reassigned to community
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residential programs and aftercare services as the patients
moved out. Another segment of the hospital staff members,
because of their long years of employment in an institu-
tion for the mentally ill, preferred to adhere to a status
quo philosophy of hospital admissions which was believed to
be the only appropriate modality of care and treatment.
The same ambivalence regarding job accountability
raised by other staff was also indicated by the physicians
who, in the past, were members of a state hospital medical
staff. The doctors felt fragmented since their directives
from administration at the Regional and Area levels in-
formed them that they were now responsible for psychiatric
and medical care on assigned units rather than on hospital-
wide coverage. They were also administratively responsible
to area directors, none of whom were medical doctors. This
process of deinstitutionalization now began to impact the
institution of medical practice as the essential approach
to mental illness. Though a medical staff existed, the
"medical model" at the State Hospital was significantly
altered. Physicians previously responded, and were direct-
ly accountable, to a superintendent holding a physician's
license
.
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Staff I nterdisciplinary Teams
Resulting From Decentralization
Previously, at the State Hospital, there had been
centralized meetings within clinical disciplines such as
social workers, nurses, doctors, and psychologists. The
change to geographic unitization resulted in interdiscip-
linary clinical team meetings. As the unit transition
progressed and the teams became more actively involved in
a decision-making process, resistance to change disappeared
with the exception of the medical staff. Authority and ac-
countability rested with the Unit Administrator and the
Area Director. This led to the advent of a quasi-medical
model at the State Hospital.
However, despite this adjustment, prominent clini-
cal problems continued to be the discrepancy between the
active efforts to treat acute patients and the meager
treatment programs directed toward long-term patients.
Unitization was considered to be an initial approach to a
solution. Past programs at the State Hospital were based
upon an organic and somatic etiological frame of reference.
This changed to a focus on socio-environmental factors.
The system then became a kind of sub-hospital model
(Rowitz & Levy, 1971), a term which refers to an organiza-
tional pattern which decentralizes certain clinical and ad-
ministrative activities while continuing centralized
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control and responsibility for others. According to the
authors, such a model, though it is complex and inconsis-
tent, reduces staff tension levels. Rushing (1964) and
Grunebaum (1970) agreed that since the arrival of the com-
munity mental health period, attention to the difficulties
in developing and coordinating professional roles and re-
lationships has intensified.
Mental health interdisciplinary teams became more
prominent as a result of the local unitization process and
community mental health planning and programming. Jepson
(1970), however, notes that ’’the term team means different
things in different settings; it is not simply the usual
trinity of psychiatrist, psychologist and social worker"
(p. 461). Levenson (1970) states emphatically that, "In
order to have an effective center program, it is necessary
that the staff members function as a team and that team
work extend to all aspects of the center's program"
(p. 522). However,
The member of a newly decentralized clinical ser-
vice was too often torn between an earlier alle-
giance to the department head who is a member of
his or her own discipline, and the present rela-
tionship with his interdisciplinary clinical team
member or program administrator who comes from a
different discipline. (Baker, O'Brien, & Sheldon,
1968, p. 238)
Thus, disunity or disagreement within the clinical team can
also have a negative effect on the patient, while in those
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situations where a team works effectively and achieves open
and frank communication, there is the distinct possibility
of adequate and, in some cases, improved patient care.
In a case history of changes in the work climate of
a residential treatment center, Kempler (1971) describes
the development of effective teamwork and the achievement
of approved interdisciplinary cooperation over the course
of three years by means of "communication meetings" between
the treatment staff and administration. The team moved
towards greater group cohesion and better working rela-
tionships among individuals with different professional
statuses, philosophies, and experience. Kempler describes
the positive changes as resulting both from regular meet-
ings which encouraged the open expression of feelings, as
well as the harmony of the changes with staff and values
needs
.
The composition of mental health teams has become
modified on a continuing basis at the community or area
locus as programs have become more sensitive to social
concerns. Certain professionals have consequently experi-
enced shifts in their levels of influence and prestige,
particularly in human services programs. Despite intense
conflicts between professionals and "nonprofessionals" as
described by Shaw and Eagle (1971), some of the groups
having been in a marginal status with respect to their
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degree of professionalism have taken advantage of opportun-
ities to further advance their identity. They have secured
and earned a stable place for themselves in the mental
health field. However, the dismay expressed by a psychi-
atrist such as Jacobson (1967) about the "boldness of some
inadequately trained persons in attempting to see patients
with the sanction of clinic directors" (p. 15) continues
to reflect the sentiments of many mental health profession-
als in addition to other human services agencies and within
the general medical hospital professions and administra-
tions
.
Schulberg and Baker (1975) emphasized that:
It often has been demonstrated that professional
workers in bureaucratic organizations are con-
fronted with conflicting role definitions, and
that they are prone to develop either a "local"
or "cosmopolitan" orientational pattern. Those
adopting the local organization in which they
work give major consideration to its expectations
in defining major tasks; those adopting a cosmo-
politan orientation tend to give primacy to the
expectations of external groups such as their
profession and colleagues in other work settings,
(p. 213)
Decentralization at the State
Hospital Unit Level
Through an initial phase of decentralization re-
garding accountability and responsibility at the area
level, a unit administrator and a interdisciplinary team
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were assigned to the state hospital's Fall River unit by
the area administrator in 1973. A registered nurse with
a master's degree in psychiatric nursing became the unit
administrator. She had previous experience on the Inpa-
tient Unit at the Community Mental Health Center as well
as involvement in planning and implementing community men-
tal health programs. The team members included registered
nurses, licensed practical nurses, a psychologist, a social
worker, and several mental health assistants.
This experience was the first and most significant
meaningful tie between the community and the institution
in Taunton. In spite of this breakthrough, however, there
remained a dual system of providing mental health services,
the responsibility of which was that of the area office
—
deinstitutionalization of the chronic population at the
state hospital, and the treatment of acutely mentally ill
at the community health center's inpatient service as well
as outpatient and day programs, while there was a superin-
tendent responsible for the entire operation of Taunton
State Hospital. It was a period of confusion for all unit
personnel. There was uncertainty on behalf of certain
state hospital staff members regarding their accountability
and the reality of relocating long-stay patients to the
community because of personal reasons.
Nevertheless, the identification of selected
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patients for community reentry was begun by the core, in-
terdisciplinary team, utilizing an unsophisticated, profes-
sional and common sense approach—daily observation and
clinical records. Two years later, by way of an affilia-
tion with Brandeis University and two of its students along
with a regional staff person, a more sophisticated and
quite lengthy instrument was designated by the Regional
Services Administrator to select patients, by category, to
be deinstitutionalized. It was no more meaningful nor ef-
fective than the method employed by the Fall River unit
staff who self-perpetrated a system many months before
charts, graphs, questionnaires, and memos were generated
from either the central or regional offices of the Depart-
ment of Mental Health.
The message had been clear: depopulation or clos-
ing of the state hospital was the goal, and within a time-
frame which would shortly be limited by DMH mandate. The
Fall River Area administration and state hospital staff
took the initiative. This was the first realistic clinical
and programmatic approach to deinstitutionalization in the
Commonwealth
.
In keeping with the Department of Mental Health's
expressed intent to eventually phase out Taunton State
Hospital while concomitantly establishing alternative com-
munity programs, a transitional group living unit was
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organized at Borden Colony, part of State Hospital property
located three miles from the institution which was previ-
ously designated as the "state farm." The building which
housed the clients and staff was called "River Falls Manor"
and the program began in February of 1974.
The goal and philosophy were commensurate with the
Fall River unit's placement program, to place 60 patients
within a one-year period, while respecting the dignity of
each patient and the social equilibrium of the community.
The program provided patients with a supportive, rehabili-
tation experience in an environment that fostered growth
and independence. To achieve such an environment, it was
necessary to establish a unique area set apart from the
traditional chronic ward which functioned similarly to a
community home in atmosphere as well as activities. The
number of patients was kept to a maximum of 20 at any one
time (for the most part, evenly divided among males and
females) to ensure quality care and individual programming.
Using in-service training as a vehicle, the daily staff,
most of whom were— and still are—mental health assistants
and licensed practical nurses working three shifts, were
integrated with the selected patients into the program.
A key to the success of the program was the indi-
vidual support and attention, training and consultation
received by invested employees from nursing supervisors,
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physicians, and other "professionals” among the staff as
well as the area administration. The "line staff" were,
afterall, involved in preparing themselves for eventual
total integration into the community along with their pa-
tients
.
The hospital unit had a predominantly chronic
institutionalized patient population who had received
custodial care for years. Such patients considered the
protective environment of the hospital as their home and
historically had been unable to function adequately and
acceptably in the community. Over the years, institution-
al dependencies were fostered to a point of incapacitation.
It was now the responsibility of the Fall River administra-
tion and staff to alleviate these factors and prepare the
patients for leaving in a gradual, sensitive manner.
The multi-disciplined transitional program commit-
tee was comprised of the unit administrator and eight
members of the unit staff: a principal social worker
(A.C.S.W.), a principal psychologist, two registered
nurses, a licensed practical nurse, and three mental health
assistants. Their immediate task was to select the first
group of patients and develop a program which would encom-
pass a learning or relearning process for the residents who
were to move to a "less restrictive" setting.
Criteria for the selection of patients, as stated
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earlier, was primarily based upon daily observation and the
clinical record. The committee determined the following:
1. The patient must have a potential for adjust-
ment to community living with certain degrees of supervi-
sion
.
2. The patient should not be demonstrating anti-
social behavior that would disrupt the functioning of the
program.
3. The patient must be physically able to be in-
volved in the activities offered.
4. The patient must be capable of self-preserva-
tion relative to fire drills.
5. The patient's family or relatives, if existent,
when notified of the program should be at least supportive
and cooperative; if not, hopefully involved.
Based upon the fact that over half of the inpatient
population in the Fall River unit was over 65 years of age
with financial assistance eligibility through welfare med-
ical assistance (Medicare), and that there were some com-
munity nursing homes available, the initial focus continued
to be on the geriatric patient. However, the younger pa-
tient was screened according to the selection criteria for
the transitional program and community placement.
Originally, the "transitional program" at Borden
Colony was to be a pilot program for the Fall River unit
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patients and staff with a time frame of one year. The lo-
cation, off of the State Hospital grounds, was reassigned
to another area after eight months by the hospital superin-
tendent with the approval of the Regional Services Adminis-
trator, in spite of protests by the Fall River administra-
tor and unit administrator. The following letter addressed
to the Superintendent explains what appears to be a logical
and honest request by the area administrator.
I wish to propose to the Taunton State Hospital
executive meeting on September 3rd that the Fall
River Unit be permitted to extend its Borden Colony
Pre-Placement Program in time, beyond that present-
ly agreed upon to at least the fall of 1975.
Our reasons and needs are as follows:
1. We are now under heavy fire in the Fall
River community from certain sources not only not
to have more halfway houses, but to stop several
we already have going. In the various discussions
with city authorities and concerned residents, we
are definitely on the line as a department and as
an agency to demonstrate quality programs in com-
munity placement and care of the chronic patients.
There are two enclosures which will indicate both
the troubles in a recent zoning hearing and our
response to a recent inquiry by a city councillor.
2. In addition, the approval of a Housing
Authority residence in one case was turned down
for unknown reasons at the Department of Community
Affairs in Boston and in a second instance is hung
up with the local Housing Authority Board. Both
of these houses are in process to serve existing
Fall River Unit patients and some of the chronic
patients in the Fall River community whom we have
intercepted in recent years from going to Taunton.
3. Last week, anticipating the needs for di-
rect information about our preparations for commun-
ity placement, I visited the Borden Colony Pre-
Placement Program. I found it to be an excellent
program mudged on a basis of 25 years familiarity
with attempts to activate and socialize chronic
patients in many hospitals. We are going to need
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to have this program in its current excellent con-
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t irnate there are at least 15 patientsin the Fall River community who will need exactlythe type of program that now exists. It will help
us gain the community acceptance now being actively
challenged. This is in addition to those who are
already screened on the ward to replace the firstgroup from the Colony who will be placed in commun-ity residences.
In effect, we have a sudden whole chain of
events threatening our mutual program. It is abso-lutely necessary to keep the placement unit as a
crucial link.
ihe resulting alternative was the establishment of
an on-site location at the State Hospital which was util-
ized to continue a transitional living arrangement. The
arrangement was the result of a straightforward statement
from the unit administrator which stressed:
We do not have a separate area for the program
which creates inherent ongoing problems. It is
extremely difficult to provide special services
to selected patients with a limited number of per-
sonnel without interfering with the operation of
the total unit and coverage services to other pa-
tients. Needless to say, one primary objective is
to obtain a designated area in order that we might
implement the program to its fullest potential with
a minimum of unit disruption.
It is felt that a successful halfway house op-
eration is dependent on three factors: (1) that
the patients and staff be sufficiently prepared
for community living and working; (2) that the
halfway house be staffed with an adequate number
of personnel interested in creating a home-like at-
mosphere; and (3) that whatever services necessary
are provided to the patient by a community network
of which consultation to personnel is imperative.
The major purpose continued to be the development
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of a program that would be a viable experience in preparing
both patients and staff for community living experiences.
The transitional program was thus continued on an empty
ward of the State Hospital with the following criteria:
Goals
:
1. To assist the employees in developing skills in
community mental health practice.
2. To assist the patients in determining and de-
fining their needs in preparing for community living.
3. To assist the patients in developing confidence
in themselves as individuals and as a cohesive group, which
will make it possible for them to successfully integrate
into the community.
4. To assist the families in becoming involved and
an ultimate strength for the patient.
5. To establish a foundation in preparation that
will ensure an effective halfway house operation.
6. To establish a system of care for all patients
who proceed to a community residence which will continue
indefinitely to be a part of the area unit follow-up sys-
tem which assumes appropriate responsibility for a contin-
uing care process.
Methods
:
1. Within the framework of the In-service Educa-
tion Program, employees will be provided with continuing
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education and supervision that will be meaningful to them
as it relates to the patients in the programs, and geared
toward enhancing their community mental health skills.
2. There will be supportive and ongoing opportun-
ities for employees to evaluate patients adjustment, and
modify the program.
3. Through individual attention from their assigned
therapist and the program's group activity, patients will
be taught the necessary skills to make the transition from
the structured hospital ward situation toward the greater
independence of a group living situation. Designated ac-
tivities with structure, purpose and goals will be formu-
lated
.
4. The provision of education, support and thera-
peutic services to the patient's family in order to alle-
viate their anxiety regarding the patient's reentering into
the community, to increase their understanding and accep-
tance, and to hopefully involve them in a support system.
5. Records will be kept regarding the growth and
revision of the program as well as individual progress
notes on each patient and family.
The primary expectation of all of the planning and
activities was the ultimate successful placement ol approx-
imately 15 patients in group home living experiences which
were to be established in the Fall River Area early in 1977.
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Although the experience at the State Hospital was
one of quasi-decentralization of management and programming
toward a phase of deinstitutionalization, the progress of
the movement was the result of certain unit staff members
who followed the Department's directives with a dedication
towards the goal of relocating the most able "chronic” pa-
tients to a less restrictive setting with little or none
of the fiscal or personnel means to do the job. There
were, however, other staff members who steadfastly related
that "it won't work."
As explained later in the chapter, the proposed
decentralization of resources as projected by regional and
central office planners for such an endeavor was never
realized. It was proclaimed by the department that such
dollars were still essential for the maintenance of the
units and support costs of the State Hospital.
The Fall River unit staff, administrators, and es-
pecially the patients were at a "point of no return."
Meanwhile, an unincorporated but very active and supportive
group was being formed. The organization consisted of
citizens and relatives of the State Hospital patients.
They raised money for many items and activities for the pa-
tients as well as home furnishings which were placed in
storage until a group home could be located and somehow
purchased
.
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Solicitation by this group, together with the Fall
River DMH administrators and staff for private financial
support, resulted in the entrance of a private entrepreneur
upon the scene. The individual purchased a home in Fall
River in an appropriately zoned middle class neighborhood
and made the necessary renovations to adhere to licensing
and safety regulations. Upon discharge from the state hos-
pital, all of the initial 12 patients became eligible for
social security income (SSI) benefits. From this income,
the rent was derived in addition to an allowance and some
savings for the residents of the first group home. DMH
provided the salaries of relocated state hospital personnel
to staff the home for seven days, 24-hours a day with a
direct line of accountability to the area office.
A distinction should be made here between what has
been briefly described as a private "entrepreneur" system
of developing a group residence and that which is regarded
as a "vendor system." Decentralization of services and
programs in the Massachusetts mental health system resulted
in the development of a variety of services provided by
"vendors" operating by contract with the department.
Rather simply, the process involves a "request for
proposal (RFP ) which entails placing an advertisement in
the classified section of several newspapers. The adver-
tisement or RFP briefly describes the program desired and
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the target population as part of the solicitation. Inter-
ested and prospective vendors or organizations who respond
are then required to present a more specific document in
terms of background, experience and training, a description
of how their program could fill the needs of the department
and client, and finally the cost of the program. Usually a
committee of DMH staff and area board citizens then make
the selection with the approval of the Commissioner's
Office
.
Contracted programs are funded through the "pur-
chase of service" or the "03" account
,
and the types of
mental health services provided throughout the Commonwealth
include: Residential
—
group residences, supervised apart-
ments, and respite care; Nonresident ial— day treatment, day
activity, pre-vocational workshops, emergency services,
crisis intervention, and pre-screening. Some of the ser-
vices, particularly residential, emergency and crisis in-
tervention are offered to children as well as adults.
Ordway House opened its doors on February 15, 1975
as a group living residence. Between that date and June
of 1977, 23 residents were discharged from Taunton State
Hospital to the home which still included 12 former hospit-
alized patients. Of the other 11 residents, four made suf-
ficient progress to live at home with their families— one
male resident got married and six clients took up residence
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in semi-supervised cooperative apartments which were also
staffed by DMH employees and supported by the clients' SSI
payments. All 23 residents remained involved in the pro-
gramming of psychiatric outpatient services as needed,
namely medication, at the Corrigan Mental Health Center;
and medical services were provided by a private physician
whose office was located near the home. Weekly profession-
al consultation (five hours per week) was originally pro-
vided to staff by a psychologist and a social worker from
the state hospital unit who later transferred to the com-
munity when the unit completely closed. Daily staffing of
the home (three shifts, seven days) included one licensed
practical nurse, two mental health assistant II 's, and six
mental health assistant I's, all of whom were relocated to
the community from the hospital with the patients. During
that period, not one resident was rehospitalized.
The citizen support group of relatives and friends
of the state hospital patients referred to previously be-
came a legal organization naming itself Community Care,
Incorporated. While most areas throughout the Commonwealth
were striving towards "vendor" participation of community
living arrangements for depopulated or discharged state
hospital patients as directed by the Commissioner's Office,
the Fall River area continued the alleged decentralization
process by way of its own planning process.
164
During the summer of 1978, a large three-story ten-
ement house was obtained and converted as a residence for
14 Taunton State Hospital discharged patients. Again, the
home was located in a middle-class neighborhood, in an un-
restricted zone, and nearby to churches, stores, and public
transportation. The residents came from the transitional
program which had been an ongoing process at the state hos-
pital. This time, however, instead of a venture taken on
by an entrepreneur, the home was purchased by Community
Care, Incorporated through a mortgage received at a local
bank. Payments were met by donations, fund-raising enter-
prises, but mainly from the resident's SSI payments. The
Department of Mental Health's agreement was to provide suf-
ficient staff for the residence—46 licensed practical
nurses, one mental health assistant II, and six mental
health assistant I's— and "start-up" money amounting to
$22,000
—$10,000 for the down-payment, safety factors and
legal fees; $5,000 for furnishing; and $7,000 for a van for
transportation
.
It should be pointed out that between the state
positions originally assigned to the Corrigan Center when
it opened with a projected inpatient population of 38
—
which at the time was averaging less than one-half that
amount— and the unit positions at the state hospital, the
Fall River area was indeed in a very comfortable position
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regarding flexibility in reassigning DMH staff for commun-
ity programs. It must be added that the area administra-
tion had anticipated the movement towards depopulating the
patients to Fall River, and the required staffing patterns
within the goals of the Commissioner's promise of "deinsti-
tutionalization." As a result of the commitment, the Fall
River Area Office protected "line positions" (direct-care).
There was no manipulating of such critical positions, such
as combining vacant lower level positions or filling such
vacancies "in lieu" for higher administrative nondirect
care positions as existed in other areas. Such frugality
m creative planning and management related to the depopu-
lating of the state hospital, not as a result of any de-
partmental programmed decentralization process, but as a
plan for survival and accomplishment of the directives of
the Commissioner and the regional administrator. Two more
group residences were opened for 20 former inpatients by
the same method prior to the closing of the Fall River
unit at the State Hospital in January of 1979, but with
less "start-up" money from the Department because Taunton
State Hospital dollars were needed due to the slower rate
of deinstitutionalization in the other areas in the region
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Decentralization at the Area Level
The Massachusetts Department of Mental Health's
plan to deinstitutionalize patients from Taunton State
Hospital in Region V promulgated that future requests for
hospital admissions were to be diverted by a shift to a
series of community or area—based services and programs.
Highly significant to Fall River's deinstitution-
alization procedures, policies and programs remained the
question of latitude regarding the decentralization of
accountability and autonomy in decision-making and imple-
mentation. The same question related to the endeavors of
the Massachusetts legislators and the Commissioner's Office
to support autonomy at the area or community level.
The Fall River unit at the hospital closed on
January 6, 1979 when the last patients were relocated to
the community. Three years earlier, the Fall River clients
at the institution totaled 158. It should be noted that
for about 18 months, from July of 1977 to January of 1979,
there were no admissions from the community to the State
Hospital unit. All acute admissions, including many court
commitments, were to the 24-bed inpatient service at the
Corrigan Community Mental Health Center at the time.
Shortly after closing the Fall River unit at the
State Hospital, it became evident that if community mental
health in the area was to become a viable system, changes
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would have to take place regarding two sub-systems, each
of which was providing aftercare and support services.
These programs were not completely autonomous since they
had a direct line of accountability to the area office.
They were, however, involved in duplication of effort and
had been reporting from two points of concentration. One
point was at the State Hospital where the unit administra-
tor and certain staff were actively engaged in the transfer
of appropriately designated patients to nursing homes with-
in the catchment area, and in nearby Rhode Island with the
same team providing follow-up services. As previously
stated, the same personnel in consort with the area direc-
tor also initiated the opening of the community group homes
over a four-year period.
During the same period of time, community or area-
based personnel at the Corrigan Mental Health Center were
attempting to locate placements for a certain number of
the Center's discharged inpatients who no longer had a
home, family or a generic support system. The area staff
was attempting to provide follow-up/case management, nurs-
ing home continuing care, medication clinic, and day treat-
ment services for those community clients requiring those
services
.
It was decided by me, as the Area Director, that
such sub-systems, as suggested by Schulber and Baker,
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should be congruent. As a result, there were reassignments
of personnel who were transferred from the State Hospital
to the community after the close of the unit. The Associ-
ate Area Director was assigned the responsibility of coor-
dinating and supervising all aftercare services with middle
management staff in charge of each program and directly re-
sponsible to the Area administration. Thus, the "umbrella"
and accountability of aftercare services included four
group homes and one cooperative apartment for 50 of the
last patients discharged from the State Hospital, continu-
ing care of about 120 elderly patients (a combined popula-
tion of former State Hospital and Corrigan Community Mental
Health Center inpatients) in 14 nursing homes with whom the
Fall River Area Facility had affiliation agreements, a team
of six case managers who follow the community needs of 120
to 150 clients, a medication clinic operated by two full-
time R.N.'s, and a half-time psychiatrist who fulfilled
the pharmacological needs of a total case load of over 900
clients with an average of 20 per day.
The reader should consider the findings and com-
ments of Schulberg and Baker (1975) related to their sec-
tion entitled A Centralized Nursing Department in a Decen -
tralized Hospital (1975). The Fall River/Taunton State
Hospital Unit Nursing Department administration, as de-
scribed earlier, took the lead in the decentralization
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process at the State Hospital. At the same time, total
responsibility for nursing personnel assignments, supervi-
sion and accountability
,
regardless of the program in which
they were functioning and usually in tandem with other dis-
ciplines
,
was that of the same Fall River nursing adminis-
tration, i.e., director, assistant director and nursing
supervisors
.
In the spring of 1979, after the State Hospital
closed in January of that year and all programs became
area-based, area administration determined that the daily
performance and programmatic accountability was the respon-
sibility of program heads such as MSW's, Ph.D.’s, as well
as R.N.'s with degrees, and that all community programs
should be truly interdepartmentalized and decentralized
within and outside of the Corrigan Center. For the first
time, opposition began to take place by nursing administra-
tion. As Schulberg and Baker (1975) stated:
For some time, the (nursing) department continued
to function as a powerful professional subsystem
with traditional line responsibilities rather than
new staff ones, and thus generated much controversy
among the other disciplinary and clinical subsystems
which had adjusted to the hospital's decentralized
structure. (p. 223)
Though the authors’ commentary alluded to the
Boston State Hospital in the 1960 ' s , the substance of the
quotation was as appropriate over a decade later--but at a
community mental health center, and after the Fall River
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Unit at Taunton State Hospital had been closed.
The Area administration and staff planned for de-
mst ltut lonalization of programs and services along with
the patients. The process was believed to include the
transfer of support costs and personnel from the Region V
State Hospital to the community in order to accomplish the
mission. Further, the concept was expected to include de-
centralization of autonomy and planning, decision-making,
and budgetary/personnel control at the area level with ac-
countability to the office of the Commissioner.
The thrust towards decentralization of accountabil-
ity and resources to the area level was promulgated by the
Department of Mental Health's central and regional offices
as the "first carrot" for those who acknowledged agreement
and concern regarding deinstitutionalization, and for Fall
River, the closing of its unit at Taunton State Hospital.
In preparation for fiscal year 1979 (July 1, 1978
to June 30, 1979), an effort was made by the Region Ser-
vices Administrator and Supervising Program Analyst, with
the support of seven area directors, to initiate a fiscal
and management system which would allow for nearly total
autonomy at the area levels. It was related that the
Regional Office would be responsible in the early stages
to the Central Office and to the Commonwealth's Executive
Office of Human Services for monitoring the process. The
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plan was approved by former Commissioner Okin and permis-
sion was granted by the EOHS.
For further information, reference can be made to
"Analysis of Department of Mental Health Region VII [later
changed to Region V] Budget" and "Proposed Budget Structure
for the Department of Mental Health." The latter document
states
:
The goal of the new Regional budget was to
consolidate, under the management of the Area
Directors, the fiscal and personnel resources
servicing their respective areas. Such a bud-
getary reorganization:
Would provide Area Directors with fiscal and
personnel control in order to accomplish their
responsibilities.
Would provide fiscal accountability so that
there will be clearer determination of the utili-
zation of resources in each area program.
Would more effectively accomplish deinstitu-
tionalization— the shift from State Hospital based
to community based care--by giving the Area Direc-
tors fiscal control and treatment of patients who
are transferred from the State Hospital to commun-
ity living. (p. 2)
It is further related that "Deinstitutionalization" in-
cludes several concepts:
1. Alternatives in the community to clients
now residing in institutional facilities.
2. Community alternative treatment programs
to eliminate unnecessary reliance on institutions
for persons now living in the community.
3. Utilizing existing institutional resources
to support both of these efforts through realloca-
tion to community programs. (p. 13)
Finally, it declared:
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The Fall River Unit is on the verge of closing
at Taunton State Hospital. As the clients moveinto the Fall River Area, the resources previously
utilized at Taunton for those clients will shiftto community resources for those and other clients.
In addition, this move will likely add to the(inpatient) census at the Corrigan Mental HealthCenter for some period of time. This will neces-
sitate additional supportive services at Corrigan,
such as dietary, pharmacy and similar support ser-
vices in the Taunton State Hospital maintenance
account and transfer those resources appropriately
to the Fall River Area. (p. 14)
Throughout the planning stages with Region adminis-
tration based upon projected deinstitutionalization goals,
there was a wide assumption that the inpatient census could
be maintained at a range between 12 to 18 beds. Therefore,
for the operation of the total Center programs, the budget
remained the same for three years while the inpatient cen-
sus slowly and gradually began to climb.
It appeared that by indicating written approval by
the Area Directors for such a change, the result was to
decentralize the process only to the Region V level where
the administrator and business office assumed direct con-
trol over seven area budgets, those of the State Hospital,
the State School for the Retarded, personnel changes, and
contracted community mental health and retardation programs.
A footnote in the aforementioned proposal stated, "As a
control mechanism, the Regional Services Administrator has
final sign off powers on all personnel action" (p. 8).
The die now had been cast and the picture of
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alleged area autonomy was becoming much clearer to the area
directors. Though the budget proposal was never circulated
as such, the area directors were later told that it was a
"compromise" version. Otherwise, it was maintained by the
Regional Services Administrator that it would not have been
approved because of a "lack of credibility" on the part of
Commissioner Okin towards area competence to manage separ-
ate budgets. The future of area autonomy became question-
able, but the mandate to continue the deinstitutionaliza-
tion process and, in fact, to depopulate the geographic
units at the State Hospital continued.
Of special significance to the problem was the role
and ramifications of decentralization regarding the alleged
shift of resources to community mental health programs and
support services. In order to complete the closing of the
Fall River hospital unit, planned and, indeed, promised
flexibility within the Fall River Area annual budget for
the transfer of support costs (medication, food, laundry,
and housekeeping/maintenance) for former Taunton State Hos-
pital patients did not occur. The last of the patients had
been discharged to nursing homes, to the Corrigan Center's
inpatient unit or to four newly established group resi-
dences. Funds were never transferred from the hospital to
the Corrigan Center's accounts or as support for the cli-
ents in the group homes. The lack of adequate resources
174
can be traced in part to what were, at the least, miscon-
ceptions about the economics of community-based care.
There is little evidence that the reduction in the popula-
tion of state hospitals freed funds for less restrictive
services
.
In planning for the fiscal year 1981 Region V bud-
get (July 1, 1980 to June 30, 1981), the following "Region
V Budget Narrative" was prepared by the Regional Services
Administrator and sent to seven area directors, the assis-
tant superintendent at Taunton State Hospital, and the
superintendent of the Paul Dever State School for the Re-
tarded :
In Region V, a decentralized service system or-
ganized in seven geographic catchment areas provide
a growing array of mental health, mental retarda-
tion, and substance abuse services. The major
thrust over the last several years throughout the
Region has been the systematic development of a
solid foundation for a community-based system. In
fulfilling the mandate of providing comprehensive
area services with qualified staff, a major goal
has been to shift reliance away from the two large
institutional settings in the Region. Taunton State
Hospital and Dever State School to services which
maximize growth potential in less restrictive, more
integrated environments. In order to continue im-
plementation of these goals in FY '81, the growth
and development of each area system is required
through rebudgeting of existing resources, reallo-
cation of Taunton State Hospital resources as the
census declines and new program dollars occur.
A number of key administrative, programmatic and
fiscal issues still remain to be addressed in order
to completely fulfill the mandate of decentralized
service planning in Region V. Since past efforts in
the Region have emphasized the residential component
over support services, a focus in FY '81 will be to
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increase the availability of a continuum of non-
resident ial services. While program development
continued to the highest priority, it is necessaryto increase resources for Regional and Area manage-
ment to administratively keep pace with the growing
and complex service system. A serious fiscal issue
addressed in the FY ' 81 budget under program ade-quacy includes providing the necessary resources to
existing residential and day programs in order thatthey can make the necessary repairs and renovations
to meet all applicable standards including safety
and licensing
-
]
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The "decentralized service system" referred to in
the Regional Services Administrator's "Budget Narrative"
began at former Commissioner Okin’s Office and ended at
the Region V office. So-called decentralized decision-
making and/or fiscal autonomy toward program goals were
first decided by the Regional Services Administrator with
the responsibility placed upon the Fall River Area Director
to implement them with scarce resources.
Meanwhile, the number of newly funded Region V
office personnel positions and their varied responsibili-
ties began to increase steadily. This phenomenon was con-
trary to the attempts by the State legislature two years
earlier to minimize the Regional offices throughout the
Commonwealth in terms of size, cost and effectiveness.
They were considered to be another layer in the Department
of Mental Health's bureaucracy. With little or no addi-
tional resources available to the Fall River Area for com-
munity mental health support programs and group residences
as well as support costs for the Corrigan Mental Health
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Center's rising inpatient population, monitoring of area
programs by additional Regional staff continued. General-
ly, untrained Region V staff representing the Regional
Services Administrator were assigned the responsibility
of following guidelines developed by an equally untrained
central office staff relative to actual "line" experience
in community mental health problems and practices. It was,
indeed, ludicrous since uncredentialed program "surveyors"
and "evaluators" were checking the credentials of area
program directors and staff. At the same time, several
attempts were made at measurement and evaluation of area
programs by the utilization of such tools as MIS (manage-
ment information system) and CAS (community assessment
scale), both of which were completely inadequate and very
costly
.
The process for deinstitutionalizing mental pa-
tients also led to the concomitant transfer or emphasis
of other meaningful elements from the state hospital which
encompass Area mental health programs. Over the past sev-
eral years, there has been a dramatic upsurge in three of
those elements or factors pertaining to client as well as
to staff advocacy: (1) governance (hospital trustees/area
boards); (2) forensic services; and (3) union-management
relations
.
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Governance
In 1975, Schulberg and Baker related that:
The problem of how best to involve citizens remains
crucial but unresolved, so that further experimen-tation with optimal linkage patterns most likely
will continue in both fruitful as well as contro-
versial directions as the mental hospital (commun-ity mental health center) seeks to refine this
^ ^ T a 1 tie to its community .... The various
state community mental health acts passed in recent
years range in philosophy from those giving citizenboards complete budgetary and administrative control
to those in which the citizens' links to program
design and operation are primarily advisory in na-
ture. (p. 249)
The latter example currently exists within the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, but area boards and constituent citizen
advocacy groups are increasing in political strength with
the exception of State Hospital trustees.
Several years ago, shortly before the emphasis to-
ward deinstitutionalization, the Taunton State Hospital
trustees were empowered, among other responsibilities, to
either appoint or confirm appointments for three key ad-
ministrative positions for the management of the state
hospital—the superintendent, the assistant superintendent,
and the steward (responsible for business and personnel
matters). Because the "old" state hospital structure has
gradually disappeared as a result of changing Department of
Mental Health goals, rules and regulations, as well as leg-
islative support for the changes, the role of the Board of
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Trustees has become extremely blurred and nearly dysfunc-
tional
.
The Board still exists at Taunton State Hospital.
Monthly meetings continue between the members and the as-
sistant superintendent /administrator
. The group has the
same concerns regarding the welfare of the patients, work-
ing conditions of hospital personnel and the physical con-
dition and needs of the buildings and wards. Compared to
the function and role of the state hospital trustees in
past years, however, it has become quite apparent that
trustees’ prowess and decision-making governance have be-
come diminished. The State Hospital trustees, at this
writing, are seeking a Massachusetts Department of Mental
Health and Massachusetts Attorney General Office ruling re-
garding their current role and responsibilities as a "gov-
erning body" of the hospital.
At the same time, encouragement for stronger citi-
zen advocacy through community area board and other mental
health and retardation organizations has developed as a
result of legislation and the Massachusetts Department of
Mental Health's mandates and "public realtions" or "commun-
ity acceptance" endeavors. The shift in the emphasis upon
stronger governance at the area level as opposed to the
limited governance at the State Hospital led to a highly
political and functional citizen Area board in the Fall
River area.
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In the spring of 1982, the Department of Mental
Health produced a document regarding its philosophy of
citizen participation" entitled "Proposed Area Restruc-
turing." It outlined a series of commitments that area
board members should adhere to and the major advocacy role
which should be followed by the citizen group. By defini-
tion, if not intent, the policy created a partnership be-
tween the area board and area directors.
Over-soliciting citizen advocacy to ensure deinsti-
tutionalization, however, can result in a backlash of a
quest for control. There is always the danger that the
inherent responsibility for citizen constructive criticism
and support can evolve into attempts at power by way of
destructive behavior and actions. Should the latter occur,
however, there remains a major question. That is, would
the situation develop naturally as a part of the process
and the enthusiasm of certain members to cure all the ills
of the system while having little knowledge or understand-
ing of the complexities involved? Or, could the situation
develop as a carefully planned attempt by a few influential
members to take over the administration of the area office?
It appears that whenever there is a combination of advocacy
groups or special interest individuals with cross—purposes
representing general hospital trustees, special funded an-
cillary programs, health planning agencies, local and
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state wide mental retardation organizations, vendor consti-
tuency and consumers of the services, the result for an
area director can easily become a "catch—22."
Dangers exist which are centered around control
issues. Yet it is generally accepted that area board advo-
cacy for appropriate and quality mental health (and retar-
dation) services is a legitimate and necessary support
mechanism. The Massachusetts Department of Mental Health,
however, is not consistent in providing for a governance
which strictly adheres to a legally and universally accep-
table set of bylaws which, in particular, clearly defines
the role of the nominating committee as well as membership
qualifications and terms of office.
Once any inconsistencies are clarified and recti-
fied then, by all means, the area offices should pursue
"The Citizen Participation Functional Area" as presented
by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals:
The goal of citizen participation is to increase
the system's responsiveness to citizen needs, and
thus increase the assistance, support, and sanc-
tion for community mental health programs from
consumers, their folk-support systems, and their
communities. One of the beliefs central to this
approach is that by enhancing the scope of influ-
ence of citizens and by maintaining open systems
of communications and accountability, this goal
can be achieved. (p. 32)
181
Forensic Services
With the movement to relocate state hospital pa-
tients to the community and to decentralize control of
services, the need for new or expanded ancillary services
became apparent. This need was crystalized further as the
result of increased client flow and staff interaction be-
tween the Department of Mental Health and other agencies
particularly the courts and the Massachusetts Department
of Corrections.
In past years, all court commitments and
Bridgewater Correctional Institute transfers of Fall River
residents were referred to the Fall River unit at Taunton
State Hospital. After the closing of the unit, the
Corrigan Area Office and inpatient service assumed that
responsibility
.
That which began several years ago as a part-time
community court liaison staff person assignment resulted
in a full-time forensic ("legal medicine") services coor-
dinator representing the Fall River Area Office and its
clients with the Third District Court (adult and juvenile),
the Superior Court, and the Bridgewater Massachusetts Cor-
rectional Institute ("MCI").
Forensic services have included a continuous in-
volvement in transfers to and from the Bridgewater MCI,
court commitments, pre-sentencing psychiatric evaluations,
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competency to stand trial psychiatric evaluations, writs
of apprehension, and court petitions regarding guardian-
ship and conservator issues.
Rather than having a "court clinic" per se, wherein
either by contract or departmental staff assignments of
psychiatrists, psychologists or social workers who are
literally located at the courts, the services requested or
mandated by the judicial system have been provided at the
Corrigan Community Mental Health Center by the same clini-
cal disciplines. Every referral from and to the courts
and corrections have been channelled through the office,
and with the consultation of the forensic services coordin-
ator. In addition, this same person has served as the
liaison between the area office and other human services
providers such as legal advocates, Massachusetts Department
of Social Services, Massachusetts Department of Public
Welfare, the Office for Children and catchment area school
departments
.
Another result of the decentralization process in
Fall River was the assignment of an attorney from the
Central Office's legal department to the District Office.
Legal counsel has been available to staff and clients re-
lated to mental health services for two years.
However, Fall River's extension of the decentrali-
zation order directed to forensic concerns is not mirrored
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by other catchment areas or generally considered an essen-
tial part of the mandate for deinstitutionalization. This
kind of differential regional interpretation is character-
istic of the focus of change centering upon decentraliza-
tion as opposed to a clear mandate and guidelines for the
d© i ns t i t ut i on al izat ion of mental health services.
Union Management Relations
The growing conflict between deinstitutionalization
and the decentralization process had no greater traumatic
effect than that which was encountered by the largest union
representing Department of Mental Health employees— the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employ-
ees ("AFSCME"). Its members are engaged in core or support
services such as dietary, security, housekeeping, mainten-
ance, and a large percentage of the clerical force, as
well as direct-care staff who are mental health assistants
(attendants), occupational therapists, and licensed prac-
tical nurses. The total AFSCME membership within mental
health in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is 18,000.
Physicians, registered nurses, and psychologists are repre-
sented by the Massachusetts Nurses Association ("MNA").
Social workers, rehabilitation counselors, and a classi-
fied number of the secretarial employees belong to the
third bargaining unit, the National Association of
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Government Employees ("NAGE").
The most active and vociferous union regarding the
movement of patients and staff from the Massachusetts
state hospitals to the community and the threatened job
losses of the projected "phasing down" or closing of those
institutions has, and continues to be, "AFSCME." This
union has continually acted as a "watchdog" and advocate
for its membership and the patients.
The situation was essentially caused by the lack
of clarity and philosophical purpose under the process of
decentralization that was generally assumed for deinstitu-
tionalization. Employees not able to see the changes as
humanistic or enabling, resisted the movement. Staff an-
xiety and fears also resulted from the dearth of personal
involvement in what seemed an antipersonnel edict. From
their viewpoint, under the mandate of decentralization,
deinstitutionalization was but an attempt to depopulate
or close the hospitals and reduce expenditures by demin-
ishing or removing service personnel.
State Senator Chester Atkins (Chairperson of the
powerful "Ways and Means Committee") said:
The most forgotten people in the Department of
Mental Health are the individuals who provide di-
rect patient care and services. In the hierarchy
of the Department of Mental Health, one's status
is determined in large measure by how far one is
removed from providing patient care. We should
establish joint labor management committees at
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our lnst itut ions to examine the factors thatare affecting the recruitment and retention of em-ployees. With 400% turnover rates at some of ourinstitutions, we are spending millions of dollarsto advertise for new personnel, to process payrollforms, and to train direct care employees, only toface closing their personnel files a few months
later. (p. 6)
Union activity and membership at the area level in
Fall River was indeed sparse until the closing of the geo-
graphic unit at the State Hospital. Staff concern and
members grew gradually during the period from 1979 to 1982.
The "they" (Taunton State Hospital employees) and "we"
(Corrigan Mental Health Center employees) attitude changed
because of a common concern for staff rights under the
union contract—such as seniority of employees regarding
hiring and layoffs, choice of shift, and promotions as
well as to grievance procedures related to overall working
conditions. Former State Hospital employees, as well as
patients, had been relocated to the community and the in-
tegration culminated in the mutual protection of one's
livelihood
.
About one month prior to the close of the Fall
River unit at the hospital (December 4, 1978), a memorandum
was sent to the seven area directors from the Regional
Services Administrator with copies to the Assistant Super-
intendent of Taunton State Hospital, the labor relations
representative at the Central Office of DMH , and the
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Region V business manager. The directive stated:
The closing of the Fall River Inpatient Unit is
expected to be completed on January 2, 1979. Ef-fective immediately, the employees in this unit
shall have priority in transferring to other units
before any other transfers or promotions can be
authorized
.
The result was that a few of the older employees
decided upon retirement, some requested and were granted
assignments to other geographic units at the hospital, and
the majority transferred to the area where practically all
of them became involved in staffing the group residences
or other community programs such as day treatment or case
management. Others were added to the inpatient service
at the Corrigan Center.
Meanwhile, as presented in Chapter V, the strategy
by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees was exercised as a result of the overall process
which was occurring throughout the Commonwealth.
CHAPTER VIII
RESEARCH SURVEY
From the point of view of planning, Community
Mental Health has reflected a focus on strategies and tac-
tics for dealing with the scheduled withdrawal of federal
funds. The assumption of fiscal responsibility by the
states programmed in grant contracts by the annual reduc-
tion ol federal dollars resulted in responses that have
ranged from a critical diminution of essential services
to the evoking of creative methods for maintaining, and
even broadening, services through the use of alternative
funding and person-power sources. Despite the purported
reform and humanistic character of the deinstitutionaliza-
tion movement, had politicians and health planners not be-
lieved it would also be a significant financial saving,
except for the subsequent involvement of the courts in the
area of patient's rights, it is unlikely that the concept
would have proceeded to implementation.
It was not the purpose of this study to suggest
that Massachusetts is the single culprit in the phenomenon
of popularizing a program to deinstitutionalize mental
health services that was an incidental codicil to a
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political strategy; the intent was rather to document the
deleterious and negative results that can derive from an
accidental reform movement in the area of health services.
As progress was made in articulating and documenting the
contention, it became apparent that significant consensual
affirmation was lacking.
To provide this information, a survey utilizing a
mailed questionnaire was designed and implemented. Using
a statistical random table, the questionnaire recipients
were selected from a cross sectional pool of DMH and pri-
vate vendor employees in Fall River and the rest of south-
eastern Massachusetts. One hundred names were chosen.
Administrative and service levels of employment were more
or less equally represented. The questionnaire package
included a self-addressed, stamped, return envelope, and a
subsequent phone call was made to each potential respondent
to urge participation. No names were required for identi-
fication in order to guarantee confidentiality through
anonymity. However, job category was indicated through
coding
.
The employment categories included in the actual
number of 64 respondents (a much higher percentage than
is generally expected for this kind of procedure) were:
Area directors (6)
Associate area directors ( 6 )
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Assistant hospital superintendents (2)
Business managers (2)
Unit administrators
( 3 )
Nursing directors ( 3 )
Directors, clinical, social work
and emergency services
Quality assurance/human rights
coordinators y '
Psychologists (6)
Case managers (6)
Psychiatrists (4)
Rehabilitation counselors (2)
Day-treatment supervisors (3)
Mental health assistants (12)
Forensic services (2)
Medication clinic personnel (2)
Group home professionals (3)
Group home paraprofessional (10)
Occupational therapists (3)
Licensing coordinators (4)
Crisis center directors (3)
District court judges (2)
Hospital trustees (2)
Area board members (2)
Note: Only those in service prior to 1975, when the de
centralization factor became an issue, were included
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in the mailing.
The following text is a replicate of the cover let-
ter mailed with the questionnaire:
As part of the research for my dissertation, I
am asking you to take the brief time to assist me
by answering the enclosed questionnaire.
Please respond to any or all of the questions
that relate to your position and experience as a
clinician, service provider or administrator in
the mental health system of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. If you choose to participate, please
complete your response as soon as possible and re-
turn it in the stamped and addressed envelope pro-
vided.
To assure confidentiality, it is requested
that you do not sign your name or otherwise indi-
cate your identity.
The questionnaire addresses itself to an issue
exemplified by this statement made in 1977 by the
Commissioner of Mental Health, Dr. Robert Okin re-
garding the projected "Five Year Plan":
Decentralization has been the real key to the
progress made in improving mental health care over
the last ten years. There has been a continued
strengthening of the area structure as the primary
administrative unit for the delivery of services.
By the end of 1973, these units were functioning
in almost every area, and in 1975, the position
of area director was finally funded.
Our research hypothesis contends that during the
following years, decentralization
,
while being programmat-
ically pursued, was verbally converted to the title of
deinstitutionalization
,
without any concomitant adjustment
in philosophy or purpose. It further proposes that the
many ineptitudes, transgressions in treatment, planning
and human rights that have occurred and are continuing to
occur have resulted from this cosmetic substitution.
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The questionnaire is intended to ascertain the ex-
tent of awareness, agreement and disagreement by service
and managerial staff to this thesis.
Since the questionnaire was brief and required a
simple check-off answering procedure (though it did allow
ample space for additional comment)
,
only two weeks were
allowed for response. The results were statistically sur-
prising. Sixty-four, two-thirds of the questionnaire,
returned answers; and much time and effort was additionally
taken in written comments which are completely recorded in
the following material.
Responses
The copy of the questionnaire, along with the num-
ber and kind of responses identified by the three listed
alternative categor ies--posit ive
,
negative, status quo
—
is obviously supportive of our research assumption. It,
however, does not reflect the depth and breadth of concern
indicated by the large and comprehensive range of comments
that were also submitted with the returns. These are pre-
sented without editing.
The preponderance, roughtly three-quarters, of
"Yes" answers to the first four questions indicates the
confusion that still exists around the decentralization
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and deinstitutionalization issue. With 46 of the 64 re-
spondents perceiving decentralization as an obfuscating
process to the move to deinstitutionalize mental health
care and treatment services, for the variety of reasons
reflected in answers to question five and the "additional
comments," the only doubt to be cast on the judgment is in
terms of the reliability of the questionnaire and the size
and range of the survey population.
Because it was only the intent of this particular
endeavor to ascertain if the issue was sufficiently prom-
inent in the minds of staff to be considered as a variable
in their conceptualization of the relative quality of ser-
vices, further study is needed to determine the exact na-
ture and range of the responses.
Questionnaire
1. Were you aware of the 1977 commitment and man-
date of the commissioner to decentralize management and
fiscal resources? Yes 40 No 24
2. Did you, at the time, conceive it as being re-
lated to the later emphasis on deinstitutionalization?
Yes 30 No 10
3. Do you conceive the two processes as essential-
ly related? Yes 50 No 14
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4. If the answer to No. 3 is "yes," do you think
that the relationship is: (circle one) enabling (36), dis-
abling (14), unimportant (0) in pursuing the goals of dein-
stitutionalization?
5. In which of the following areas do you think
the relationship between decentralization and deinstitu-
tionalization has influenced or changed services?
Positive /Negative / Status Quo
a
.
Administration
:
Central 8 20 36
Regional 8 26 30
Area 28 12 24
b. Budget /Contracting
:
(including private vendors) 10 28 10
c
.
Middle Management
:
(department program heads) 20 16 28
d. Quality of Services/
Assurance
:
20 24 20
e
.
Human/Civil Rights: 26 22 12
f Quality of Personnel: 20 10 34
g. Community Involvement:
(area board citizens 20 34 10
at large)
h. Rate of Institutional
Depopulation :
48 2 14State Hospital
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Positive/Negative/Status Quo
Community Mental Health
Center
8 46 10
i . Prevention of Recedivism: 4 34 26
j • Treatment and Care of the 8 34 22
Chronic Population:
k. Ratio of Professional to
Nonprofessional in Staff- 16 14 28
ing Patterns:
1 . Involvement of Service
Providers From the Pri- 20 20 18
vate Sector (Vendors):
m
.
General Working Conditions : 7 19 36
n . Hiring and Firing Practices: 6 10 38
o
.
Union/Management Relations : 6 12 40
P. Court/Police Relations: 14 20 30
Quotes From Questionnaire "Comments"
1. Decentralize management-yes. Fiscal resources
no
.
The old "Beacon Hill Watchers' (state legislators)
didn't feel that Okin (former Commissioner) had either the
power or the leverage to bring about any significant loos-
ening of their grasp of the purse strings.
2. I felt that decentralization meant that the
Commonwealth would have 41 fairly autonomous entities
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(areas), each planning unique service delivery systems
tailored to the uniqueness of each area. Large-scale de-
institutionalization would then be an historical accident,
possibly, but not a "fait accompli', and certainly not a
State policy! If this was to be a State policy, it would
have to, and did, make a mockery of the concept of area
decentralized autonomy.
3. The phenomenon of large-scale deinstitutional-
ization might have emerged from most, or all, of the DMH
area planning processes, but with much more unevenness
based on local needs, priorities and pace.
4. Essentially, I don't believe decentralization
has ever happened. Spending plans, contract amendments,
rate-setting, staffing, filling vacancies, etc. are still
nonexistent at the area level, until okayed or ratified by
the central control centers (DMH Central Office). Discre-
tionary funds, transfers within accounts— all of the fea-
tures that could make the area responsive and effective
are part of the decision-making apparatus that exists out-
side of, and above, the Area level.
5. If the premise is that there is a relationship
and there are two phenomena— deinstitutionalization and
decentralization, then nothing has changed.
6. After discussing the questionnaire with staff
members and officers of the (Mental Health) Association,
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there seems to be agreement that the promise has not been
completed and there is confusion and fragmentation with new
directions started without completion of the strengthening
of the area structure.
7. There continues to be unmet needs in the com-
munity. Deinstitutionalization has resulted in some people
being in the community, but detached or unattached because
they fall between the cracks. Chester Atkins (Massachusetts
State Senator and Chairman of the House Ways Committee), I
believe, described the situation as "Alice in Wonderland"
—
a lot of movement, rhetoric, shuffling of papers, and mis-
direction
.
8. There were many hospitalized patients who
should not have been hospitalized in 1970. Deinstitution-
alization was justified for these people, with services
offered by the DMH in the community to help them maintain
themselves in the community. DMH lost sight along with
judgment in discharging people who could not handle living
in the community. DMH's priority became "close down in-
stitutions and let’s make history."
9. The Department wanted out of caring for the
mentally ill. It has done a good job of destroying itself
with impossible goals, poor management with priorities in
all the wrong areas. It got to the point that patient care
was not, and sorry to say, is not at this time, a top pri-
ority .
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10. I feel that the Department of Mental Health
failed in its attempt to "decentralization.” The Depart-
ment’s main concern was to close all institutions and dis-
continue state supplied care and concern for the mentally
disabled. I feel the only important issues in DMH were
the number of clients involved and how to lower it, not
the fact that these members represented "human beings” in
need of care and treatment.
11. It appeared that the department's role changed
from deinstitutionalization to decentralization no matter
what the cost to the patient and the community. Ironically,
it was the area administration that received the disapprov-
al of the community.
12. It was not the concept of deinstitutionaliza-
tion that created all the negative aspects. It was the
methodology and the unrealistic time table that created
serious problems to those areas that were the first to
deinstitutionalize
.
13. I see no conflict with Okin's (former Commis-
sioner) statement and deinstitutionalization. However,
the process of decentralizing to the area level in many
ways is a f arce . Central DMH still retains too much con-
trol .
14. I believe that in "contracting” (vendors on
state DMH accounts), some control factors are lost. They
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are more costly to the state and serve limited portions of
those in need of services.
15. Some human rights are denied for the follow-
ing reasons: (a) for some clients, institutions are the
least restrictive setting and there are insufficient place-
ments available, and (b) people are put out before being
properly treated or appropriate plans made for them.
(c) There is inadequate staff for "managing" clients in a
community setting, and (d) it is in the long run more
costly for the Mental Health Budget. (e) The understaffing
has tended to lower morale considerably, thereby decreasing
effectiveness of staff.
16. Facilities are not available within the State
system for certain types of clients. For example, the el-
derly who have major psychiatric problems of a chronic na-
ture. We see people in need of services for whom there is
no help available. At least an environment of institution
ground does not compare to city squallor.
17. Budget cuts affect areas differently. Some
areas seem to have sufficient funds and are thus able to
do a good job because they have enough staff who are well
trained to meet the client needs. Other areas don't even
have enough funds to "get by."
18. Certification, quality assurance and accredi-
tation by J.C.A.H. is an essential step in increasing the
199
funds for DMH. I believe the State must make the initial
investment of adequacy of staff and it must provide all of
the necessary care units sufficient in size/scope to meet
the needs of State residents in need of care regardless of
their ability to pay. The future can be more self-sustain-
ing as reimbursements accrue. The State would be short-
sighted in doing less.
19. I perceive deinstitutionalization as philo-
sophically good. I also endorse the notion of decentral-
ization. Both, however, must be properly funded and man-
aged if the change is to be effective.
20. Decentralization promotes multiplication of
valuable services which are too expensive to maintain by
catchment areas--mult iplicat ion of personnel at all levels
—management, clinics and support. It definitely needs
more money to support the system and personnel. Without
this initial expensive delivery, decentralization will
certainly continue to detract from quality of services
that can be rendered.
CHAPTER IX
COMMENTS AND SUMMARY
The philosophical conflict between essence and ex-
istence has provided a major issue for arguments concerning
morals, ethics and social policy. Rousseau, Tolstoy,
Baudelaire, Hobbes, Marx et al
. have propounded the con-
flict and perpetuated its belief through the supposition
of the natural essence of human nature and absolute solu-
tions. They have faulted mainly politics and civilization
as the responsible agents for the burgeoning of inhumanity
amongst our species. For them, the essence of humanity is
primitivity to be partially recovered in either utopian
idealism, religious contrition, or social collectivism
programmed for "absolute" compliance.
In opposition, claiming that our innate nature is
only expressed by our current way of being in the world,
existentialists and other anti-utopians such as Camus,
Satre and Spengler purport that our essence and our exis-
tence are, in fact, identical.
Social reform of the last three centuries, at
least, has been based upon the argument for essence, that
the nature of humans, through essentially benign and
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willing for the good of all if left unfettered and unop-
pressed, needs programmed directory and leadership. The
first stop in the process typically requires the total
elimination of the existing structured system.
Semantically and psycholinguist ically
,
the prefix
de has become an essential symbolic component of this
argument. Detoxification; debriefing, decontamination,
delousing, decentralization, deinstitutionalization, all
suggest a remedial radical change by reversion to a pre-
vious more basic and thus non-pathologic condition.
Change-oriented reformers have become reflexively condi-
tioned to "de" as the verbal precursor and symbol of an
ultimate degree of humanistic reform through the return
to some simulation of our natural benign essence.
Whether or not the politicians and planners who
formulated the decentralization movement in Massachusetts
human services in general, and mental health in particular,
were aware of our philo-linguist ic contention is actually
not relevant to this thesis. But the argument and con-
flict is proposed to give possible added insight into the
psychology of the public and professional fervor that was
the initial response to both decentralization and deinsti-
tutionalization.
The states' rights movement is probably the most
aggressive and familiar proposal intended to disseminate
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governance and budget powers down from a central authority,
the federal government, to a more localized body, the state
government. The clamor for decentralization of state pow-
ers is an attempt by politicians and others to continue the
process to the smallest elected or authorized office repre-
senting local constituencies.
The major problem with decentralization movements
is that they assume that efficiency, economy, appropriate-
ness and increased quantity and quality of services are in-
herent in the concept. And that centralized bureaucratic
authority is essentially wasteful and cannot effectively
reflect the needs of local consumer populations.
The concept of decentralization suffers from the
paradox of being, on the one hand, an effective platform
for criticizing and monitoring the services provided by
the central government, while on the other it has become
a costly and ineffective miniature mimicry of those same
services when implemented at the community level.
In the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health,
the structure and function of area, regional and district
offices have been, and are, a slimmed down duplicate of
the central office. Authority and responsibilities are
allocated to the identical job-titles and professions.
The idiosyncratic needs of the local community that are
supposed to emerge under decentralization are depressed
by
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the absence of a permanent office or staff to continually
assess and research those required services that are pe-
culiar to a given community.
The public propensity backed by political advertis-
ing to perceive decentralization as a social reform move-
ment in Massachusetts has resulted in what might be called
a decontamination" reaction in which local hiring prac-
tices have tended to hire inappropriately trained or un-
qualified persons for professional and administrative po-
sitions out of both conscious and unconscious attempts to
further establish the independence and right of local
authorities to determine their complete destiny. Too often
the expense of this practice has been a detriment to the
quality and kind of services. Local area boards are essen-
tially the arena for this vitiating behavior.
Mental illness is not a local phenomenon. Its na-
ture and indices are relatively stable throughout the na-
tions of the western world where stress from social and
economic factors abide in the etiological configuration of
breakdown syndromes. That current methods stemming from
the authority of the medical model are inadequate and in-
effective is generally conceded. That state hospitals are
inappropriately used for warehousing patients; that psychi-
atrists in particular are the major unwitting perpetrators
of this ineffective system because of the restrictiveness
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and inappropriateness of their practice and training; that
the mental health system is in dire need of a radical
change and not just the cosmetic application of depopulat-
ing or closing hospitals and replacing them with miniature
institutions called halfway houses or community residences
that simply ape the old practice, is evident to most prac-
titioners and critics. Deinstitutionalization is indicated
when an ideology and its attendant practices that have
prolonged to the extent of becoming an institution in
themselves resist all attempts at substantial reform short
of repudiation.
It may be that our mental health system has not
yet attained the level of inability to clean its own house
and make indicated critical changes. It also may be that
it has. Whatever the situation is, the process of decen-
tralization does not necessarily involve in this issue.
However, through a growing process of deprof es-
sionalizing the mental health system, turnover in service
professional staff is expectedly high. Competent psychia-
trists, psychologists, nurses, social workers will not stay
in their positions, or cannot be found to fill openings,
while many long-term professional categories are unlicensed
or mis-educated . Yet credit is taken for this very process,
as the defenders are quick to claim that the growing exis-
tence of alternative human service workers in replacement
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of traditional professions is itself a major component in
the process of deinstitutionalization. While this is not
entirely fatuous—nonprofessionals are amongst some of the
best service providers
— the circumstance of "accidental"
deinst ltut lonalizat ion contradicts the essential of planned
intention
.
According to Glenn (1975),
Characteristic of each humanitarian movement are
four distinct periods. The first is a period of
innovation or new ideas. This peaks rapidly af-
ter the initial outburst of enthusiasm, as the
community mental health movement did between 1965
and 1970. The peak is followed by a period of
criticism and then a time of retrenchment. The
four periods are thus innovation, peaking, criti-
cism, and retrenchment. (p. 174)
In the southeastern region of Massachusetts, the
first period of innovation began in the mid-1970's with
the initiation of transitional living arrangements at the
State Hospital for the first group of patients identified
as the highest functioning, and most likely to move suc-
cessfully to their respective communities in a setting of
group residences and supervised apartments which would
allegedly be supported by the decentralization of personnel
and fiscal resources from the Taunton State Hospital, as
206
well as administrative decision-making and autonomy at the
area level.
The second period
—
peaking— took place when the
geographic units began to depopulate at a rapid rate with
constant pressure from the central and regional offices of
the Department of Mental Health. In the Commonwealth, two
state hospitals (Grafton and Foxboro) had closed completely
several years earlier—but with the transfer of the "most
difficult" or "medically impaired" patients with poor prog-
noses for relocation to any community programs to other
mental health or public health state hospitals. Accompany-
ing the movement to other hospitals was the reallocation or
decentralization of personnel and support costs within DMH.
This period also included the continued placement of hun-
dreds of patients in nursing homes in the southeastern
Massachusetts Region VII and throughout the Commonwealth
with little or no plans for aftercare or follow-up by the
Department. This, indeed, was the peak of the
Massachusetts Department of Mental Health's endeavors.
Individuals, many of whom should have never been committed
or admitted to state hospitals by current admission crite-
ria and diagnoses, were discharged to the community.
Those involved in the process were considered to be human-
itarians and pioneers in the deinstitutionalization move-
Decent ralizat ion , as supposedly concomitant,ment
.
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followed another direction by way of DMH
,
Central and Re-
gional office strategy and planning. It became a power
struggle at those levels for the survival of administrative
positions and a dominance of decision-making towards area
goals
.
The Massachusetts Department of Mental Health began
to experience the third and fourth periods of criticism and
retrenchment during fiscal year 1980 after closing the two
state hospitals. The criticism was often self-perpetuated
by area administrators and staff. Major concerns and ques-
tions related to what we were actually accomplishing in
community mental health, in what direction were we going,
what were our resources, and most significantly, how were
we managing in a system which is very complex in the eyes
of clients, personnel, the public, and the legislators.
There had been several occasions at area levels
when staff and management, including area directors, sug-
gested the need for Glenn's fourth period of retrenchment.
It was suggested that a period of "time out" be considered
during which it was hoped to seek an answer to the question
of what deinstitutionalization and decentralization meant
at all levels of the Massachusetts Department of Mental
Health. The suggestion was never formally acknowledged nor
was the question ever answered. There was, instead, an in-
herent departmental commitment to former Commissioner Okin s
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major goal to close the Commonwealth's mental hospitals
with all patients' care and treatment incorporated within
a number of community-based programs, both private and
public
.
State hospitals in Massachusetts proceeded to de-
populate the patients to their respective areas more rapid-
ly than the developing community mental health systems
could absorb the impact, especially related to the latency
of those planned decentralized factors. Hierarchal plan-
ners in the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health un-
derestimated the degree of continuing chronicity and the
demands of this population for community support, and the
areas were unable to meet the costs of servicing them. The
state hospital budgets were reduced, but the funds did not
follow the patients to the community. The DMH budget was
not sufficient to support both the hospital demands for ac-
creditation/certification for reimbursement of funds and
adequate quality of care, as well as similar demands upon
the growing community-based service needs. There still
exists no clarity as to who has ultimate authority in de-
cisions requiring allocation of substantial funds within
the Department. The responsibility for allocation of, and
actual access to monies needed to implement innovative ser-
vices essential to deinstitutionalization were typically
not decentralized, and authority to dispense was unclear
in the process.
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Because the communities did not receive adequate
financial backing to provide the needed services for the
chronic patients, a significant backlash followed and the
area offices were frequently cited for not providing the
services which were expected—especially by citizen area
advisory boards.
The forced reduction of deinstitutionalization
goals has been the result of a major external factor. It
was the lack of approved funding by the State legislature
for expanded and new programs for fiscal years 1982 and
1983 (July 1, 1981 to June 30, 1983). As presented in
several instances throughout this paper, and for various
reasons, the fiscal and management accountability of the
Massachusetts Department of Mental Health which has the
highest allocation of state dollars of any agency has been
less than credible in the eyes of members of the General
Court. Fiscal year 1983 has ended and decentralization of
financial autonomy has still not reached the communities.
Each area continues to present quarterly "spending plans"
— a practice which results in requesting, and sometimes
receiving, three-month allowances from the State Comptrol-
ler's Office until the end of each fiscal year on June 30.
Decentralization of responsibility became a funnel
which was directed at the areas by the Department of Mental
Health's Central Office. There was, and continues to be,
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insufficient resources to accomplish required tasks of pro-
viding a myriad of services. Other human services agencies
in the Commonwealth, some of whom offer direct care such as
the Division of Youth Services, the Department of Correc-
tions, as well as those funded to provide advocacy, pur-
chase of service and referral such as the Office for Chil-
dren, Department of Social Services, and the District Court
System came to depend more and more upon the Department of
Mental Health, particularly for inpatient services at the
state hospitals and community mental health centers. In-
deed, a reversal of deinstitutionalization has been occur-
ring. The dependency has also included private agencies
and practitioners, as well as general hospitals who seek
refuge in the public sector for those patients who are el-
derly and/or are "difficult to manage." The majority of
these persons usually have no family ties, and no financial
resources (especially insurance coverage), nor a place to
live. DMH's inpatient facilities have thus, in many in-
stances, become surrogate "homes" or "hotels" for those
citizens who could not or would not be treated at the com-
munity level by both the private and public sector. The
supposed need for inpatient treatment, in numerous clinical
evaluations, have been considered inappropriate by any in-
patient admission criteria as well as utilization review
evaluations, and have resulted in a steadily growing inter-
agency problem.
211
The significant rise in the inpatient census has
been coupled with the radical change in the categories of
the patient population. The shift began during mid-1979
when the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare dis-
continued payment to certain nursing homes in surrounding
states where a number of elderly and chronic patients had
been relocated. The patients were subsequently returned to
the area of responsibility; and because of no alternative
programs, the "contingency" plans had them readmitted to
either state hospitals of community mental health centers.
Thus
,
from 1980 to the present
,
the number of
chronic patients with the increased rates of recedivism
and the additional referrals for inpatient admission from
other sources, has created an intolerable situation for
both patients and staff. Obviously, the quality of care
has suffered and, in many cases, the staff to patient ratio
has reached what could be easily determined a dangerous
level. In addition, those inpatient facilities at state
hospitals or at community mental centers striving to
achieve Massachusetts Department of Public Health survey
approval for federal reimbursement are failing in their
attempts, and others have lost or are in danger of losing
the dollars associated with such reimbursement.
Decentralization was presented by DMH Central
Office "planners" as intending to place the ultimate
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responsibility for patient quality of care and treatment
in a less restrictive setting, with sufficient financial
resources, at the area level. It was also proclaimed that
decentralization of services would be far less costly than
institutional or state hospital care.
With decentralization, however, the area directors'
role of accepting total responsibility for the effective-
ness of community programs--whet her staffed by contracted
or Department of Mental Health personnel has been quite
apparent. Should a client not meet the admission criteria
of vendored programs and private hospitals (the latter to
date has not been a fruitful endeavor), or if a client can-
not function within the standards or criteria of such ser-
vices, the Department of Mental Health area director is
usually required to pursue all possible alternatives in
response to a problem situation. The Department of Mental
Health Area Office, therefore, remains as a back-up for
those clients who do not meet the requirements for third
party payment and/or are determined to be "unmanageable"
by private vendors or general hospitals.
Politicizing Mental Health
Operationally, if not conceptually, mental health
has been increasingly politicized. More and more of the
Massachusetts Department of Mental Health's activities
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involving organizing for and delivering mental health ser-
vices have moved into the sphere of politics and the
courts. The phenomenon has reached the point where legal
and budget initiated legislation have become the primary
determinants of the kind and quality of care offered.
Most of those directly involved in mental health, either
at the service delivery or administrative level
,
should
know well that they must blend political consideration
with their professional knowledge and skill.
It can be said with a large degree of assurance
that the Commissioner of Mental Health position in
Massachusetts since the early 1970 's has become more and
more politically sensitive. From the perceived requisite
of a psychiatrist-commissioner, the Department has moved
for the first time to a professional manager without a
medical degree, but with substantial lobbying and polit-
ical experience.
Vendor Involvement
Depopulation of the state hospital and the move
away from the medical model of treatment and essential
services under the guise of decentralization and beneath
the "human services" logo led, in a large part, to the
vendor system of private and essentially non-experienced
providers. The outcome has been that the most needj
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chronic and indigent population is receiving the least
professional service and have become "experiments" for a
social change movement.
From March 1978 to March 1981, during which time
deinstitutionalization in Massachusetts was supposedly at
its peak— in terms of discharging state hospital patients
—the State's Department of Mental Health was allocating
more dollars into vendor, community-based programs than
into state hospital budgets. Public records indicate that
a great deal of the "contracted" money was, and still is,
'line-itemed" for general administrative costs and salar-
ies; and there still remains the need for a clear defini-
tion of vendor accountability to DMH regarding mental
health contract monitoring in terms of dollars utilized
and quality / licensing of programs.
Nonprofessionals in Mental Health
The term "nonprofessional" refers to those staff
members who are involved in mental health direct-care ser-
vice at state hospitals or in community-based DMH or pri-
vate, contracted programs who do not have a college degree
in related mental health disciplines. Use of the term by
the writer is not intended to demean or degrade those so
employed.
It is intended, however, to present the fact that
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with de i ns t i t ut ion al i zat i on
,
there was the transfer of
hundreds of mental health assistance throughout the state
of Massachusetts, as well as the hiring of vendor staff
with similar qualifications, to work in community programs
—particularly in group residences and apartments. The
mental health system became "deprofessionalized" since it
changed from an emphasis upon the professionals
—
psychiat-
ric (M.D.'s), psychological (Ph.D.'s), and social work
(M.S.W.’s)— to those staff who are commonly referred to as
"para-professionals .
"
This movement has placed a great deal of responsi-
bility and stress on the personnel who entered the system
with no formal education in the field of mental health, and
who have been generally neglected by DMH in the area of in-
service training in a variety of categories, including
basic first aid, restraint and seclusion, and especially
legal and human civil rights. The majority of the "para-
professionals" are dedicated and caring on behalf of their
disabled patients on a shift-by-shift, day-by-day basis,
but the "burnout" rate is extensive, especially in group
residences. On the other hand, there are those who feel
that such personnel who accept a low pay scale and much
responsibility are either working in the system as a sec-
ond job" and/or have some sort of a "personal need" to per-
form such tasks.
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Although the "line-staff" allegedly work under the
required supervision and licenses of professionals such as
registered nurses, psychologists and social workers, it
does not alter the fact that "custodial care" at the state
hospitals has merely been transferred to the community.
There exists a dearth of therapeutic ongoing support ser-
vices resembling a professional treatment modality in a
majority of group residences. Except for a change of lo-
cation, many former chronic patients are not much better
off than they were at the hospital.
Continuity of Care
Chronically mentally handicapped are today found in
a variety of community residential settings—staffed homes
and apartments as well as "board and room" lodgings. They
appear to be merely places to "exist."
The residents in group homes are usually a mixed
or heterogeneous population. Former inpatients are usually
relocated to a residence according to a "vacancy" and not
according to a planned "individual service plan" ("ISP").
Categories of mental illness are therefore nonexistent and
stages of "normalization" are not pursued in a scientific
manner
.
Individual service plans which, under deinstitu-
tionalization should be common practice, in the peculiar
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situations in Massachusetts usually result from a court
mandate or an advocacy position. Efficient monitoring or
case management seldom occurs within the system without
the same pressure from the court, legal or public advocacy
groups
.
In general, deinstitutionalization planning has
not been conducive to clients' continuity of care. It has
too often taken place precipitately without the prior de-
velopment of necessary community-based follow-up services,
particularly for those clients who are most severely
handicapped. The result is that many clients have simply
"fallen through the cracks" of a fragmented service deliv-
ery system.
Review of the Target Population
The target population of deinstitutionalization is
presumably comprised of clients discharged from large pub-
lic institutions. Although these are the individual most
often associated with the term deinstitutionalization,
they made up only a portion of the total number of mentally
handicapped persons affected by the movement. There are
also numbers of never-institutionalized mentally handi-
capped individuals, who, as the direct result of deinsti-
tutionalization policies and practices, represent an ever
increasing percentage of the target population.
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The process of deinstitutionalization has also af-
fected services for those clients who, despite deinstitu-
tionalization efforts, continue to utilize public facili-
ties. These include the institutions' old long—stay, new
long-stay, and short-stay resident clients. All of these
subgroups represent fallout from the deinstitutionalization
movement and must be represented in deinstitutionalization
planning efforts.
In addition, there are numerous persons living in
the community who, though severely mentally ill, have never
entered the state system of mental health care. For exam-
ple, based upon national percentages, the Social Security
Administration estimates that there are approximately 518
persons in the Fall River catchment area who are receiving
SSI benefits for psychiatric disabilities. This group in-
cludes persons who have been treated in private psychiatric
facilities and have been discharged because of lack of in-
surance coverage, persons discharged from area general
hospitals with additional psychiatric problems, persons
who have been inappropriately placed in nursing homes, and
persons who, for reasons such as language barrier, family
opposition, or lack of knowledge about the availability of
treatment have not previously utilized the mental health
system.
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The Reality of CSP's at the Area Level
The Community Support Program model attempts to
provide a range of modalities to service a range of patient
needs. The hope was that the endeavor would be sufficient
so that services would be available in the community-based
programs to replace the support that a patient might seek
in returning to the hospital and thereby avert a readmis-
sion. Beyond this was the expectation that the quality of
life of the severely disabled patient would also be en-
hanced by the services so that his/her quality of life out-
side the hospital would exceed that of theirs when they
were "institutionalized."
Present evidence, including the experience in Fall
River, is insufficient to guarantee these outcomes, and any
CSP must be seen at this time as experimental in nature and
generative of data that will guide and direct future plan-
ning. In using hospital return as a criteria for program
efficacy, the only approaches that have any measurable
level of success are those programs that provide extensive
and aggressive services to the at-risk population outside
the context of the hospital. What is not known is the ex-
tent of sufficient services that would have to be provided
for this population to both prevent chronic recidivism as
well as to assure a reasonable quality of living.
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Numerous attempts were made at the state hospital
unit and the Corrigan Center in Fall River to install var-
ious preparatory courses in community living to the pre-
discharged chronic inpatients. The theory behind these
efforts was that patients would have a better chance of
remaining in the community if they had learned the set of
skills basic to survival in independent living. While
these demonstration efforts were successful in improving
the level of patient competence in everything from ironing
clothes to shopping for groceries and clothes, their suc-
cess rate, in the more important area of preventing re-
hospitalization, has been disappointingly low. Once again,
those working in the field of community mental health dis-
covered the difference between theory and reality, as well
as what appeared to be oversimplified prognoses such as
Caplan's (1972) which related that:
Despite (their) limitations, the vast majority of
the severely disabled population are only partially
disabled. They all have some recognizable strengths
which should be reinforced. Like the general pop-
ulation, these individuals need food, recreation,
transportation, medical care, and a personal sup-
port system.
A preventive and/or rehabilitation community support pro-
gram for the chronically disabled has been a more complex
problem and one in need of a costly, highly specialized
network of services.
221
Areas, regions, districts emphasized expanded and
new programs in an attempt to assure improved continuity
of patient care through the so-called decentralized system
as promulgated by the Central Office of DMH
. For the past
three fiscal years, although requested by the area admin-
istration, no new or expansion monies were appropriated by
the state legislature. The key committee members of the
Commonwealth's General Court were emphatic and unanimous
in their opinion that the Department of Mental Health,
statewide, was wasting hundreds of thousands of tax dollars
in the decentralization process--part icularly within the
private vendor system, which has traditionally been rather
loosely monitored programmatically and fiscally by the
Department. It became a certainty that the political cli-
mate at the state legislature had so turned against mental
health programs that any additional monies for the comple-
tion of the area CSP would not be seen. Meanwhile, exist-
ing elements continued to operate under extra strain with
diminished resources and very limited results.
Current Status
Common sense, that may have been ignored in the
initial euphoria of the deinstitutionalization movement,
would indicate that it is not a panacea for treatment of
the mentally ill. For some patients, no appropriate
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therapy now exists.
Long-term or chronic schizophrenics have been liv-
ing in a state of maladaptive passivity. These patients
are not returned from state hospitals or community mental
health centers to functional roles in the community.
Rather, they are maintained on tranquilizing drugs—with a
minimum of monitoring or aftercare, and with toxic and dis-
abling side effects such as tardive-dyskinesia—which in
itself requires ongoing evaluation and research. Their
ability to respond and understand the transactions and be-
havior requisite to anything approaching normal participa-
tion and involvement in community affairs are radically
diminished. For chronic and recedivist mental health pa-
tients, alleged treatment has been no different than that
which was attempted in the 1950’s with the exception of
"ice packs" and "straight- j ackets" which have been replaced
by drug therapy.
Severely mentally ill patients have become unoffi-
cial and government-sanctioned human "guinea pigs" on be-
half of pharmaceutical companies, drug salesmen and local
pharmacies. Decentralization has merely transferred the
allocation of federal and state monies to the private sec-
tor where entrepreneurs have gained additional income in
the group home and workshop business while the patients
show no significant improvement. Many of the chronically
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mentally ill, with their progressive conditions, have gone
beyond the power of any modern therapy, and we must accept
the fact that psychiatry is not now able to cure some forms
of severe emotional disability. Little can be offered be-
yond humane, custodial care.
Many community mental health planners have judged
that people are usually better off when they are cared for
within their communities, near families, friends, and
homes. This idea is based on the mis-assumpt ion that the
mentally ill—especially those who have spent many years
as a chronic population in public institutions— indeed have
an identifiable "community" with any known families (or
families who care and support), friends, and homes.
The guiding principles for the future of state hos-
pitals expounded by many authors are not exclusively appli-
cable to state hospital care. They are equally relevant
to the planning of decentralized community-based services
for the chronically mentally ill. This crossover is con-
sistent with a slow to develop evolution in the thinking
of many service providers who increasingly stress that the
principals of humane and effective treatment are far more
important than locational considerations. The biggest
irony is that by returning to the community, many former
patients have lost their only real community the hospital.
For all its faults, the hospital provided a place where
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they belonged. On the street, many of them have no place
at all. Freedom to be sick, helpless and isolated is not
freedom.
State hospitals need to redefine their role in the
deinstitutionalization/decentralization era so that they
are more than just havens or dumping grounds for those pa-
tients not served by the contemporary community mental
health delivery system. The goals and treatment strategies
should be congruent with the spirit of the Community Sup-
port System movement, but modified to be truly responsive
to those patients unable or unwilling to utilize treatment
programs in the community.
Two decades of experience with deinstitutionaliza-
tion and so-called decentralization policies have reaf-
firmed the integral role the hospital needs to play in the
delivery of services to a significant portion of the chron-
ically mentally disabled. Obviously, there will always be
a sizable group of patients whose treatment needs necessi-
tate a period of inpatient care. Such persons require in-
patient care not only for reasons of safety and protection,
but also to initiate a course of treatment that is respon-
sive to their needs.
I am not indicting, per se, innovative community
efforts, but rather allowing for observers to face the
question of whether hospitalization is as bad for the
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chronically mentally ill as they are portrayed to be. The
de ins t i tut ional izat ion movement, with the lack of adequate
planning and achievement of a decentralization process and
funding to accompany it, has illuminated the need for state
hospitals to develop models and concomitant treatment based
on more realistic, functional and enlightened perspectives
of the health care needs of the long-term mental patient.
Implicit in the objectives of deinstitutionaliza-
tion as it is generally understood was an expectation that
mental illness could indeed be prevented and that even
chronic patterns of severely disturbed behavior could be
altered. In the beginning, it was the "best of times"
with the highest functioning of the hospitalized patients
returning to communities and the most highly skilled and
motivated staff accompanying them, with adequate dollars
to accomplish the original programs. In less than ten
years, it became the "worst of times." The shortcomings
of the initial legislation, the broken promise of complete
decentralization and area autonomy, the lack of an ade-
quate system of follow-up care, the hard realities of in-
sufficient funding, and the uncertainties as to effective
therapy that continue to plague psychiatry must all be
reckoned with.
Now priorities must be established and the first
task is to provide sufficient places of habitation with
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proper care whether they be at the state hospitals or in
the community. New approaches to treatment should be un-
dertaken— "sans" heavy dosages of medication— and those
approaches must not ignore and thus jeopardize the individ-
ual life situation of patients whom the treatment presumes
to serve. It is essential that it is known who is being
treated, where in the network of services, with what suc-
cess or failure, and for what reasons.
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